Under such circumstances, can the Senator seriously contend that, because the veto power has been disused by the kings of England, therefore, it ought to be taken from the President of the United States? The king is a hereditary sovereign—the President an elective magistrate. The king is not responsible to the people for the administration of the executive government—the President is alone responsible. The king could feel no interest in using the veto power, except to maintain the prerogatives of the crown; and it has been shown to be wholly unnecessary for this purpose; whilst the President has never exerted it on any important occasion, but in obedience to the public will, and then only for the purpose of preventing encroachment by Congress on the Constitution of the country, on the rights of the States, and on the liberties of the people.
The Senator is mistaken in supposing that the veto power has never been exercised in France. It is true, I believe, that it has never been exerted by the government of Louis Philippe; but his government is as yet nothing but a mere experiment. It has now existed less than twelve years, and during this short period there have been nineteen different cabinets. I saw a list of them a few days ago, in one of the public journals. To cite the example of such a government as authority here, is to prove that a Senator is hard run for arguments. The unfortunate Louis the Sixteenth, used the suspensive veto power conferred upon him by the first French Constitution, upon more than one occasion; but he used it not to enforce the will of the people as our Presidents have done, but against public opinion, which was at that time omnipotent in France. These vetoes proved but a feeble barrier against the tremendous torrent of the Revolution, which was at that time overwhelming all the corrupt and tyrannical institutions of the ancient monarchy.
The Senator has referred to the Declaration of Independence, to show that the exercise of this veto power by the king on the acts of the colonial legislature was one of the causes of the Revolution. In that instrument he is charged with having “refused his assent to laws the most wholesome and necessary for the public good.” In those days a douceur was presented, in Pennsylvania, to the proprietary governor, with every act of assembly in which the people felt a deep interest. I state this fact on the authority of Dr. Franklin. After the act was approved by the governor, it had then to be sent three thousand miles across the Atlantic for the approbation of a hereditary sovereign, in no manner responsible to the people of this country. It would have been strange, indeed, had not this power been abused under such circumstances. This was like the veto of Augustus after he had usurped the liberties of the Roman people, and made himself sole tribune—not like that of the tribunes annually elected by the Roman people. This was not the veto of James Madison, Andrew Jackson, or John Tyler—not the veto of a freeman, responsible to his fellow-freemen for the faithful and honest exercise of his important trust. This power is either democratic or arbitrary, as the authority exercising it may be dependent on the people or independent of them.
But, sir, this veto power, which I humbly apprehend to be useful in every State government, becomes absolutely necessary under the peculiar and complex form of the Federal Government. To this point I desire especially to direct the attention of the Senate. The Federal Constitution was a work of mutual compromise and concession; and the States which became parties to it, must take the evil with the good. A majority of the people within each of the several States have the inherent right to change, modify, and amend their Constitution at pleasure. Not so with respect to the Federal Constitution. In regard to it, a majority of the people of the United States can exercise no such power. And why? Simply because they have solemnly surrendered it, in consideration of obtaining by this surrender all the blessings and benefits of our glorious Union. It requires two-thirds of the representatives of the States in the Senate, and two-thirds of the representatives of the people in the House, even to propose an amendment to the Constitution; and this must be ratified by three-fourths of the States before it can take effect. Even if twenty-five of the twenty-six States of which the Union is composed should determine to deprive “little Delaware” of her equal representation in the Senate, she could defy them all, whilst this Constitution shall endure. It declares that “no State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate.”
As the Constitution could not have been adopted except by a majority of the people in every State of the Union, the members of the convention believed that it would be reasonable and just to require that three-fourths of the States should concur in changing that which all had adopted, and to which all had become parties. To give it a binding force upon the conscience of every public functionary, each Senator and Representative, whether in Congress or the several State legislatures, and every executive and judicial officer, whether State or Federal, is bound solemnly to swear or affirm that he will support the Constitution.
Now, sir, it has been said, and said truly by the Senator, that the will of the majority ought to prevail. This is an axiom in the science of liberty, which nobody at the present day will dispute. Under the Federal Constitution, this will must be declared in the manner which it has prescribed; and sooner or later, the majority must and will be obeyed in the enactment of laws. But what is this majority to which we are all bound to yield? Is it the majority of Senators and Representatives in Congress, or a majority of the people themselves? The fallacy of the Senator’s argument, from beginning to end, consists in the assumption that Congress, in every situation and under every circumstance, truly represents the deliberate will of the people. The framers of the Constitution believed it might be otherwise, and therefore they imposed the restriction of the qualified veto of the President upon the legislative action of Congress.
What is the most glorious and useful invention of modern times in the science of free government? Undoubtedly, written constitutions. For want of these, the ancient republics were scenes of turbulence, violence and disorder, and ended in self-destruction. And what are all our constitutions, but restraints imposed, not by arbitrary authority, but by the people upon themselves and their own representatives? Such throughout is the character of the Federal Constitution. And it is this Constitution thus restricted, which has so long secured our liberty and prosperity, and has endeared itself to the heart of every good citizen.
This system of self-imposed restraints is a necessary element of our social condition. Every wise and virtuous man adopts resolutions by which he regulates his conduct, for the purpose of counteracting the evil propensities of his nature, and preventing him from yielding under the impulses of sudden and strong temptation. Is such a man the less free—the less independent, because he chooses to submit to these self-imposed restraints? In like manner, is the majority of the people less free and less independent, because it has chosen to impose constitutional restrictions upon itself and its representatives? Is this any abridgment of popular liberty? The true philosophy of republican government, as the history of the world has demonstrated, consists in the establishment of such counteracting powers,—powers always created by the people themselves,—as shall render it morally certain that no law can be passed by their servants which shall not be in accordance with their will, and calculated to promote their good.
It is for this reason that a senate has been established in every State of the Union to control the House of Representatives: and I presume there is scarcely an individual in the country who is not convinced of its necessity. Fifty years ago, opinions were much divided upon this subject, and nothing but experience has settled the question. In France, the National Assembly, although they retained the king, rejected a senate as aristocratic, and our own Franklin was opposed to it. He thought that the popular branch was alone necessary to reflect the will of the people, and that a senate would be but a mere incumbrance. His influence prevailed in the convention which framed the first constitution for Pennsylvania, and we had no senate. The Doctor’s argument against it was contained in one of his homely but striking illustrations. Why, said he, will you place a horse in front of a cart to draw it forward, and another behind to draw it back? Experience, which is the wisest teacher, has demonstrated the fallacy of this and all other similar arguments, and public opinion is now unanimous on the subject. Where is the man who does not now feel that the control of a senate is necessary to restrain and modify the action of the popular branch?
And how is our own Senate composed? One-fourth of the people of this Union, through the agency of the State legislatures, can send a majority into this chamber. A bill may pass the House of Representatives by a unanimous vote, and yet be defeated here by a majority of Senators representing but one-fourth of the people of the United States. Why does not the Senator from Kentucky propose to abolish the Senate? His argument would be much stronger against its existence than against that of the veto power in the hands of a Chief Magistrate, who, in this particular, is the true representative of the majority of the whole people.