All the beauty, and harmony, and order of the universe arise from counteracting influences. When its great Author, in the beginning, gave the planets their projective impulse, they would have rushed in a straight line through the realms of boundless space, had he not restrained them within their prescribed orbits by the counteracting influence of gravitation. All the valuable inventions in mechanics consist in blending simple powers together so as to restrain and regulate the action of each other. Restraint—restraint—not that imposed by arbitrary and irresponsible power, but by the people themselves, in their own written constitutions, is the great law which has rendered Democratic Representative Government so successful in these latter times. The best security which the people can have against abuses of trust by their public servants, is to ordain that it shall be the duty of one class of them to watch and restrain another. Sir, this Federal Government, in its legislative attributes, is nothing but a system of restraints from beginning to end. In order to enact any bill into a law, it must be passed by the representatives of the people in the House, and also by the representatives of the sovereign States in the Senate, where, as I have observed before, it may be defeated by Senators from States containing but one-fourth of the population of the country. After it has undergone these two ordeals, it must yet be subjected to that of the Executive, as the tribune of the whole people, for his approbation. If he should exercise his veto power, it cannot become a law unless it be passed by a majority of two-thirds of both Houses. These are the mutual restraints which the people have imposed on their public servants, to preserve their own rights and those of the States from rash, hasty, and impolitic legislation. No treaty with a foreign power can be binding upon the people of this country unless it shall receive the assent of the President and two-thirds of the Senate; and this is the restraint which the people have imposed on the treaty-making power.
All these restraints are peculiarly necessary to protect the rights and preserve the harmony of the different States which compose our Union. It now consists of twenty-six distinct and independent States, and this number may yet be considerably increased. These States differ essentially from each other in their domestic institutions, in the character of their population, and even, to some extent, in their language. They embrace every variety of soil, climate, and productions. In an enlarged view, I believe their interests to be all identical; although, to the eye of local and sectional prejudice, they always appear to be conflicting. In such a condition, mutual jealousies must arise, which can only be repressed by that mutual forbearance which pervades the Constitution. To legislate wisely for such a people is a task of extreme delicacy, and requires much self-restraining prudence and caution. In this point of view, I firmly believe that the veto power is one of the best safeguards of the Union. By this power, the majority of the people in every State have decreed that the existing laws shall remain unchanged, unless not only a majority in each House of Congress, but the President also, shall sanction the change. By these wise and wholesome restrictions, they have secured themselves, so far as human prudence can, against hasty, oppressive, and dangerous legislation.
The rights of the weaker portions of the Union will find one of their greatest securities in the veto power. It would be easy to imagine interests of the deepest importance to particular sections which might be seriously endangered by its destruction. For example, not more than one-third of the States have any direct interest in the coasting trade. This trade is now secured to American vessels, not merely by a protective duty, but by an absolute prohibition of all foreign competition. Suppose the advocates of free trade run mad should excite the jealousy of the Senators and Representatives from the other two-thirds of the States against this comparatively local interest, and convince them that this trade ought to be thrown open to foreign navigation. By such a competition, they might contend that the price of freight would be reduced, and that the producers of cotton, wheat, and other articles ought not to be taxed in order to sustain such a monopoly in favor of their own ship building and navigating interest. Should Congress, influenced by these or any other consideration, ever pass an act to open this trade to the competition of foreigners, there is no man fit to fill the executive chair who would not place his veto upon it, and thus refer the subject to the sober determination of the American people. To deprive the navigating States of this privilege, would be to aim a deadly blow at the very existence of the Union.
Let me suppose another case of a much more dangerous character. In the Southern States, which compose the weaker portion of the Union, a species of property exists which is now attracting the attention of the whole civilized world. These States never would have become parties to the Union, had not their rights in this property been secured by the Federal Constitution. Foreign and domestic fanatics—some from the belief that they are doing God’s service, and others from a desire to divide and destroy this glorious Republic—have conspired to emancipate the Southern slaves. On this question, the people of the South, beyond the limits of their own States, stand alone and unsupported by any power on earth, except that of the Northern Democracy. These fanatical philanthropists are now conducting a crusade over the whole world, and are endeavoring to concentrate the public opinion of all mankind against this right of property. Suppose they should ever influence a majority in both Houses of Congress to pass a law, not to abolish this property—for that would be too palpable a violation of the Constitution—but to render it of no value, under the letter, but against the spirit of some one of the powers granted; will any lover of his country say that the President ought not to possess the power of arresting such an act by his veto, until the solemn decision of the people should be known on this question, involving the life or death of the Union? We, sir, of the non-slaveholding States, entered the Union upon the express condition that this property should be protected. Whatever may be our own private opinions in regard to slavery in the abstract, ought we to hazard all the blessings of our free institutions—our Union and our strength—in such a crusade against our brethren of the South? Ought we to jeopard every political right we hold dear, for the sake of enabling these fanatics to invade Southern rights, and render that fair portion of our common inheritance a scene of servile war, rapine, and murder? Shall we apply the torch to the magnificent temple of human liberty which our forefathers reared at the price of their blood and treasure, and permit all we hold dear to perish in the conflagration? I trust not.
