The moral here seems to be that, whatever else a man ought to do, he ought to seek his own advantage—real self-sacrifice cannot be his duty. This conviction of the unreasonableness of self-sacrifice reveals itself in another form in the doctrine that morality cannot be made completely rational unless a reconciliation between prudence and benevolence can be found; [Footnote: SIDGWICK, The Methods of Ethics, concluding chapter, Sec 5.] and in the labored attempts to show that the good of the individual must actually coincide with that of the community. [Footnote: E. g. GREEN, Prolegomena to Ethics, Sec Sec 244-245. Aristotle tries to prove that he who dies for his country is impelled by self-love. He does what is honorable, and thus "gives the greater good to himself." Ethics, Book IX, chapter viii.] It may be questioned whether the same conviction did not lurk in the back of the mind of that sternest of moralists, Kant, who denied that happiness ought to be sought at all, and yet found so irrational the divorce of virtue and happiness that he postulated a God to guarantee their union. [Footnote: The Critique of the Practical Reason, chapter ii.]
Thus, moralists of widely different schools agree in recognizing that self-interest is a principle that should not be placed second to any other. The confessed egoist only goes a step further in recognizing it as a principle that has no rival. And that men generally are inclined to regard egoism as not unnatural seems evinced by the fact that for apparently altruistic actions they are very apt to seek ulterior egoistic motives, while, if the action seems plainly egoistic, they seek no further.
Does, then, anything seem more natural than egoism? and, if natural, may it not be assumed to be proper and right?
(3) Finally, it may be urged that he who serves his own interests at all intelligently has, at least, a comprehensive aim, and does not live at random. In so far, egoism appears to be rational in a sense dwelt on above; [Footnote: Sec Sec 55-56] it harmonizes and unifies the impulses and desires of the man.
103. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST EGOISM.—What may be said against egoism?
(1) Enough has been said above to show that egoism is not inevitable, but that men actually are influenced by motives which cannot be regarded as egoistic. It is, hence, not necessary to dwell upon this point.
(2) As to the naturalness of egoism. Both the professional moralist and the man in the street may hesitate to admit that a man should neglect his own interests, and may find it natural that he should cultivate them assiduously. But it is only the exceptional man who maintains that he should have nothing else in view.
There are individuals so constituted that self-interest makes to them a peculiarly strong appeal. Others, more social by nature, may be misled by psychological theory to maintain that a man's chief and only end is his own "satisfaction." [Footnote: See below, chapter xxvi, 3.] Still others, realizing that both one's own interests and the interests of one's neighbor are natural and seemingly legitimate objects of regard, are perplexed as to the method of reconciling their apparently conflicting claims, and are betrayed into inconsistent utterances.
But it is too much to say that the professional moralist and the plain man normally regard pure egoism with favor and find it natural. In spite of our cynical maxims and our inclination to seek for ulterior motives for apparently altruistic acts, we abhor the thorough-going egoist, and we are not inclined to look upon the phenomena, let us say, of the family life, as manifestations of self-seeking.
It is worth while to remark that, even if the approach to the Cyrenaic ideal were so common as not to seem wholly unnatural, that would not prove that it ought to be embraced; it is natural for men to err, but that does not make error our duty.