III. We may say that we perceive the same object (complex of mental elements) at two different times, when we do not mean that what is actually experienced on the two occasions is the same in either of the preceding senses; but only that the two experiences are terms in a certain series, the whole of which may be regarded as represented by any part. In this sense does one see the same tree on two succeeding days.
IV. Any two mental elements or complexes of mental elements in consciousness at the one time may be called the same to mark the fact that they are alike.
V. Any mental element or complex of mental elements may be called the same with its representative, whether this representative resemble it or not.
VI. When a man has learned from experience of his own body (as a thing immediately known) that a consciousness of his body in a certain peculiar relation to a given object (complex of mental elements) is a presupposition to a consciousness of the object, and wishes to mark the fact that he is perceiving or imagining two human bodies in this relation to a single object, and connecting in thought with each of them a picture of the object, he may say that he is perceiving or imagining two men seeing the same object. This sense of the word same obviously expresses quite a complex thought.
VII. In addition to these kinds of sameness found within the sphere of the immediately known, we obtain one kind by stepping beyond it, which, since we step beyond it, so to speak, with only one foot, may be here mentioned as belonging at least partially to the world of immediate objects. When we have come to believe that things in consciousness have their correlates in a world outside of consciousness, we may speak of the things in consciousness as the same with their "external" correlates; or, at any rate, we may talk of them as if they were the same in some sense of the word which will allow us to include the two (or three) distinct things under one name, and treat them as one. This is constantly done. The importance of remembering that we have really more than one thing to consider, it would seem scarcely necessary to emphasize. How far this is really a new kind of sameness I discussed at some length.
After having marked these seven kinds of sameness as having to do with the immediately known, I proceeded to consider the kinds of sameness which may obtain in a world or worlds beyond consciousness. It was pointed out that one may look upon the "external" in three ways. One may believe in "external" things as merely bundles of "real" qualities, and may stop there: or one may believe in such bundles of "real" qualities, and in addition hold to "substance" or "substratum" as an obscure something implied by these "real" qualities: or, lastly, one may hold that the only correlate of the thing in consciousness is "noumenon," a thing not distinguishable from the "substance" above mentioned.
It was then shown that a realm of "external" things, consisting of bundles of "real" qualities in a world beyond consciousness, would, since it is to the man thinking it merely a duplicate of the immediate world, admit of the existence of all the kinds of sameness above enumerated, and would not furnish any one kind which might increase the list. And with respect to the "external" as noumenon, it was stated that if the noumenal be represented to the mind at all, at least the first kind of sameness must be attributed to it, and that other kinds will be, in proportion to the degree of clearness allowed this vague and inconsistent entity. No new kind of sameness need, however, be looked for in this field. If one hold to the "external" in both kinds, he must, of course, search three distinct realms of being before he can be sure that he has not overlooked any legitimate sense of the word same. As a result of the foregoing analysis we may maintain that, whatever be his belief as to ideas, things, and noumena, his search will not result in more than the seven kinds of sameness I have given. In the assumed new fields we find mere repetition. The pure Idealist would reduce the list to six by dropping off the seventh kind altogether.
Next, as to the sameness of the Self or Ego. It was pointed out that one may take the word self to mean: (1) the self in consciousness, or as phenomenon; (2) the self as bundle of "real" qualities out of consciousness; (3) the self as "substance" or "noumenon;" (4) two of these, or all of these, taken together.
It was said that as the fourth sense is sufficiently discussed in examining the first three, it would not be separately considered. The three remaining senses were then taken up in reverse order. The third and the Second were found to furnish no new kind of sameness, and to be on a par with the corresponding senses of the word "not-self," except as touching the sixth kind of sameness. As respects this, it was admitted that no one would speak of two men as perceiving the same self, whether as bundle of "real" qualities or as noumenon. It was remarked, however, that this is due not to a difference in the self and not-self in themselves considered, but to a difference in their relation to other things in a consciousness.
The self in consciousness, or as immediately known, was then discussed. It was stated that we may safely assume this to be either a part or the whole of consciousness, or the one or the other of these in some peculiar aspect or relation. Self, viewed as a part of consciousness, was found to furnish no new kind of sameness, and was found to admit of all the kinds discovered except the sixth; this one being inadmissible from the fact that when we make the self a part of consciousness we always make it the subjective part and not the objective. Self, viewed as the whole of consciousness, was likewise found to furnish no new kind of sameness, and it was found to admit of all the seven kinds discovered—even of the sixth, though in a modified way, since this kind can belong only to a part of the self, the objective part, which is in some sense common and impersonal. It may, to be sure, be objected that it would be contrary to common usage to speak of two men as seeing the same self in any sense of that word; but in making the self the whole of consciousness one has already abandoned the common standpoint, and one may as well be consistent in carrying out the consequences. Assuming the self to be not a part or the whole of consciousness simply, but regarded in some peculiar aspect or relation, was not found to be significant as concerns kinds of sameness.