[129]. Meletæ are properly “complete declamations,” not, as are the Progymnasmata, exercises in parts of oratory, The others are some of these parts only.
[130]. This is an early example of the confusion and cross-division which has infested formal Rhetoric to the present day. For the first three heads are purely material, the last two grammatical-formal; so that, instead of ranking side by side, each of 1, 2, 3 should rank under each of 4, 5. Cf. Professor Bain’s Rhetoric, vol. i., where similar cross-division more than once occurs.
[131]. χρεῖαι, rather “maxims” than “uses” in the theological sense. Hermogenes exhausts his special gift in distinguishing them from the more general maxim or γνώμη.
[132]. The ἠθοποΐια above referred to. It has a special reference to the drawing-up of speeches suitable to such and such a character in such and such a situation.
[133]. Description of the graphic and picturesque kind.
[134]. Subject or question in the wide sense.
[135]. Speaking of Walz’s order: I have little doubt myself that he preceded Aphthonius in time.
[136]. δεινὸς and δεινότης are good examples of the difficulty of getting exact English equivalents for Greek rhetorical terms. Some prefer “vehemence” or “intensity,” but neither of these will suit universally. The word seems to refer to the orator’s power of suiting his method to his case, to alertness and fertility of resource.
[137]. “Distribution of the indictment”; “preliminary statement”; “acknowledgment with justification”; “introduction to narrative,” are attempts at Englishings of these.
[138]. Quintilian adds quæstio and quod in quæstione appareat to these, and explains στάσις itself as so called vel ex eo quod ibi sit primus causæ congressus vel quod in hoc causa consistat. The kinds and sub-kinds of στάσεις were luxuriously wallowed in: and ὁρικὴ, and στοχαστικὴ, negotialis and comparativus, with a dozen others, can be investigated by those who choose.