It still remained to consider a possible position; that of the man who distinguishes between the formal and the material element in consciousness, and identifies self or mind with the former. The formal element of consciousness is not a part of consciousness as the word part is commonly used, nor is it the whole of consciousness, in the ordinary acceptation of the word whole. And though this view might very well have been brought under a former head by stretching a little the meaning of the word part, yet such is its importance that I chose rather to omit it when discussing self as a part of consciousness (there using the word part in a limited sense), and to take it up later by itself.
It was insisted that if the formal element in consciousness is enough of a thing to be distinguished from something else, and to be discussed, it is enough of a thing to admit of distinctions and differences much as other things do. After examination it appeared, as a matter of fact, that there is no reason why the believer in "form" should not attribute to it all of the seven kinds of sameness before described—even (in the modified way described a moment ago) the sixth kind. And it also appeared that no new kind of sameness is discoverable in this field. With this closed the search for samenesses.
It will be observed that we have passed in review the self and the not-self as immediately known, the self and the not-self as bundles of "real" qualities out of consciousness, and the self and the not-self as noumenon or substance. I know of no other field in which the search may be prosecuted, unless such be invented gratuitously by increasing the "layers" of being in a way no one seems inclined to increase them. And in view of the fact that the samenesses found in any "layer" below the first seem to be only repetitions of what we find in that one, we could have no reason to hope that any such needless increase in strata could add a single new kind of sameness to those described.
Sec. 19. Now that we have obtained a list of the different kinds of sameness, we may pass our eye over it with a view to discovering what the various kinds have in common, and what is the reason that we express such diverse experiences by the use of the one word. Such an examination reveals the fact that the common notion which unites them is the idea of similarity. In some cases this notion lies more in the foreground than in others, but in all cases it is present, and forms the bond of union. I will run through the list and point this out, beginning, however, with the second kind, and reserving the first for discussion after the others.
II. A mere mention of the second kind of sameness is, in this connection, sufficient. Two mental experiences are there avowedly called the same to mark similarity.
III. When we speak of the same object as perceived on two occasions, we do not, as has been noticed, mean that what is actually in the sense at the two different times is similar. Nevertheless, we find here, too, the notion of similarity, for the two experiences are not considered merely in themselves, but as elements in a group or series, and as each representing the whole series. When, therefore, we have the two experiences, we regard ourselves as having in them two experiences of the one series; which means, to be more explicit, that we have in mind on the two occasions two complexes which are similar, and which, when thought of together, are related to each other as the memory image and its original are related. Here the likeness lies in what is represented, not in the representatives.
IV. As in the second kind of sameness, so in the fourth, the reference to similarity is unmistakable. We call qualities or things the same when they are of the one kind, when they are observed to resemble each other.
V. The relation of representative and thing represented evidently implies the notion of similarity. It is quite true that we often recognize as in this relation things that we do not think of as being similar at all, and yet a little reflection will show that one thing can stand for another only in so far as it resembles it. The resemblance may lie in the qualities of the things in themselves considered, or it may lie in external relations of which the things are capable, or functions which they may serve. The very notion of a proxy is a something which, for the purpose in hand, may be regarded as capable of assuming the functions of another. In so far as it can do this it is like the other. Things wholly different (if things could be wholly different) could not represent each other.
VI. When a man thinks of two other men as perceiving the same object, he must recognize, if he reflect, that he has in mind a picture of the object, of two human bodies in a peculiar relation to it, and two images of the object somehow connected with these bodies. He need not think of these images as wholly resembling his picture of the object or each other. He does, indeed, make them more or less like his picture of the object, but what is prominent in his mind is the thought of them as representatives, as related to and giving information concerning the object. I say concerning the object, but this phrase is ambiguous. If the man under discussion believes in "real" objects in an extra-consciousness world, he will look upon the images as representing such a "real" object; though, of course, his guarantee for this "real" object, and all his information concerning, it must be found in his picture of the object, and this, or its copy, will stand for the "real" object in any mental complex he may construct. If the man be an Idealist, accepting only what can be found in a consciousness, he will look upon the two images as related to his picture of the object and representative of that. In any case he must regard them as representatives, and in this sense the same with the thing they represent. The notion of similarity which is at the bottom of this idea of representative and thing represented is then implied in sameness of the sixth kind also.
VII. And since those who distinguish between the immediate and the mediate objects of knowledge make the former representative of the latter, we have evidently this implied notion of similarity in the seventh kind of sameness as well as in the sixth. The mediate object is said to be known through the immediate: that is, the qualities and relations of the one are made to stand for and serve in place of the qualities and relations of the other. This they can do, of course, only in so far as the two sets of qualities and relations are similar. It is easy enough to see that this notion of similarity is present when we think of an idea or complex of ideas as representing a "real" thing beyond consciousness, and giving information concerning it. When, however, we sublimate our "real" thing into a noumenon and strip it of the determinations which, taken together, make up our idea of a thing, we destroy, if we are consistent and thorough-going, all notion of similarity between the two; but in doing this we destroy our noumenon altogether. If, for instance, we refuse to allow to our notion of a thing "any qualitative or quantitative expression whatever," we cannot think of the thing as having reality or existence, or any mark by which it is to be distinguished from nothing at all. In this case the idea is no longer representative, for it has nothing to represent. If, on the other hand, we do not wholly destroy the noumenon, but still allow it a diluted existence of an indefinite kind, in so far as it has this, and can be represented in mind at all, it resembles the idea, and just so far may the idea stand as its representative.