22 B: ἱκανὸς καὶ τέλεος καὶ πᾶσι φυτοῖς καὶ ζώοις αἱρετός, οἷσπερ δυνατὸν ἦν οὕτως ἀεὶ διὰ βίου ζῆν· εἰ δέ τις ἄλλα ᾑρεῖθ’ ἡμῶν, παρὰ φύσιν ἂν τὴν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς αἱρετοῦ ἐλάμβανεν ἄκων ἐξ ἀγνοίας ἤ τινος ἀνάγκης οὐκ εὐδαίμονος.
60 C, 61 A. 61 E: τὸν ἀγαπητότατον βίον. 64 C: τοῦ πᾶσι γεγονέναι προσφιλῆ τὴν τοιαύτην διάθεσιν. 67 A.
“Omnibus naturæ humanæ desideriis prorsus satisfacere” (Stallbaum ad Philêb. p. 18 D-E, page 139).
Pleasures are unlike to each other, and even opposite cognitions are so likewise.
Sokrates then remarks that pleasure is very multifarious and diverse: and that under that same word, different forms and varieties are signified, very unlike to each other, and sometimes even opposite to each other. Thus the intemperate man has his pleasures, while the temperate man enjoys his pleasures also, attached to his own mode of life: so too the simpleton has pleasure in his foolish dreams and hopes, the intelligent man in the exercise of intellectual force. These and many others are varieties of pleasure not resembling, but highly dissimilar, even opposite. — Protarchus replies — That they proceed from dissimilar and opposite circumstances, but that in themselves they are not dissimilar or opposite. Pleasure must be completely similar to pleasure — itself to itself. — So too (rejoins Sokrates) colour is like to colour: in that respect there is no difference between them. But black colour is different from, and even opposite to, white colour.[5] You will go wrong if you make things altogether opposite, into one. You may call all pleasures by the name pleasures: but you must not affirm between them any other point of resemblance, nor call them all good. I maintain that some are bad, others good. What common property in all of them, is it, that you signify by the name good? As different pleasures are unlike to each other, so also different cognitions (or modes of intelligence) are unlike to each other; though all of them agree in being cognitions. To this Protarchus accedes.[6] — We must enter upon our enquiry after The Good with this mutual concession: That Pleasure, which you affirm to be The Good — and Intelligence, which I declare to be so — is at once both Unum, and Multa et Diversa.[7]
[5] Plat. Philêb. p. 12 D-E.
[6] Plat. Philêb. pp. 13 D-E, 14 A.
[7] Plat. Philêb. p. 14 B.
Whether Pleasure, or Wisdom, corresponds to this description? Appeal to individual choice.
In determining between the two competing doctrines — pleasure on one side and intelligence on the other — Sokrates makes appeal to individual choice. “Would you be satisfied (he asks Protarchus) to live your life through in the enjoyment of the greatest pleasures? Would any one of us be satisfied to live, possessing the fullest measure and variety of intelligence, reason, knowledge, and memory — but having no sense, great or small, either of pleasure or pain?” And Protarchus replies, in reference to the joint life of intelligence and pleasure combined, “Every man will choose this joint life in preference to either of them separately. It is not one man who will choose it, and another who will reject it: but every man will choose it alike.”[8]