[23] Plato, Lachês, 199 E. Οὐκ ἄρα εὐρήκαμεν, ἀνδρεία ὅ, τι ἔστιν.
Remarks. Warfare of Sokrates against the false persuasion of knowledge. Brave generals deliver opinions confidently about courage without knowing what it is.
Here ends the dialogue called Lachês, without any positive result. Nothing is proved except the ignorance of two brave and eminent generals respecting the moral attribute known by the name Courage: which nevertheless they are known to possess, and have the full sentiment and persuasion of knowing perfectly; so that they give confident advice as to the means of imparting it. “I am unaccustomed to debates like these” (says Lachês): “but I am piqued and mortified — because I feel that I know well what Courage is, yet somehow or other I cannot state my own thoughts in words.” Here is a description[24] of the intellectual deficiency which Sokrates seeks to render conspicuous to the consciousness, instead of suffering it to remain latent and unknown, as it is in the ordinary mind. Here, as elsewhere, he impugns the false persuasion of knowledge, and the unconscious presumption of estimable men in delivering opinions upon ethical and social subjects, which have become familiar and interwoven with deeply rooted associations, but have never been studied under a master, nor carefully analysed and discussed, nor looked at in their full generality. This is a mental defect which he pronounces to be universal: belonging not less to men of action like Nikias and Lachês, than to Sophists and Rhetors like Protagoras and Gorgias.
[24] Plato, Lachês, 194. Καίτοι ἀήθης γ’ εἰμὶ (Lachês) τῶν τοιούτων λόγων· ἀλλά τίς με καὶ φιλονεικία εἴληφε πρὸς τὰ εἰρημένα, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγανακτῶ, εἰ οὑτωσὶ ἂ νοῶ μὴ οἷός τ’ εἰμὶ εἰπεῖν· νοεῖν μὲν γὰρ ἔμοιγε δοκῶ περὶ ἀνδρείας ὅ, τι ἔστιν, οὐκ οἶδα δ’ ὅπῃ με ἄρτι διέφυγεν, ὥστε μὴ ξυλλαβεῖν τῷ λόγῳ αὐτὴν καὶ εἰπεῖν ὅ, τι ἔστιν.
Compare the Charmidês p. 159 A, 160 D, where Sokrates professes to tell Charmides, If temperance is really in you, you can of course inform us what it is.
No solution given by Plato. Apparent tendency of his mind, in looking for a solution. Intelligence — cannot be understood without reference to some object or end.
Here, as elsewhere, Plato (or the Platonic Sokrates) exposes the faulty solutions of others, but proposes no better solution of his own, and even disclaims all ability to do so. We may nevertheless trace, in the refutation which he gives of the two unsatisfactory explanations, hints guiding the mind into that direction in which Plato looks to supply the deficiency. Thus when Lachês, after having given as his first answer (to the question, What is Courage?) a definition not even formally sufficient, is put by Sokrates upon giving his second answer, — That Courage is intelligent endurance: Sokrates asks him[25] — “Yes, intelligent: but intelligent to what end? Do you mean, to all things alike, great as well as little?” We are here reminded that intelligence, simply taken, is altogether undefined; that intelligence must relate to something — and when human conduct is in question, must relate to some end; and that the Something, and the End, to which it relates, must be set forth, before the proposition can be clearly understood.
[25] Plato, Lachês, 192 D.
ἡ φρόνιμος καρτερία … ἴδωμεν δή, ἡ εἰς τι φρόνιμος· ἢ ἡ εἰς ἅπαντα καὶ τὰ μεγάλα καὶ τὰ σμικρά;