It is possible that at some future day the majority in Congress may attempt, by indirect means, to emancipate the slaves of the South. There is no knowing through what channel the ever active spirit of fanaticism may seek to accomplish its object. The attempt may be made through the taxing power, or some other express power granted by the Constitution. God only knows how it may be made. It is hard to say what means fanaticism may not adopt to accomplish its purpose. Do we feel so secure, in this hour of peril from abroad and peril at home, as to be willing to prostrate any of the barriers which the Constitution has reared against hasty and dangerous legislation? No, sir, never was the value of the veto power more manifest than at the present moment. For the weaker portion of the Union, whose constitutional rights are now assailed with such violence, to think of abandoning this safeguard, would be almost suicidal. It is my solemn conviction, that there never was a wiser or more beautiful adaptation of theory to practice in any government than that which requires a majority of two-thirds in both Houses of Congress to pass an act returned by the President with his objections, under all the high responsibilities which he owes to his country.
Sir, ours is a glorious Constitution. Let us venerate it—let us stand by it as the work of great and good men, unsurpassed in the history of any age or nation. Let us not assail it rashly with our invading hands, but honor it as the fountain of our prosperity and power. Let us protect it as the only system of government which could have rendered us what we are in half a century, and enabled us to take the front rank among the nations of the earth. In my opinion, it is the only form of government which can preserve the blessings of liberty and prosperity to the people, and at the same time secure the rights and sovereignty of the States. Sir, the great mass of the people are unwilling that it shall be changed. Although the Senator from Kentucky, to whom I cannot and do not attribute any but patriotic motives, has brought himself to believe that a change is necessary, especially in the veto power, I must differ from him entirely, convinced that his opinions on this subject are based upon fallacious theories of the nature of our institutions. This view of his opinions is strengthened by his declarations the other day as to the illimitable rights of the majority in Congress. On that point he differs essentially from the framers of the Constitution. They believed that the people of the different States had rights which might be violated by such a majority; and the veto power was one of the modes which they devised for preventing these rights from being invaded.
The Senator, in support of his objections to the veto power, has used what he denominates a numerical argument, and asks, can it be supposed that any President will possess more wisdom than nine Senators and forty Representatives. (This is the number more than a bare majority of each body which would at present be required to pass a bill by a majority of two-thirds.) To this question, my answer is, no, it is not to be so supposed at all. All that we have to suppose is, what our ancestors, in their acknowledged wisdom, did suppose; that Senators and Representatives are but mortal men, endowed with mortal passions and subject to mortal infirmities; that they are susceptible of selfish and unwise impulses, and that they do not always and under all circumstances, truly reflect the will of their constituents. These founders of our Government, therefore, supposed the possibility that Congress might pass an act through the influence of unwise or improper motives; and that the best mode of saving the country from the evil effects of such legislation was to place a qualified veto in the hands of the people’s own representative, the President of the United States, by means of which, unless two-thirds of each House of Congress should repass the bill, the question must be brought directly before the people themselves. These wise men had made the President so dependent on Congress that they knew he would never abuse this power, nor exert it unless from the highest and most solemn convictions of duty; and experience has established their wisdom and foresight.
As to the Senator’s numerical argument, I might as well ask him, is it to be supposed that we are so superior in wisdom to the members of the House that the vote of one Senator ought to annul the votes of thirty-two Representatives? And yet the bill to repeal the bankrupt law has just been defeated in this body by a majority of one, although it had passed the House by a majority of thirty-two. The Senator’s numerical argument, if it be good for anything at all, would be good for the abolition of the Senate as well as of the veto; and would lead at once to the investment of all the powers of legislation in the popular branch alone. But experience has long exploded this theory throughout the world. The framers of the Constitution, in consummate wisdom, thought proper to impose checks, and balances, and restrictions on their Governmental agents; and woe betide us, if the day should ever arrive when they shall be removed.
But I must admit that another of the Senator’s arguments is perhaps not quite so easily refuted, though, I think, it is not very difficult to demonstrate its fallacy. It is undoubtedly his strongest position. He says that the tendency of the veto power is to draw after it all the powers of legislation; and that Congress, in passing laws, will be compelled to consult, not the good of the country alone, but to ascertain, in the first instance, what the President will approve, and then regulate their conduct according to his predetermined will.
This argument presupposes the existence of two facts, which must be established before it can have the least force. First, that the President would depart from his proper sphere, and attempt to influence the initiatory legislation of Congress: and, second, that Congress would be so subservient as to originate and pass laws, not according to the dictates of their own judgment, but in obedience to his expressed wishes. Now, sir, does not the Senator perceive that his argument proves too much? Would not the President have precisely the same influence over Congress, so far as his patronage extends, as if the veto had never existed at all? He would then resemble the King of England, whose veto power has been almost abandoned for the last hundred and fifty years. If the President’s power and patronage were coextensive with that of the king, he could exercise an influence over Congress similar to that which is now exerted over the British Parliament, and might control legislation in the same manner.