Accordingly a French brig of war, the Cuirassier, is fitted out with despatches to Mr. Serrurier. They reached him on the 3d June. On the 4th, he has an interview with Mr. McLane, and makes explanations which the latter very properly requests may be reduced to writing. In compliance with this request, the French minister, on the 5th, addresses a note to Mr. McLane. After expressing the regrets of the French government at the rejection of the bill, he uses the following language: “The king’s government, sir, after this rejection, the object of so much painful disappointment to both governments, has deliberated, and its unanimous determination has been to make an appeal from the first vote of the present Chamber to the next Chamber, and to appear before the next legislature with its treaty and its bill in hand.

“It flatters itself that the light already thrown upon this serious question, during these first debates, and the expression of the public wishes becoming each day more clear and distinct, and, finally, a more mature examination, will have, in the mean time, modified the minds of persons, and that its own conviction will become the conviction of the Chambers. The king’s government, sir, will make every loyal and constitutional effort to that effect, and will do all that its persevering persuasion of the justice and of the mutual advantages of the treaty authorizes you to expect from it. Its intention, moreover, is to do all that our constitution allows, to hasten, as much as possible, the period of the new presentation of the rejected law.

“Such, sir, are the sentiments, such the intentions of his majesty’s government. I think I may rely that, on its part, the Government of the Republic will avoid, with foreseeing solicitude, in this transitory state of things, all that might become a fresh cause of irritation between the two countries, compromit the treaty, and raise up an obstacle perhaps insurmountable, to the views of reconciliation and harmony which animate the king’s council.”

Now, sir, examine this letter, even without any reference to the answer of Mr. McLane, and can there be a doubt as to its true construction? It was not merely the disposition, but “it was the intention of the king’s government to do all that their constitution allows; to hasten, as much as possible, the period of the new presentation of the rejected law.” The President knew that under the constitution of France the king could at any time convoke the Chambers upon three weeks’ notice. It was in his power, therefore, to present this law to the Chambers whenever he thought proper. The promise was to hasten this presentation as much as possible. Without any thing further the President had a right confidently to expect that the Chambers would be convoked in season to enable him to present their decision to the Congress of the United States in his next annual message. The assurance was made on the 5th June, and Congress did not assemble until the beginning of December. But the letter of Mr. McLane, of the 27th June, removes all possible doubt from this subject. He informs Mr. Serrurier that “the President is still unable to understand the causes which led to the result of the proceeding in the Chamber, especially when he recollected the assurances which had so often been made by the king and his ministers, of their earnest desire to carry the convention into effect, and the support which the Chamber had afforded in all the other measures proposed by the king.” And again:

“The assurances which M. Serrurier’s letter contains, of the adherence of the king’s government to the treaty, of its unanimous determination to appeal from the decision of the present to the new Chamber, and its conviction that the public wish, and a mature examination of the subject, will lead to a favorable result, and its intention to make every constitutional effort to that effect, and finally, its intention to do all that the constitution allows to hasten the presentation of the new law, have been fully considered by the President.

“Though fully sensible of the high responsibility which he owes to the American people, in a matter touching so nearly the national honor, the President, still trusting to the good faith and justice of France, willing to manifest a spirit of forbearance so long as it may be consistent with the rights and dignity of his country, and truly desiring to preserve those relations of friendship, which, commencing in our struggle for independence, form the true policy of both nations, and sincerely respecting the king’s wishes, will rely upon the assurances which M. Serrurier has been instructed to offer, and will therefore await with confidence the promised appeal to the new Chamber.

“The President, in desiring the undersigned to request that his sentiments on this subject may be made known to his majesty’s government, has instructed him also to state his expectation that the king, seeing the great interests now involved in the subject, and the deep solicitude felt by the people of the United States respecting it, will enable him, when presenting the subject to Congress, as his duty will require him to do at the opening of their next session, to announce at that time the result of that appeal, and of his majesty’s efforts for its success.”

Had this letter of Mr. McLane placed a different construction upon the engagement of the French government from that which Mr. Serrurier intended to communicate, it was his duty to make the necessary explanations without delay. He, in that case, would have done so instantly. It was a subject of too much importance to suffer any misapprehension to exist concerning it for a single moment.

Notwithstanding all which had passed, the President, on the faith of these assurances of the French government, suffered Congress to adjourn without presenting the subject to their view. This rash, this violent man, instigated by his own good feelings towards our ancient ally, and by his love of peace, determines that he would try them once more, that he once more would extend the olive branch before presenting to Congress and the nation a history of our wrongs. I confess I do not approve of this policy. I think the time had then arrived to manifest to France some sensibility on our part on account of her delay in executing the treaty. I believe that such a course would have been dictated by sound policy.

What were the consequences of this new manifestation of the kindly feelings of the President towards France? Was it properly appreciated by the French government? Was it received in the liberal and friendly spirit from which it had proceeded? Let the sequel answer these questions. I shall read you Mr. Livingston’s opinion on the subject. In a letter to Mr. Forsyth, under date of the 22d November, 1834, he thus expresses himself: