Now, sir, my position is, that when the Constitution of the United States, in a special case, has conferred upon the Senate, which is essentially a branch of the legislature, a participation in executive power, you cannot by construction extend this power beyond the plain terms of the grant. It is an exception from the general rule pervading the whole instrument. Appointment to office is in the strictest sense an executive power. But it is expressly declared that the assent of the Senate shall be necessary to the exercise of this power on the part of the President. The grant to the Senate is special. In this particular case, it is an abstraction from the general executive powers granted under the Constitution to the President[President]. According to the maxim of the common law, expressio unius est exclusio alterius—it follows conclusively that what has not been given is withheld, and remains in that branch of the Government which is the appropriate depository of executive power. The exception proves the rule. And the grant of executive power to the Senate is confined to appointments to office, and to them alone. This necessarily excludes other executive powers. It cannot, therefore, be contended with any force, as the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster) has contended, that because the consent of the Senate is made necessary by the Constitution to appointments of officers,—that, therefore, by implication, it is necessary for their removal. Besides, these two things are very distinct in their nature, as I shall hereafter have occasion to demonstrate.

But to proceed with the argument. I shall contend that the sole power of removing executive officers is vested in the President by the Constitution. First, from a correct construction of the instrument itself; and second, even if that were doubtful, from the great danger resulting to the public interest from any other construction.

The Constitution declares in express language that “the executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States.” Under these general terms, I shall, once for all, disclaim the idea of attempting to derive any portion of the power of the Chief Magistrate from any other fountain than the Constitution itself. I therefore entirely repel the imputation, so far as I am concerned, which would invest him with executive powers derived from the prerogatives of the kings or emperors of the old world. Such arguments are entirely out of the question.

The Constitution also declares that “he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” These two clauses of the Constitution confer the executive power on the President, and define his duties. Is, then, the removal from office an executive power? If it be so, there is an end of the question; because the Constitution nowhere declares that the Senate, or any other human tribunal, shall participate in the exercise of this power. It will not be contended but that the power of removal exists, and must exist, somewhere. Where else can it exist but in the executive, on whom the Constitution imposes the obligation of taking care that the laws shall be faithfully executed? It will not be pretended that the power of removal is either of a legislative or judicial character. From its very nature, it belongs to the executive. In case he discovers that an officer is violating his trust—that instead of executing the laws, his conduct is in direct opposition to their requisition, is it not, strictly speaking, an executive power to arrest him in his career, by removing him from office? How could the President execute the trust confided to him, if he were destitute of this authority? If he possessed it not, he would be compelled to witness the executive officers violating the laws of Congress without the power of preventing it.

On this subject, it is impossible for me to advance anything new. It was exhausted by Mr. Madison, in the debate of 1789, in the House of Representatives. I am confident the Senate will indulge me whilst I read two extracts from his speeches on that occasion, delivered on the 16th and 17th June, 1789. The first was delivered on the 16th June, 1789, and is as follows:

“By a strict examination of the Constitution, on what appears to be its true principles, and considering the great departments of the Government in the relation they have to each other, I have my doubts whether we are not absolutely tied down to the construction declared in the bill. In the first section of the first article, it is said that all legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States. In the second article, it is affirmed that the executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. In the third article, it is declared that the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court; and in such inferior courts as Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish.

“I suppose it will be readily admitted, that so far as the Constitution has separated the powers of these great departments, it would be improper to combine them together; and so far as it has left any particular department in the entire possession of the powers incident to that department, I conceive we ought not to qualify them further than they are qualified by the Constitution. The legislative powers are vested in Congress, and are to be exercised by them uncontrolled by any other department, except the Constitution has qualified it otherwise. The Constitution has qualified the legislative power, by authorizing the President to object to any act it may pass, requiring, in this case, two-thirds of both Houses to concur in making a law; but still the absolute legislative power is vested in the Congress with this qualification alone.

“The Constitution affirms, that the executive power shall be vested in the President. Are there exceptions to this proposition? Yes, there are. The Constitution says, that in appointing to office, the Senate shall be associated with the President, unless in case of inferior officers, when the law shall otherwise direct. Have we a right to extend this exception? I believe not. If the Constitution had invested all executive power in the President, I venture to assert that the Legislature has no right to diminish or modify his executive authority.”

Again:

“The doctrine, however, which seems to stand most in opposition to the principles I contend for, is, that the power to annul an appointment is, in the nature of things, incidental to the power which makes the appointment. I agree that if nothing more was said in the Constitution than that the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, should appoint to office, there would be great force in saying that the power of removal resulted by a natural implication from the power of appointing. But there is another part of the Constitution, no less explicit than the one on which the gentleman’s doctrine is founded; it is that part which declares that the executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States.