CHAPTER XIII.
SEDAN.
German Decision.
While Strasburg was enduring the agonies of a siege and bombardment, and the “Army of the Rhine,” already oppressed by “la question des vivres,” was chafing in its restricted camps under the cannon of Metz; while Paris was quivering with excitement and barely restrained from bursting into open revolt, the victorious German host was closing steadily, yet swiftly, round the distracted and misguided Army of Chalons. It was pressed in so closely on the Belgian frontier that, during the afternoon of the 30th, before De Failly had been driven over the Meuse, Count Bismarck sent a formal communication to the German Minister at Brussels, in which he expressed a hope that, should MacMahon lead his soldiers across the boundary, the Belgian authorities would immediately deprive them of their arms. At night, in his quarters at Buzancy, King William sanctioned a decisive order to his son and the Saxon Prince. The troops were to march at dawn, attack the enemy wherever he could be found on the left and right bank of the Meuse, in order that he might be crushed up as much as possible between the river and the Belgian border. The Saxon Prince was to operate beyond the Meuse, with two Corps; the Prussian Prince on the front and left; movements designed to bar the road to Montmédy, prevent any attempt to recross the river, and, eventually, to interpose the German left wing between the French and Mézières. “Should the adversary enter Belgium and not be immediately disarmed, he is to be followed at once without waiting for fresh orders.” These were not the final instructions which led to the investment of an Army, but they prepared the way towards, and foreshadowed the accomplishment of that astonishing result.
Confusion in the French Camp.
Marshal MacMahon, perplexed, but not dismayed, by the events of the 30th, remained for some time in doubt. “I do not know what I shall do,” said the Marshal early in the evening to Ducrot’s aide-de-camp. “In any case, the Emperor should at once start for Sedan.” At that time the Emperor was in the camp of Ducrot, who, instructed to protect the retreat of the Army either by Douzy or by Carignan, that is, towards Sedan or Montmédy, had divided his Corps between those two places. At a later period, when darkness had set in, MacMahon, seated at a bivouac fire, on the heights above Mouzon, sent for General Lebrun, and directed him to retreat, at once, upon Sedan, not by the highway, which was crowded with fugitives and wagons, but by cross roads leading upon Douzy. “We have had a bad time,” said the Marshal, “but the situation is not hopeless. At the most, the German Army before us cannot exceed in numbers sixty or seventy thousand men. If they attack us, so much the better; we shall be able, doubtless, to fling them into the Meuse.” The Marshal, who never spared himself, and seemed to live without sleep, rode back to Sedan, and Lebrun, stumbling along devious tracks, in the darkness, and apparently in dubious military array, fearing all the time that he might be attacked, entered Douzy at eight in the morning, and did not reach Bazeilles, his destination, until ten o’clock.
Meantime Ducrot, embarrassed by the presence of the Emperor, awaited anxiously, at Carignan, the final orders of MacMahon. He respectfully urged His Majesty to depart by train for Sedan, but the Emperor refused—“he wished to be with the Corps which covered the retreat.” He was astonished and incredulous when the rout before Mouzon was described. “It is impossible,” he repeatedly exclaimed, “our positions were magnificent!” In the night he vanished from Carignan; and it was only some hours after he had gone that Ducrot was informed of his departure by train. The General then, in concert with Margueritte, whose cavalry were on the Chiers, resolved to retreat in the morning, without waiting longer for orders, and to move upon Illy, because he assumed that MacMahon would certainly direct the Army on Mézières. He was mistaken. On reaching Villers-Cernay, about four in the afternoon of the 31st, Ducrot learned that he was to retire upon Sedan, and not upon Mézières, “whither I have not any intention of going,” said the Marshal’s despatch. In fact, the two Divisions of the 1st Corps, left at Douzy on the 30th, had been already ordered to retire on the Givonne. Lebrun, whom we saw follow in their wake, after his painful night march, did not destroy the bridge over the Chiers; so that, when he was passing Francheval, Ducrot actually saw the enemy—they were Saxon horsemen—issuing from the village, and cutting in upon the baggage and transport trains.
On that memorable 30th, when the Emperor informed the Empress by telegram, from Carignan, that there had been an “engagement of no great importance,” an officer destined to be conspicuous, dropped in upon the Army; it was De Wimpffen. He has been defined by General Lebrun, who was with him at St. Cyr, as a man of firm will, and “an unlimited confidence in his own capacity.” Indeed, he had come to restore victory. When he passed through Paris, the Comte de Palikao was good enough to tell him—so he writes, although Palikao “thinks” he could not have so expressed himself—that MacMahon chimed in too easily with the suggestions of the Emperor, which was not the fact; that His Majesty was in a false position, and that he caused the greatest embarrassment. “Send me to the Army,” said De Wimpffen, “I shall impart the needed boldness and decision.” So he was sent to supersede De Failly in command of the 5th Corps, carrying in his pocket a letter which authorized him to succeed MacMahon in command of the Army, should any accident befall the Marshal. It was this audacious personage who supervened on the 30th, and to his horror, found the Army he might have to guide and govern, falling to pieces under his eyes. He met troops in flight from Mouzon; they were frightened, famished, and could hardly be persuaded that the “Prussians” were not at their heels. As evidence of the reigning disorder, De Wimpffen says that he collected on the 30th, three regiments belonging to the 5th, 7th, and 12th Corps, some squadrons of De Failly’s cavalry, and several hundreds of men belonging to the 1st Corps, who obeyed a non-combatant officer. The General led them during the night to Sedan. A like confusion prevailed on all sides, as the soldiers, hungry and thoroughly wearied, fell asleep as they dropped on the ground in their dreary bivouacs.
The Emperor entered Sedan about midnight. The Marshal urged him to embark afresh in the train, and seek security in Mézières, where General Vinoy was expected, and where he did, indeed, arrive that night with the advance guard of one division of the 13th Corps. The Emperor refused to quit Sedan, but the Prince Imperial had been sent away. The movement of Vinoy was delayed several hours, because a train running to Avesnes, and bearing the young Prince, “his baggage, his escort, and his suite,” barred the way to Mézières.