Imperial Federation: The Problem of National Unity

by George R. Parkin

No one who considers the geographical position of the Cape, and its relation to the greatest trade route of the Empire, can regard these utterances as exaggerated. The Cape is, and must always be, one of the greatest turning places of the world's commerce. Between St. Helena and Mauritius for the Indian bound ships, between St. Helena and King George's Sound for those going towards the Southern seas, the Cape is the only sufficient resting-place that European ships can find.

'As a vessel steaming from British ports for India, or China, or Australia, in time of war begins to approach the point of exhaustion of its coal supply it finds itself in a region of storms, far from any shelter except that at the Cape of Good Hope. The position of that refuge, and the certainty of being able to deny it to an enemy, combined with the command of the Red Sea route, even if only for the purpose of stopping it, draws therefore, on behalf of England, an almost impassable line on this side of the globe {235} between the Eastern and the Western Hemispheres. The difficulty which our ownership of the Cape places in the way of possible opponents, even more than the refuge afforded to our ships, constitutes in war the supreme advantage of the possession of the Cape of Good Hope as a naval station[1].'

Such being the relation of South Africa to the Empire, such the importance of its remaining under the British flag, we may well ask, with some anxiety, whether the feelings of its people and the interests of the colony point in the same direction.

The attitude of the leading men of South Africa towards the idea of national unity is clearly defined. Mr. Hofmeyer, the leader of the Dutch or Afrikander party, at the colonial conference of 1887, brought forward, and earnestly pressed upon the assembled delegates, a scheme for 'promoting a closer union between the various parts of the British Empire by means of an imperial tariff of customs.' His words indicate the temper of mind in which he addresses himself to the question: 'I have taken this matter in hand with two objects: to promote the union of the Empire, and at the same time to obtain revenue for the purpose of general defence.'

Sir Gordon Sprigg, for many years Premier of Cape Colony, speaking in London in 1891, strongly advocated a similar policy, and was urgent, to quote his own words, 'that an invitation should be addressed to the governments of the various colonies and dependencies {236} to send representatives to this country to consider, in a conference, the practicability of forming a commercial union between the different parts of the Empire,' regarding this as the most effectual way of accomplishing what he considered should be the aim of national statesmanship, viz. the unification of national interests.

The present Premier of Cape Colony, and the most influential man in South Africa, Mr. Cecil Rhodes, has stated that he looks upon the consolidation of the different colonies of South Africa as the main aim of his political life, but at the same time his utterances, from the beginning of his political career to the present moment, indicate conclusively that he only thinks of a united South Africa as an integral part of a united Empire, so constituted as to give adequate expression to the aims of its various members. It is interesting to find that these three men, who may be taken as representing the different sides of South African feeling, all eminently practical, and all above a suspicion of subjecting the interest of the colony to the interest of the nation at large, are agreed in the belief that the best future for their country is close association with the mother-land, and the Empire. And looking at the facts of the situation, from a South African point of view, who can doubt that they are justified? Pressing upon British South Africa on all sides are the nations of Europe. France is in Madagascar. Bordering on British territories are those of Germany and Portugal. {237} The Dutch Republics, as yet only half won to friendliness and sympathy, are close at hand. Large native populations—which do not fade away, as in America, New Zealand, or Australia at the approach of the white man, but rather multiply under influences which make for peace—are all around. The development of a great continent overflowing with stores of wealth depends not only on the energy of the men who have the work directly in hand, but on the confidence they feel that behind them is the diplomacy of a powerful nation to maintain their rights, the wealth of a rich nation to furnish them with capital, the strength of a great people to secure them, in emergency, from disaster.

If the British connection seems of such significance to South African statesmen, in working out the future of their vast country, quite as much does the Empire require the constant advice of those statesmen in directing the difficult diplomacy and making the critical decisions which the control of so much of the continent necessitates. The lack of such advice, directly and consistently sought, is probably at the root of much of the difficulty of the past. In the long run South African opinion must dominate national policy in South Africa. That it should be expressed in an authoritative form, and under a due sense of national responsibility, are the conditions which will make it most helpful, and most reliable.

Sir Gordon Sprigg and other public men from the Cape have pointed out to me how peculiar are the {238} problems which arise in South African politics, how much they stand apart from Anglo-Saxon experience in other parts of the world, how impossible it is for anyone who has not to deal with these problems on the spot to understand them. Here, if anywhere, the maxim is true to which I have alluded in another place, that 'only those who know a country are fitted to rule it.' It is only by utilizing the knowledge and experience of the best minds of the country that adequate direction can be given to its external relations as to its internal government.

The actual and contingent stake which Great Britain, Australia and other parts of the Empire have in the exclusive use of the Cape as a naval station in time of war may be roughly outlined in figures. Lord Brassey, dwelling upon the importance to the nation of completing the fortification and equipment of the neighbouring harbours, mentions in the Naval Annual for 1890, that at present about £90,000,000 worth of commerce centres at or passes this point every year, including £20,000,000 of outward trade to Australia, £13,000,000 to the Cape itself, and portions of the Indian, Chinese and other Eastern trade which make up the whole. This is under normal conditions. But should the Suez Canal be closed, and it is difficult to see how in a great European war this could be prevented, unless England could obtain and maintain absolute naval control of the Mediterranean, and military control of Egypt, then at least £150,000,000, and possibly £200,000,000 of {239} British trade would be forced to go round the Cape. I have mentioned elsewhere Lord Dufferin's statement, to the London Chamber of Commerce, that if anything ever occurred to take away our control of the Indian markets there is not a cottage in the manufacturing districts of England which would not feel the blow at once. If this be true of the Indian trade alone, the argument becomes much more impressive when applied to the risks which would be incurred, alike by Britain, India, and Australia if they were compelled to depend for the security of the whole vast volume of Eastern and Australian commerce upon such neutral rights as could be granted by an independent South Africa, or if they left the Cape in such a position that it could be seized by a hostile power. We have an interesting historical illustration of what security on this great trade route means in the fact, stated on apparently reliable authority, that between the years 1793 and 1797, when the French held the Isle of France and Bourbon, no less than 2266 British merchantmen were seized by French ships or expeditions sallying out from those stations. So intolerable did the situation become for British commerce that the conquest of the French stations became an absolute necessity, and this was effected in 1810 when a new outbreak of war had made like disaster imminent. Yet this was before the vast trade of Australasia had come into existence, and when our trade with the East was but a trifle compared with its present great proportions.

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