A Handbook of Ethical Theory

by George Stuart Fullerton

So long as the motives which impel him to get, to avoid, to be, or to do, something, do not include, except as means to some ulterior end, the desire or will of his fellow-man, there appears no reason to deny him the title of "Egoist." Nor need we deny him the title because he may be unconscious of his egoism. There are unconscious egoists who are wholly absorbed in the individual objects which are the end of their strivings. They may be quite unaware that they are ruled by self-interest, when it is clear to the spectator that such is the case. [Footnote: James, Psychology, Vol. I, chapter x, pp. 319-321; a baby is characterized as "the completest egoist.">[ But the philosophical egoist must rise to a higher plane of reflection.

There are, thus, egoisms of many sorts, and they may urge men to very different courses of conduct. Some of them may pass over more naturally than others into forms of doctrine which are not egoistic at all. He who aims at a maximum of pleasure for himself is likely to remain an egoist; he whose ambition is to be a patron of science or a philanthropist, may, it is true, remain within the circle of the self, but it is quite possible that his ulterior aim may come to be forgotten and his real interest be transferred to the enlightenment of mankind or to the relief of suffering.

It is especially worthy of remark that in judging a system of doctrine we must take it as a whole, and not confine ourselves to a few utterances of the man who urges it, however unequivocal they may appear when taken in isolation. He whose motive to action is always some idea of his own personal good is an egoist. But a philosopher may hold that human motives are always of this sort, and yet reveal unmistakably, both in his life and in his writings, that he is not really an egoist at all. In which case, we may tax him with more or less inconsistency, but we should not misconceive him.

102. THE ARGUMENTS FOR EGOISM.—So much for the forms of egoism. It remains to enquire what may be urged in favor of the doctrine, and what may be said against it.

(1) It has been urged that egoism is inevitable. This, to be sure, can scarcely be regarded as an argument that a man ought to be an egoist, for there seems little sense in telling a man that he ought to do what he cannot possibly help doing. But the argument may be used to deter us from advocating some other ethical doctrine.

"On the occasion of every act that he exercises," says Bentham, "every human being is led to pursue that line of conduct which, according to his view of the case, taken by him at the moment, will be in the highest degree contributory to his own greatest happiness." [Footnote: The Constitutional Code. Introduction, Sec 2.]

From this we might conclude, not only that every man is an egoist, but also that every man is at all times a prudent and calculating egoist— which seems to flatter grossly the drunkard and the excited man laying about him in blind fury. But one may hold that egoism is inevitable without going so far. [Footnote: Psychological Hedonism, the doctrine that "volition is always determined by pleasures or pains actual or prospective," need not be thus exaggerated. See SIDGWICK's Methods of Ethics, I, iv, Sec 1.]

(2) The egoistic ideal may be urged upon us on the ground that it addresses itself to man as natural and reasonable.

Thus, the Cyrenaics saw in the fact that we are from our childhood attracted to pleasure, and, when we have attained it, seek no further, a proof that pleasure is the chief good. [Footnote: Diogenes Laertius, II, "Aristippus," Sec 8.] Paley maintains that, when it has been pointed out that private happiness has been the motive of an act, "no further question can reasonably be asked." [Footnote: Moral Philosophy, II, Sec 3.] Our citations from Hobbes and Bentham and Green reveal that these writers never think of giving reasons why a man should seek his own good.

And various moralists, who do not make self-interest the one fundamental principle which should rule human conduct, are evidently loath to make of it a principle subordinate to some other. Bishop Butler, who maintains that virtue consists in the pursuit of right and good as such, yet holds that: "When we sit down in a cool hour, we can neither justify to ourselves this nor any other pursuit till we are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or at least not contrary to it." [Footnote: Sermon XI.] Clarke, who dwells upon the eternal and immutable obligations of morality "incumbent on men from the very nature and reason of things themselves" teaches that it is not reasonable for men to adhere to virtue if they receive no advantage from it. [Footnote: Boyle Lectures, 1705, Prop. I.]