[8] Plato, Philêbus, p. 21 A. δέξαι’ ἂν σύ, Πρώταρχε, ζῆν τὸν βίον ἅπαντα ἡδόμενος ἡδονὰς τὰς μεγίστας; 21 D-E: εἴ τις δέξαιτ’ ἂν αὖ ζῆν ἡμῶν, &c. 22 A: Πᾶς δήπου τοῦτόν γε αἱρήσεται πρότερον ἢ ἐκείνων ὁποτερονοῦν, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις γε οὐχ ὁ μέν, ὁ δ’ οὔ. 60 D: εἴ τις ἄνευ τούτων δέξαιτ’ ἄν, &c.
Here again in appealing to the individual choice and judgment, the Platonic Sokrates indirectly recognises what, in the Theætêtus and other dialogues, we have seen him formally rejecting and endeavouring to confute — the Protagorean canon or measure. Protarchus is the measure of truth or falsehood, of belief or disbelief, to Protarchus himself: every other man is so to himself. Sokrates may be a wiser man, in the estimation of the public, than Protarchus; and if Protarchus believes him to be such, that very belief may amount to an authority, determining Protarchus to accept or reject various opinions propounded by Sokrates: but the ultimate verdict must emanate from the bosom of the acceptor or rejector. I have already observed elsewhere, that a large part of the conversation which the Platonic dialogues put into the mouth of Sokrates, is addressed to individualities and specialties of the other interlocutors: that this very power of discriminating between one mind and another, forms the great superiority of dialectic colloquy as compared with written treatise or rhetorical discourse — both of which address the same terms to a multitude of hearers or readers differing among themselves, without possibility of separate adaptation to each. (See above, [ch. xxvi. pp. 50-54], on Phædrus.)
First Question submitted to Protarchus — Intense Pleasure, without any intelligence — He declines to accept it.
The point, which Sokrates submits to the individual judgment of Protarchus, is — “Would you be satisfied to pass your life in the enjoyment of the most intense pleasures, and would you desire nothing farther?” The reply is in the affirmative. “But recollect (adds Sokrates) that you are to have nothing else. The question assumes that you are to be without thought, intelligence, reason, sight, and memory: you are neither to have opinion of present enjoyment, nor remembrance of past, nor anticipation of future: you are to live the life of an oyster, with great present pleasure?” The question being put with these additions, Protarchus alters his view, and replies in the negative: at the same time expressing his surprise at the strangeness of the hypothesis.[9]
[9] Plato, Philêbus, p. 21.
Such an hypothesis does indeed depart so totally from the conditions of human life, that it cannot be considered as a fair test of any doctrine. A perpetuity of delicious sensations cannot be enjoyed, consistent with the conditions of animal organization. A man cannot realise to himself that which the hypothesis promises; much less can he realise it without those accompaniments which it assumes him to renounce. The loss stands out far more palpably than the gain. It is no refutation of the theory of Philêbus; who, announcing pleasure as the Summum Bonum, is entitled to call for pleasure in all its varieties, and for exemption from all pains. Sokrates himself had previously insisted on the great variety as well as on the great dissimilarity of the modes of pleasure and pain. To each variety of pleasure there corresponds a desire: to each variety of pain, an aversion.
If the Summum Bonum is to fulfil the conditions postulated — that is, if it be such as to satisfy all human desires, it ought to comprise all these varieties of pleasure. It ought, e.g., to comprise the pleasures of self-esteem, and conscious self-protecting power, affording security for the future; it ought to comprise exemption from the pains of self-reproach, self-contempt, and conscious helplessness. These are among the greatest pleasures and pains of the mature man, though they are aggregates formed by association. Now the alternative tendered by Sokrates neither includes these pleasures nor eliminates these pains. It includes only the pleasures of sense; and it is tendered to one who has rooted in his mind desires for other pleasures, and aversions for other pains, besides those of sense. It does not therefore come up to the requirements fairly implied in the theory of Philêbus.
Second Question — Whether he will accept a life of Intelligence purely without any pleasure or pain? Answer — No.
Sokrates now proceeds to ask Protarchus, whether he will accept a life of full and all-comprehensive intelligence purely and simply, without any taste either of pleasure or pain. To which Protarchus answers, that neither he nor any one else would accept such a life.[10] Both of them agree that the Summum Bonum ought to be sought neither in pleasure singly, nor in intelligence singly, but in both combined.
[10] Plato, Philêbus, pp. 21-22.