Life of James Buchanan, Fifteenth President of the United States. v. 1 (of 2)

by George Ticknor Curtis

“I do not hope for any decision on our affairs before the middle of January. One motive for delay is an expectation that the message of the President may arrive before the discussion, and that it may contain something to show a strong national feeling on the subject. This is not mere conjecture: I know the fact; and I repeat now, from a full knowledge of the case, what I have more than once stated in my former despatches as my firm persuasion, that the moderate tone taken by our Government, when the rejection was first known, was attributed by some to indifference, or to a conviction on the part of the President that he would not be supported in any strong measure by the people, and by others to a consciousness that the convention had given us more than we were entitled to ask.”

I shall now proceed to show in what manner the French government performed the engagement which had been made by their representative in Washington to hasten the presentation of the rejected law as much as possible.

The Chambers met on the 31st July, and the king made them a speech. This speech contains no allusion to the subject of the treaty except the following: “The laws necessary for carrying treaties into effect, and those still required for the accomplishment of the promises of the Chamber, will be presented to you in the course of this session.” The rejected bill was not presented. After a session of two weeks, the Chambers were prorogued on the 16th August until the 29th December,—a day, almost a month after the next meeting of Congress.

I admit that strong reasons existed for dispensing with that part of the obligation which required the French government to present the bill at this short session. No good reason has ever been alleged to excuse them for proroguing the Chambers until so late a day as the 29th of December. They might have met, and they ought to have met, at an early period of the autumn. They have heretofore met, on different occasions, for the despatch of business, in every month of the year. It was in vain that Mr. Livingston urged the necessity of an earlier meeting on the Count de Rigny. It was in vain that he appealed to the positive engagement of the French government made by Mr. Serrurier. It was in vain that he declared to him, “that the President could not, at the opening of the next session of Congress, avoid laying before that body a statement of the then position of affairs on this interesting subject, nor, under any circumstances, permit that session to end, as it must, on the third of March, without recommending such measures as he may deem that justice and the honor of the country may require.” All his remonstrances were disregarded. Instead of hastening the presentation of the rejected law as much as possible, they refused to assemble the Chambers in time even to present the bill before the meeting of Congress. Their meeting was so long delayed, as to render it almost impossible that their determination should be known in this country before the close of the session, notwithstanding the President had agreed not to present the subject to Congress at the previous session, under a firm conviction that he would receive this determination in time to lay it before them at the commencement of their next session. Is there a Senator in this hall, who can believe for a moment, that if the President had been informed the rejected bill would not be laid before the Chambers until the 29th December, he would have refrained from communicating to Congress, at their previous session, the state of the controversy between the two countries? Upon this construction, the engagement of the French government was mere words, without the slightest meaning; and the national vessel which brought it in such solemn form, might much better have remained at home.

What was the apology—what was the pretext under which the king’s government refused to assemble the Chambers at an earlier period? It was, that Mr. Serrurier had made no engagement to that effect, and that the intention which he had expressed in behalf of his government to do all that the constitution allows, to hasten, as much as possible, the period of the new presentation of the rejected law, meant no more than that this was their disposition. The word “intention” is thus changed into “disposition” by the Count de Rigny, and the whole engagement which was presented to the President in such an imposing form, was thus converted into a mere unmeaning profession of their desire to hasten this presentation as much as possible.

Sir, at the commencement of the session of Congress, it became the duty of the President to speak, and what could any American expect that he would say? The treaty had been violated in the first instance, by the ministers of the French king, in neglecting to lay it before the Chambers until after the first instalment was due. It was then twice submitted, at so late a period of the session, that it was impossible for the Chambers to examine and decide the question before their adjournment. On the last of these occasions, the chairman of the committee, to which the subject was referred, had reported a severe reprimand against the government, for not having sooner presented the bill, and expressed a hope that it might be presented at an early period of the next session. It was then rejected by the Chamber of Deputies; and when the French government had solemnly engaged to hasten the presentation of the rejected law, as soon as their constitution would permit, they prorogue the Chambers to the latest period which custom sanctions, in the very face of the remonstrances of the minister of the United States. I ask again, sir, before such an array of circumstances, what could any man, what could any American expect the President would say in his message? The cup of forbearance had been drained by him to the very dregs. It was then his duty to speak so as to be heard and to be regarded on the other side of the Atlantic. If the same spirit which dictated the message, or anything like it, had been manifested by Congress, the money, in my opinion, would ere this have been paid.

The question was then reduced to a single point. We demanded the execution of a solemn treaty; it had been refused. France had promised again to bring the question before the Chambers as soon as possible. The Chambers were prorogued until the latest day. The President had every reason to believe that France was trifling with us, and that the treaty would again be rejected. Is there a Senator, within the sound of my voice, who, if France had finally determined not to pay the money, would have tamely submitted to this violation of national faith? Not one!

The late war with Great Britain elevated us in the estimation of the whole world. In every portion of Europe, we have reason to be proud that we are American citizens. We have paid dearly for the exalted character we now enjoy among the nations, and we ought to preserve it and transmit it unimpaired to future generations. To them it will be a most precious inheritance.

If, after having compelled the weaker nations of the world to pay us indemnities for captures made from our citizens, we should cower before the power of France, and abandon our rights against her, when they had been secured by a solemn treaty, we should be regarded as a mere Hector among the nations. The same course which you have pursued towards the weak, you must pursue towards the powerful. If you do not, your name will become a by-word and a proverb.

But under all the provocations which the country had received, what is the character of that message? Let it be scanned with eagle eyes, and there is nothing in its language at which the most fastidious critic can take offence. It contains an enumeration of our wrongs in mild and dignified language, and a contingent recommendation of reprisals, in case the indemnity should again be rejected by the Chambers. But in this, and in all other respects, it defers entirely to the judgment of Congress. Every idea of an intended menace is excluded by the President’s express declaration. He says: “Such a measure ought not to be considered by France as a menace. Her pride and power are too well known to expect any thing from her fears, and preclude the necessity of the declaration, that nothing partaking of the character of intimidation is intended by us.”