Had the indemnity been absolutely rejected by the Chambers, the two nations would have been placed in a state of defiance towards each other. In such a condition it was the right—nay, more, it was the imperative duty of the House of Representatives to make contingent preparation for the worst. The urgency of the case was still more striking, because in ten or eleven of the States Representatives could not be elected until months after the adjournment, and, therefore, Congress could not have been assembled to meet any emergency which might occur.
But, sir, does it require a recommendation of the Executive, or a vote of the House of Representatives, to originate such an appropriation? Any individual Senator or member of the House may do it with the strictest propriety. Did the Senator from Delaware (Mr. Clayton) ask the approbation of the President, before he made the motion at the last session, which does him so much honor, to increase the appropriation for fortifications half a million? How did the amendments proposed by the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster) to the fortification bill of the last session originate? I presume from the Committee of Finance, of which he was the chairman. No doubt he conferred with the head of the proper Executive Department, according to the custom in such cases; but still these appropriations of more than four hundred thousand dollars had their origin in that committee. It was a proper, a legitimate source. Is then the ancient practice to be changed, and must it become a standing rule that we are to appropriate no money without the orders or the expressed wish of the Executive? I trust not.
The form of this appropriation has been objected to. I shall read it.
“And be it further enacted, That the sum of three millions of dollars be, and the same is hereby, appropriated out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to be expended, in whole or in part, under the direction of the President of the United States, for the military and naval service, including fortifications and ordnance, and increase of the navy; Provided, such expenditures shall be rendered necessary, for the defence of the country, prior to the next meeting of Congress.”
It has been urged that to grant money in such general terms would have been a violation of the Constitution. I do not understand that the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster), at the present session, has distinctly placed it upon this ground. Other Senators have done so in the strongest terms. Is there any thing in the Constitution which touches the question? It simply declares that “no money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law.” Whether these appropriations shall be general or specific, is left entirely, as it ought to have been, to the discretion of Congress. I admit that, ex vi termini, an appropriation of money must have a reference to some object. But whether you refer to a class, or to an individual, to the genus or to the species, your appropriation is equally constitutional. The degree of specification necessary to make the law valid never can become a constitutional question. The terms of the instrument are as broad and as general as the English language can make them. In this particular, as in almost every other, the framers of the Constitution have manifested their wisdom and their foresight. Cases may occur and have occurred in the history of this Government, demanding the strictest secrecy; cases in which to specify, would be to defeat the very object of the appropriation. A remarkable example of this kind occurs in the administration of Mr. Jefferson, to which I shall presently advert.
There are other cases in which from the very nature of things you cannot specify the objects of an appropriation without the gift of prophecy. I take the present to be a clear case of this description. The appropriation was contingent; it was to be for the defence of the country. How then could it have been specific? How could you foresee when, or where, or how the attack of France would be made? Without this foreknowledge, you could not designate when, or where, or how it would become necessary to use the money. This must depend upon France, not upon ourselves. She might be disposed to confine the contest merely to a naval war. In that event it would become necessary to apply the whole sum to secure us against naval attacks. She might threaten to invade Louisiana or any other portion of the Union. The money would then be required to call out the militia, and to march them and the regular army to that point. Every thing must depend upon the movements of the enemy. It might become necessary, in order most effectually to resist the contemplated attack, to construct steam frigates or steam batteries, or it might be deemed more proper to increase your ordinary navy and complete and arm your fortifications. In a country where Congress cannot be always in session, you must in times of danger, grant some discretionary powers to the Executive. This should always be avoided when it is possible, consistently with the safety of the country. But it was wise, it was prudent in the framers of the Constitution, in order to meet such cases, to declare in general terms that “no money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law.” Not specific appropriations. The terms are general and unrestricted. If the amendment had appropriated one million to fortifications, the second million to the increase of the navy, and the third to the purchase of ordnance and arms, it might have been found that a great deal too much had been appropriated to one object, and a great deal too little to another.
As a matter of expediency, as a means of limiting the discretion of executive officers, I am decidedly friendly to specific appropriations, whenever they can be made. I so declared in the debate at the last session. I then expressed a wish that this appropriation had been more specific; but upon reflection, I do not see how it could have been made much more so, unless we had possessed the gift of prophecy. But the Constitution has nothing to do with the question.
After all, I attached more value to specific appropriations before I had examined this subject, than I do at the present moment. Still I admit their importance. The clause which immediately follows in the Constitution, is the true touchstone of responsibility. Although the appropriation may be general; yet “a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time.” No matter in what language public money may be granted to the Executive, in its expenditure, he is but the mere trustee of the American people, and he must produce to them his vouchers for every cent entrusted to his care. This constitutional provision holds him to a strict responsibility, to a responsibility much more severe than if Congress had been required in all cases to make specific appropriations.
How Senators can create a dictator, and give him unlimited power over the purse and the sword out of such an appropriation, I am at a loss to conceive. It is a flight of imagination beyond my reach. What, sir, to appropriate three millions for the military and naval defence of the country in case it should become necessary during the recess of Congress, and at its next meeting to compel the President to account for the whole sum he may have expended; is this to create a dictator? Is this to surrender our liberties into the hands of one man? And yet gentlemen have contended for this proposition.
What has been the practice of the Government in regard to this subject? During the period of our first two Presidents, appropriations were made in the most general terms. No one then imagined that this was a violation of the Constitution. When Mr. Jefferson came into power, this practice was changed. In his message to Congress, of December 8th, 1801, he says: “In our care too of the public contributions entrusted to our discretion, it would be prudent to multiply barriers against their dissipation, by appropriating specific sums to every specific purpose susceptible of definition.” Susceptible of definition. Here is the rule, and here is the exception. He treats the subject not as a constitutional question, but as one of mere expediency. In little more than two short years after this recommendation, Mr. Jefferson found it was necessary to obtain an appropriation from Congress in the most general terms. To have made it specific, would necessarily have defeated its very object. Secrecy was necessary to success. Accordingly on the 26th February, 1803, Congress made the most extraordinary appropriation in our annals. They granted to the President the sum of two millions of dollars, “for the purpose of defraying any extraordinary expenses which may be incurred in the intercourse between the United States and foreign nations.” Here, sir, was a grant almost without any limit. It was co-extensive with the whole world. Every nation on the face of the earth was within the sphere of its operation. The President might have used this money to subsidize foreign nations to destroy our liberties. That he was utterly incapable of such conduct it is scarcely necessary to observe. I do not know that I should have voted for such an unlimited grant. Still, however, there was a responsibility to be found in his obligation under the Constitution to account for its expenditure. Mr. Jefferson never used any part of this appropriation. It had been intended for the purchase of the sovereignty of New Orleans and of other possessions in that quarter; but our treaty with France of the 30th April, 1803, by which Louisiana was ceded to us, rendered it unnecessary for him to draw any part of this money from the Treasury, under the act of Congress, by which it had been granted.