I ask again, is it not forbearing in its language? Is there a single statement in it not founded upon truth? Does it even state the whole truth against France? Are there not strong points omitted? All these questions must be answered in the affirmative. On this subject we have strong evidence from the Duke de Broglie himself. In his famous letter to Mr. Pageot of June 17th, 1835,—the arrow of the Parthian as he flew,—this fact is admitted. He says:
“If we examine in detail the message of the President of the United States, (I mean that part of it which concerns the relations between the United States and France,) it will possibly be found, that passing successively from phrase to phrase, none will be met that cannot bear an interpretation more or less plausible, nor of which, strictly speaking, it cannot be said that it is a simple exposé of such a fact, true in itself, or the assertion of such or such a right which no one contests, or the performance of such or such an obligation imposed on the President by the very nature of his functions. There will certainly be found several in which the idea of impeaching the good faith of the French government, or of acting upon it through menace or intimidation, is more or less disavowed.”
It was the whole message, and not any of the detached parts, at which the French government chose to take offence.
It is not my present purpose to discuss the propriety of the recommendation of reprisals, or whether that was the best mode of redress which could have been suggested. Some decided recommendation, however, was required from the executive, both by public opinion and by the wrongs which we had so long patiently endured.
Who can suppose that the executive intended to menace France, or to obtain from her fears what would be denied by her sense of justice? The President, in this very message, expressly disclaims such an idea. Her history places her far above any such imputation. The wonder is, how she could have ever supposed the President, against his own solemn declaration, intended to do her any such injustice. She ought to have considered it as it was, a mere executive recommendation to Congress, not intended for her at all—not to operate upon her fears, but upon their deliberations in deciding whether any and what measures should be adopted to secure the execution of the treaty. But on this subject I shall say more hereafter.
We have now arrived at the special message of the President to Congress of the 26th February last; a document which has a most important bearing on the appropriation of the three millions which was rejected by the Senate. I have given this historical sketch of our controversy with France, for the purpose of bringing Senators to the very point of time, and to the precise condition of this question, when the Senate negatived that appropriation.
What had Congress done in relation to the French question when this message was presented to us? Nothing, sir, nothing. The Senate had unanimously passed a resolution on the 15th January, that it was inexpedient, at present, to adopt any legislative measure, in regard to the state of affairs between the United States and France. This unanimity was obtained by two considerations. The one was, that the French Chambers had been convened, though not for the purpose of acting upon our treaty, on the first, instead of the twenty-ninth of December, a fact unknown to the President at the date of his message. The other, that this circumstance afforded a reasonable ground of hope, that we might learn their final determination before the close of our session on the 3d March. But whatever may have been the causes, the Senate had determined that, for the present, nothing should be done.
In the House of Representatives, at the date of the special message, on the 26th February, no measure whatever had been adopted. The President had just cause to believe that the sentiments contained in his message to Congress, at the commencement of their session, were not in unison with the feelings of either branch of the legislature. He therefore determined to lay all the information in his possession before Congress, and leave it for them to decide whether any or what measures should be adopted for the defence of the country. I shall read this message. It is as follows:
“I transmit to Congress a report from the Secretary of State, with copies of all the letters received from Mr. Livingston since the message to the House of Representatives of the 6th instant, of the instructions given to that minister, and of all the late correspondence with the French government in Paris, or in Washington, except a note of Mr. Serrurier, which, for the reasons stated in the report, is not now communicated.
“It will be seen that I have deemed it my duty to instruct Mr. Livingston to quit France with his legation, and return to the United States, if an appropriation for the fulfilment of the convention shall be refused by the Chambers.