In the case of South Africa, however, the argument for national unity is so strong that few undertake to question it. Not long since, in the Manchester Reform Club, I met a sincere disciple of the old school of thinkers on colonial policy. He had studied the question under Mr. Goldwin Smith, at Toronto, and was at first concisely and comprehensively dogmatic in his assertion that the only plan for England was not only to permit, but to encourage, each of the great colonies to become independent as soon as possible. He was an honest thinker, and one could with him afford to stake the argument on a candid answer to a single question. 'Could Great Britain, with any regard to the safety of her national position, afford to give up South Africa'? The emphatic negative which, after a moment's thought, he gave, was the only reply possible for one who acknowledged the force of facts when presented to his mind.
THE WEST INDIES.
The present and contingent relation of the British West Indies to the problem of national defence, and therefore of national unity, is more direct than at first sight may appear. No portion of the Empire was won at greater expense of prolonged conflict than the West Indian Islands, but their relative commercial importance was temporarily diminished by the occupation of other tropical countries, and the substitution of the {241} beet-root sugar of temperate climates for that of the cane. West Indian trade, which has found out many new directions, is still, however, important, and not for the United Kingdom alone, but for the Canadian Dominion as well. Canada and the West Indies are the complement of each other in natural production, and a very large trade is sure to grow up between them as they develop in wealth and population. The Dominion has, therefore, a deep interest in the power of the Empire to protect commerce such as is given by stations like Bermuda, St. Lucia and Kingston. Halifax has already been connected with Bermuda by a telegraph cable. The West Indian islands and Naval Stations at present depend for communication upon lines passing through the United States. The continuation of the Halifax-Bermuda cable to the West Indies would give an independent electric connection between all the British possessions in America. This might become a very distinct addition to the resources of our naval system.
The completion of any means of ship communication across the Isthmus of Panama would increase indefinitely the importance to the Empire of the West Indies. Australia would have at once the same kind of interest in the strength of the national position there which she now has in our possession of the Cape, or in our control of Aden and Malta. Through this new channel would probably flow the main flood of British commerce with the western coasts of North and South America. It would furnish the easiest line of {242} naval communication between the Eastern and Western coasts of Canada.
Thus for the needs of the present and the contingencies of the future the retention of the British West Indies under the national flag gives strength to our general system of defence.
The completion of telegraphic and steam communication between the principal islands has brought the question of local federation within the range of serious discussion, but the obstacles, social as well as physical, are naturally much greater than in the case of Canada and Australia, and the accomplishment of union may be for some time delayed. The islands could not well be independent in any case, and there is probably no part of the Empire which would lend itself more readily than the West Indies to national consolidation.
[1] Problems of Greater Britain, vol. ii. p. 521.
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