Now, sir, I shall undertake to prove, that scarcely an example exists in history of a powerful and independent nation having suffered such wrongs and indignities as we have done from France, with so much patience and forbearance. If France should now resort to arms,—if our defenceless seacoast should be plundered,—if the blood of our citizens should be shed,—the responsibility of the Senate, to use the language of the gentleman, will be tremendous. I shall not follow the example of the Senator, and say, their guilt,—because that would be to attribute to them an evil intention, which I believe did not exist.
In discussing this subject, I shall first present to the view of the Senate the precise attitude of the two nations towards each other, when the appropriation of three millions was refused, and then examine the reasons which have been urged to justify this refusal. After having done so, I shall exhibit our relations with France as they exist at the present moment, for the purpose of proving that we ought now to adopt the resolutions of the gentleman from Missouri, and grant all necessary appropriations for the defence of the country.
In discussing this subject, it is not my intention to follow the fortification bill either into the chamber of the committee of conference, or into the hall of the House of Representatives. It is not my purpose to explain the confusion which then existed, and which always must exist after midnight, on the last evening of the session. I shall contend that the Senate ought to have voted the three millions; that the fortification bill ought to have passed the Senate with this amendment; and that, therefore, the Senate is responsible not only for the loss of this appropriation, but for that of the entire bill.
What then was the attitude in which we stood towards France at the moment when the Senate rejected this appropriation for the defence of the country? What, at that moment, was known, or ought to have been known, in regard to this question by every Senator on this floor?
The justice of our claims upon France are now admitted by all mankind. Our generosity was equal to their justice. When she was crushed in the dust by Europe in arms—when her cities were garrisoned by a foreign foe—when her independence was trampled under foot, we refused to urge our claims. This was due to our ancient ally. It was due to our grateful remembrance of the days of other years. The testimony of Lafayette conclusively establishes this fact. In the Chamber of Deputies, on 13th June, 1833, he declared that we had refused to unite with the enemies of France in urging our claims in 1814 and 1815; and that, if we had done so, these claims would then have been settled. This circumstance will constitute one of the brightest pages of our history.
Was the sum secured to our injured fellow-citizens by the treaty of the 4th July, 1831, more than they had a right to demand? Let the report of our Committee on Foreign Relations, at the last session, answer this question. They concur entirely with the President, in the statement he had made in his message, that it was absolutely certain the indemnity fell far short of the actual amount of our just claims, independently of damages and interest for the detention; and that it was well known at the time that in this respect, the settlement involved a sacrifice. But there is now no longer room for any conjecture or doubt upon this subject. The commissioners under the treaty have closed their labors. From the very nature of their constitution, it became the interest of every claimant to reduce the other claims as much as possible, so that his own dividend might thus be increased. After a laborious and patient investigation, the claims which have been allowed by the commissioners amount to $9,352,193.47. Each claimant will receive but little more than half his principal, at the end of a quarter of a century, after losing all the interest.
Why then has this treaty remained without execution on the part of France, until this day? Our Committee on Foreign Relations, at the last session, declared their conviction that the King of France “had invariably, on all suitable occasions, manifested an anxious desire, faithfully and honestly, to fulfil the engagements contracted under his authority and in his name.” They say, that “the opposition to the execution of the treaty, and the payment of our just claims, does not proceed from the king’s government, but from a majority in the Chamber of Deputies.”
Now, sir, it is my purpose to contest this opinion, and to show, as I think I can conclusively, that it is not a just inference from the facts.
And here, to prevent all possible misconstruction, either on this side, or on the other side of the Atlantic, if by any accident my humble remarks should ever travel to such a distance, permit me to say that I am solely responsible for them myself. These opinions were in a degree formed while I was in a foreign land, and were there freely expressed upon all suitable occasions. I was then beyond the sphere of party influence and felt only as an American citizen.
Is it not then manifest, to use the language of Mr. Livingston in his note to the Count de Rigny of the 3d August, 1834, that the French government have never appreciated the importance of the subject at its just value? There are two modes in which the king could have manifested this anxious desire faithfully to fulfil the treaty. These are, by words and by actions. When a man’s words and his actions correspond, you have the highest evidence of his sincerity. Even then he may be a hypocrite in the eyes of that Being before whom the fountains of human action are unveiled. But when a man’s words and his actions are at variance,—when he promises and does not perform or even attempt to perform,—when “he speaks the word of promise to the ear and breaks it to the hope,”—the whole world will at once pronounce him insincere. If this be true in the transactions of common life, with how much more force does it apply to the intercourse between diplomatists? The deceitfulness of diplomacy has become almost a proverb. In Europe the talent of over-reaching gives a minister the glory of diplomatic skill. The French school has been distinguished in this art. To prove it, I need only mention the name of Talleyrand. The American school teaches far different lessons. On this our success has, in a great degree, depended. The skillful diplomatists of Europe are foiled by the downright honesty and directness of purpose which have characterized all our negotiations.