That this power has never been abused, is as clear as the light of the sun. I ask Senators, and I appeal to you, sir, whether the American people have not sanctioned every one of the vetoes on the three great subjects to which I have referred. Yes, sir, every one, not excepting those on the Fiscal Bank and Fiscal Corporation—the leading measures of the extra session. Notwithstanding the solemn denunciation against the President, made by the Whig party, and their appeal to the people, there has been no election held since that session in which the people have not declared, in a voice of thunder, their approbation of the two vetoes of President Tyler. I shall not, upon the present occasion, discuss the question whether all or any of these vetoes were right or wrong. I merely state the incontrovertible fact that they have all been approved by the American people.
The character of the bills vetoed shows conclusively the striking contrast between the veto power when entrusted to an elective and responsible chief magistrate, and when conferred upon a European sovereign as a royal prerogative. All the vetoes which an American President has imposed on any important act of Congress, except the one by General Washington, to which I have alluded, have been so many instances of self-denial. These acts have all been returned, accompanied by messages remonstrating against the extension of executive power, which they proposed to grant. Exerting the influence which these acts proposed to confer upon him, the President might, indeed, have made long strides towards the attainment of monarchical power. Had a national bank been established under his control, uniting the moneyed with the political power of the country; had a splendid system of internal improvements[improvements] been adopted and placed under his direction, presenting prospects of pecuniary advantage to almost every individual throughout the land; and in addition to all this, had the States become pensioners on the bounty of the Federal Government for the amount of the proceeds of the sales of the public lands, we might soon have witnessed a powerful consolidated Government, with a chief at its head, far different from the plain and unpretending President recognized by the Constitution. The General Government might then have become everything, whilst the State governments would have sunk to nothing. Thanks to the vetoes of our Presidents, and not to Congress, that most of these evils have been averted. Had these acts been all approved by the President, it is my firm conviction that the Senator himself would as deeply have deplored the consequences as any other true patriot, and that he would forever have regretted his own agency in substantially changing the form of our Government. Had these bills become laws, the executive power would then have strode over all the other powers of the Constitution; and then, indeed, the Senator might have justly compared the President of the United States with the monarchs of Europe. Our Presidents have had the self-denying firmness to render all these attempts abortive to bestow on themselves extraordinary powers, and have been content to confine themselves to those powers conferred on them by the Constitution. They have protected the rights of the States and of the people from the unconstitutional means of influence which Congress had placed within their grasp. Such have been the consequences of the veto power in the hands of our elective chief magistrate.
For what purposes has this power been exerted by European monarchs, with whom our President has been compared? When exercised at all, it has always been for the purpose of maintaining the royal prerogative and arresting the march of popular liberty. There have been but two instances of its exercise in England since the Revolution of 1688. The first was in 1692, by William the Third, the rival of Louis the Fourteenth, and beyond question the ablest man who has sat upon the throne of Great Britain for the last century and a half. He had the hardihood to veto the Earl of Shrewsbury’s bill, which had passed both houses, limiting the duration of Parliaments to three, instead of seven years, and requiring annual sessions to be held. He dreaded the influence which members of the House of Commons, responsible to their constituents at the end of each period of three years, might exert against his royal power and prerogatives; and, therefore, held on by means of the veto to septennial Parliaments. And what did George the Third? In 1806 he vetoed the Catholic Emancipation bill, and thus continued to hold in political bondage millions of his fellow-men, because they insisted upon worshipping their God according to the dictates of their own consciences.
[Here Mr. Clay observed that this was a mistake, and expressed his belief that, upon the occasion alluded to, the matter had gone no further than the resignation of the Grenville administration.]
Mr. Buchanan. I shall then read my authority. It is to be found in “Random Recollections of the House of Lords, by Mr. Grant,” page 25. The author says:
But, sir, be this author correct or incorrect, as to the existence of a veto in 1806, it is a matter of trifling importance in the present argument.[[71]] I admit that the exercise of the veto power has fallen into disuse in England since the revolution. And what are the reasons? First, because its exercise by a hereditary sovereign to preserve unimpaired the prerogatives of the crown against the voice of the people, is always an odious exertion of the royal prerogative. It is far different from its exercise by an elective magistrate, acting in the character of a tribune of the people, to preserve their rights and liberties unimpaired. And secondly, because this veto power is no longer necessary to secure the prerogatives of the crown against the assaults of popular liberty.
Two centuries ago, the people of England asserted their rights by the sword against their sovereign. They dethroned and beheaded him. Since that time, the kings of England have changed their course. They have discovered from experience that it was much easier to govern Parliament by means of the patronage and money at the command of the crown, than openly to resist it by the veto power. This system has succeeded admirably. Influence has taken the place of prerogative; and since the days of Walpole, when the votes of members were purchased almost without disguise, corruption has nearly destroyed the independent action of Parliament. It has now descended into the ranks of the people, and threatens destruction to the institutions of that country. In the recent contest for power between the Whigs and the Tories, the bargain and sale of the votes of the electors was open and notorious. The bribery and corruption of both parties sought no disguise. In many places the price of a vote was fixed, like any other commodity in the market. These things have been proclaimed without contradiction on the floor of Parliament. The Tories had the most money to expend; and the cause of dear bread, with a starving population, prevailed over the modification or repeal of the corn laws. In a country so venal, it is easy for the crown, by a politic distribution of its honors, offices and emoluments, and if these should all fail, by a direct application of money, to preserve its prerogatives without the use of the veto power.
Besides, the principal ministers of the crown are always members of the House of Lords or the House of Commons. It is they who originate the important laws; and they, and they alone, are responsible, because it is a maxim of the British government, that the king can do no wrong. If they cannot maintain a majority in Parliament by the use of the patronage and influence of the crown, they must yield their places to their successful rivals; and the king, without the least hesitation, will receive as his confidential advisers to-morrow, the very men whose principles he had condemned but yesterday. Such is a king of England. He can do no wrong.
On one memorable occasion, when the ministers of the crown themselves—I refer to the coalition administration of Mr. Fox and Lord North—had passed their East India Bill through the House of Commons, it was defeated in the House of Lords by the direct personal influence of the sovereign. George the Third, it is known, would have vetoed that bill, had it passed the House of Lords; and well he might. It was an attempt by his own ministers to obtain possession of the wealth and the power of India, and to use them for the purpose of controlling both the sovereign and the people of England. This was not the common case of a mere struggle between opposite parties as to which should administer the government, about which the sovereign of England might be perfectly indifferent; but it was an attempt to deprive the crown of its power and prerogatives.