Our constitutional right to appropriate this money is unquestionable. Whilst I express this opinion, I am sorry that the present appropriation is not more specific in its objects. Appropriation bills ought to be passed in such a manner as to leave as little to executive discretion as possible. The purposes for which the money is to be applied ought to be clearly and distinctly stated. If there were time to do it, the bill might be improved in this respect. But, sir, this is an extraordinary crisis, and demands prompt action. We must now take it as it is, or not take it at all. There is no time left to make the changes which might be desired.
Gentlemen have contended that, under this appropriation, the President would be authorized to increase the army, and appoint as many new officers to command it as he thought proper. But this is not the case. He could not, under any just construction of this bill, raise a single new company, or appoint a single officer, not authorized by existing laws. No such power is conferred upon him by its terms. It will authorize him to expend three millions of the public money, should the contingency happen which it contemplates, for putting the vessels of war now in ordinary in a condition for actual service, and for completing those the building of which has already been authorized by Congress. The money may also be applied to the completion and repair of our fortifications, and in placing them in a state of security and defence against any attack. Should it become necessary to call out the militia under existing laws, to garrison these fortifications, or defend our coast, this money may also be expended for that purpose. There is nothing in the language of the appropriation to justify the construction that the President might raise new armies, and create new officers to command them.
It is my own impression that there will be no necessity for expending any portion of this money. If there should be, however: and it is the part of wisdom to provide against such a contingency; let the responsibility rest upon those who refuse the appropriation. The country will be left defenceless, and the very knowledge of this circumstance may invite an attack.
The entire Fortification Bill failed to be passed at this session, in consequence of the disagreement between the two houses in regard to this three million appropriation. At the next session, which began in December, 1835, Colonel Benton of Missouri introduced in the Senate certain resolutions for setting apart so much of the surplus revenue as might be necessary for the defence and permanent security of the country. On the 1st and 2d of February, 1836, Mr. Buchanan addressed the Senate on these resolutions as follows:
Mr. President: I am much better pleased with the first resolution offered by the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Benton) since he has modified it upon the suggestion of the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. Grundy). When individuals have more money than they know how to expend, they often squander it foolishly. The remark applies, perhaps, with still greater force to nations. When our Treasury is overflowing, Congress, who are but mere trustees for the people, ought to be especially on their guard against wasteful expenditures of the public money. The surplus can be applied to some good and useful purpose. I am willing to grant all that may be necessary for the public defence but no more. I am therefore pleased that the resolution has assumed its present form.
The true question involved in this discussion is, on whom ought the responsibility to rest for having adjourned on the 3d of March last without providing for the defence of the country. There can be no doubt a fearful responsibility rests somewhere. For my own part, I should have been willing to leave the decision of this question to our constituents. I am a man of peace; and dislike the crimination and recrimination which this discussion must necessarily produce. But it is vain to regret what cannot now be avoided. The friends of the administration have been attacked; and we must now defend ourselves. I deem it necessary, therefore, to state the reasons why I voted, on the 3d of March last, in favor of the appropriation of three millions for the defence of the country, and why I glory in that vote.
The language used by Senators in reference to this appropriation has been very strong. It has been denounced as a violation of the Constitution. It has been declared to be such a measure as would not have received the support of the minority, had they believed it could prevail, and they would be held responsible for it. It has been stigmatized as most unusual—most astonishing—most surprising. And finally, to cap the climax, it has been proclaimed that the passage of such an appropriation would be virtually to create a dictator, and to surrender the power of the purse and the sword into the hands of the President.
I voted for that appropriation under the highest convictions of public duty, and I now intend to defend my vote against all these charges.
In examining the circumstances which not only justified this appropriation, but rendered it absolutely necessary, I am forced into the discussion of the French question. We have been told, that if we should go to war with France, we are the authors of that war. The Senator from New Jersey (Mr. Southard), has declared that it will be produced by the boastful vanity of one man, the petulance of another, and the fitful violence of a third. It would not be difficult to conjecture who are the individuals to whom the Senator alludes.
He has also informed us, that in the event of such a war, the guilt which must rest somewhere will be tremendous.