Before the close of Mr. Jefferson’s second term, it was found that specific appropriations in the extent to which they had been carried, had become inconvenient. Congress often granted too much for one object, and too little for another. This must necessarily be the case, because we cannot say beforehand precisely how much shall be required for any one purpose. On the 3d of March, 1809, an act was passed, which was approved by Mr. Jefferson, containing the following provision:
“Provided, nevertheless, That, during the recess of Congress, the President of the United States may, and he is hereby authorized, on the application of the Secretary of the proper department, and not otherwise, to direct, if in his opinion necessary for the public service, that a portion of the moneys appropriated for a particular branch of expenditure in that department, be applied to another branch of expenditure in the same department; in which case, a special account of the moneys thus transferred, and of their application, shall be laid before Congress during the first week of their next ensuing session.”
Is this act constitutional? If it be so, there is an end of the question. Has its constitutionality ever been doubted? It authorizes the President to take the money appropriated by Congress for one special object and apply it to another. The money destined for any one purpose by an appropriation bill, may be diverted from that purpose by the President, and be applied to any other purpose entirely different, with no limitation whatever upon his discretion, except that money to be expended by one of the Departments, either of War, or of the Navy, or of the Treasury, could not be transferred to another Department.
It is not my intention to cite all the precedents bearing upon this question. I shall merely advert to one other. On the 10th of March, 1812, Congress appropriated five hundred thousand dollars “for the purpose of fortifying and defending the maritime frontier of the United States.” This was in anticipation of the late war with Great Britain, and is as general in its terms, and leaves as much to executive discretion, as the proposed appropriation of three millions.
I trust, then, that I have established the positions that this appropriation originated from a legitimate source—was necessary for the defence and honor of the country, and violated no provision of the constitution. If so, it ought to have received the approbation of the Senate.
When the fortification bill came back to the Senate, with this appropriation attached to it by the House, the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster), instantly moved that it should be rejected. I feel no disposition to make any harsh observations in relation to that gentleman. I think, however, that his remark, that if the enemy had been thundering at the gates of the capitol, he would have moved to reject the appropriation, was a most unfortunate one for himself. I consider it nothing more than a bold figure of speech. I feel the most perfect confidence that the gentleman is now willing to vote all the money which may be necessary for the defence of the country.
Of the gentleman’s sincerity in opposing this appropriation, I did not then, nor do I now entertain a doubt. He was ardent and impassioned in his manner, and was evidently in a state of highly excited feeling. Probably strong political prejudices may have influenced his judgment without his knowledge. He thought that a high constitutional question was involved in the amendment, and acted accordingly.
When the bill returned again to the Senate, after we had rejected, and the House had insisted upon their amendment, the Senator immediately moved that we should adhere to our rejection. I well recollect, sir, that you (Mr. King, of Alabama, was in the chair), remarked at the time, that this was a harsh motion, and should it prevail, would be well calculated to exasperate the feelings of the House, and to defeat the bill. You then observed that the proper motion would be to insist upon our rejection, and ask a conference; and that the motion to adhere ought not to be resorted to until all gentler measures had failed.
The Senator now claims the merit, and is anxious to sustain the responsibility, of having moved to reject this appropriation. He also asks, in mercy, that when the expunging process shall commence, his vote, upon this occasion, may be spared from its operation.
For the sake of my country, and in undisguised sincerity of purpose, I declare, for the sake of the gentleman, I am rejoiced that the responsibility which he covets will, probably, not be so dreadful as we had just reason to apprehend. Had France attacked us, or should she yet attack us, in our present defenceless condition; should our cities be exposed to pillage, or the blood of our citizens be shed, either upon the land or the ocean; should our national character be dishonored, tremendous, indeed, would be the responsibility of the gentleman. In that event, he need not beseech us to spare his vote from the process of expunging. You might as well attempt to expunge a sunbeam. That vote will live for ever in the memory of the American people.