“The association of the Senate with the President in exercising that particular function, is an exception to this general rule, and exceptions to general rules, I conceive, are ever to be taken strictly. But there is another part of the Constitution which inclines, in my judgment, to favor the construction I put upon it; the President is required to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. If the duty to see the laws faithfully executed be required at the hands of the Executive Magistrate, it would seem that it was generally intended he should have that species of power which is necessary to accomplish that end. Now, if the officer, when once appointed, is not to depend upon the President for his official existence, but upon a distinct body, (for where there are two negatives required, either can prevent the removal,) I confess I do not see how the President can take care that the laws be faithfully executed. It is true, by a circuitous operation, he may obtain an impeachment, and even without this it is possible he may obtain the concurrence of the Senate for the purpose of displacing an officer; but would this give that species of control to the Executive Magistrate which seems to be required by the Constitution? I own, if my opinion was not contrary to that entertained by what I suppose to be the minority on this question, I should be doubtful of being mistaken, when I discovered how inconsistent that construction would make the Constitution with itself. I can hardly bring myself to imagine the wisdom of the convention who framed the Constitution contemplated such incongruity.”
But, sir, if doubts could arise on the language of the Constitution itself, then it would become proper, for the purpose of ascertaining the true meaning of the instrument, to resort to arguments ab inconvenienti. The framers of the Constitution never intended it to mean what would defeat the very purposes which it was intended to accomplish. I think I can prove that to deprive the President of the power of removal would be fatal to the best interests of the country.
And first, the Senate cannot always be in session. I thank Heaven for that. We must separate and attend to our ordinary business. It is necessary for a healthy political constitution that we should breathe the fresh and pure air of the country. The political excitement would rise too high if it were not cooled off in this manner. The American people never will consent, and never ought to consent, that our sessions shall become perpetual. The framers of the Constitution never intended that this should be the case. But once establish the principle that the Senate must consent to removals, as well as to appointments, and this consequence is inevitable.
A foreign minister in a remote part of the world is pursuing a course, dangerous to the best interests, and ruinous to the character of the country. He is disgracing us abroad, and endangering the public peace. He has been intrusted with an important negotiation, and is betraying his trust. He has become corrupt, or is entirely incompetent. This information arrives at Washington, three or four days after the adjournment of Congress on the 3d of March. What is to be done? Is the President to be entirely powerless until the succeeding December, when the Senate may meet again? Shall he be obliged to wait until the mischief is entirely consummated—until the country is ruined—before he can recall the corrupt or wicked minister? Or will any gentleman contend that upon every occasion, when a removal from office becomes necessary, he shall call the Senators from their homes throughout this widely extended republic? And yet, this is the inevitable consequence of the position contended for by gentlemen. Could the framers of the Constitution ever have intended such an absurdity? This argument was also adverted to by Mr. Madison.
But again, there are great numbers of disbursing officers scattered over the Union. Information is received during the recess of the Senate, that one of them in Arkansas or at the Rocky Mountains, has been guilty of peculation, and is wasting the public money. Must the President fold his arms, and suffer him to proceed in his fraudulent course, until the next meeting of the Senate? The truth is, that the President cannot execute the laws of the Union, without this power of removal.
But cases still stronger may be presented. The heads of departments are the confidential advisers of the President. It is chiefly through their agency that he must conduct the great operations of Government. Without a direct control over them, it would be impossible for him to take care that the laws shall be faithfully executed. Suppose that one of them, during the recess of the Senate, violates his instructions, refuses to hold any intercourse with the President, and pursues a career which he believes to be in opposition to the Constitution, the laws and the best interests of the country. Shall the executive arm be paralyzed; and in such a case, must he patiently submit to all these evils until the Senate can be convened? In time of war, the country might be ruined by a corrupt Secretary of War, before the Senate could be assembled.
It is not my intention, on this occasion, to discuss the question of the removal of the deposits from the Bank of the United States. I merely wish to present it as a forcible illustration of my argument. Suppose the late Secretary of the Treasury had determined to remove the deposits, and the President had believed this measure would be as ruinous to the country as the friends of the bank apprehended. If the Secretary, notwithstanding the remonstrances of the President, had proceeded to issue the order for their removal, what should we have heard from those who were the loudest in their denunciations against the Executive, if he had said, my arms are tied, I have no power to arrest the act—the deposits must be removed, because I cannot remove my Secretary? Here the evil would have been done before the Senate could possibly have been assembled. I am indebted to the speech of the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. Calhoun), at the last session, for this illustration. The truth is, view the subject in any light you may, the power of removal is in its nature inseparable from the executive power.
I have been presenting the inconveniences which would arise, during the recess of the Senate, from the want of this power in the executive. But suppose the Senate to be always in session, would this remove every difficulty? By no means. Confer upon the Senate the power of rejecting removals, and you make the executive, in the language of the debate of 1789, a double-headed monster. That power on whom is devolved the execution of your laws, must be able to remove a corrupt or an incompetent agent from office, or he cannot perform his duties. The Senate may, without inconvenience, and with very great advantage to the country, participate in appointments; but when the man is once in office, the President must necessarily possess the power of turning him out in case he does not perform his duties. This power ought not to depend upon the will of the Senate; for that body have nothing to do with the execution of the laws.
If the power contended for were vested in the Senate, what would be the consequences? Still more dangerous, if possible, than any which I have yet depicted. The cases in which removals are necessary, must rapidly increase with the number of our officers and our rapidly extending population. If the President must assign reasons to the Senate for his removals, according to the provisions of this bill, or if the Senate must participate in these removals, as well as in appointments, it necessarily follows, that these reasons must be investigated. Witnesses must be examined to ascertain the truth or falsehood of the charges made against the officer sought to be removed. The case must be tried judicially. Time must be consumed to the prejudice of our other duties. The legislative functions of the Senate must thus become impaired, and feelings excited between co-ordinate branches of the Government calculated to produce a most injurious effect upon the country. In this state of things, the case might readily occur which was anticipated by Mr. Madison in 1789. A majority of the Senate might even keep one of the heads of department in office against the will of the President. Whether they would have done so or not last winter, in the case of the Secretary of the Treasury, I shall not pretend to determine.
If this power were conferred upon the Senate, it would interfere with our judicial functions to a dangerous and alarming extent. The removal of a high officer of the Government is recommended by the President to the Senate, because of official misconduct. The charges are tried before the Senate. From the very nature of the question it must become in fact a judicial investigation. The Senate determine either that he shall remain in his office or that he shall be removed. In either case, the House of Representatives, possessing the sole power of impeachment under the Constitution, determine to exercise it against this officer. But the Senate have, by their previous proceedings, utterly disqualified themselves from giving to the accused an impartial trial. They have already decided upon his guilt or his innocence. Instead of proceeding to the trial, unbiased by favor or by prejudice, their minds are inflamed, their judgments are biased, and they come to the investigation with the feelings of partisans, rather than those of judges. The House of Representatives would have a just right to complain loudly against the exercise of this power by the Senate. We should thus disqualify ourselves from judging impartially in cases between the people of the United States and the high officers of the Government.