Thus, sir, you perceive that to deprive the President of the veto power, would afford no remedy against executive influence in Congress, if the President were disposed to exert it. Nay, more—it would encourage him to interfere secretly with our legislative functions, because, deprived of the veto power, his only resource would be to intrigue with members of Congress for the purpose of preventing the passage of measures which he might disapprove. At present this power enables him to act openly and boldly, and to state his reasons to the country for refusing his assent to any act passed by Congress.
Again: does not the Senator perceive that this argument is a direct attack upon the character of Congress? Does he not feel that the whole weight of his argument in favor of abolishing the veto power, rests upon the wisdom, integrity, and independence of that body? And yet we are told that in order to prevent the application of the veto, we shall become so subservient to the Executive, that in the passage of laws we will consult his wishes rather than our own independent judgment. The venality and baseness of Congress are the only foundations on which such an argument can rest; and yet it is the presumption of their integrity and wisdom on which the Senator relies for the purpose of proving that the veto power is wholly unnecessary, and ought to be abolished.
In regard to this thing of executive influence over Congress, I have a few words to say. Sir, I have been an attentive observer of Congressional proceedings for the last twenty years, and have watched its operations with an observing eye. I shall not pretend to say that it does not exist to some extent; but its power has been greatly overrated. It can never become dangerous to liberty, unless the patronage of the Government should be enormously increased by the passage of such unconstitutional and encroaching laws as have hitherto fallen under the blow of the veto power.
The Executive, indeed, will always have personal friends, as well as ardent political supporters of his administration in Congress, who will strongly incline to view his measures with a favorable eye. He will also have, both in and out of Congress, expectants who look to him for a share of the patronage at his disposal. But, after all, to what does this amount?
Whilst the canvass is proceeding previous to his election, the expectations of candidates for office will array around him a host of ardent and active friends. But what is his condition after the election has passed, and the patronage has been distributed? Let me appeal to the scene which we all witnessed in this city, at and after the inauguration of the late lamented President. It is almost impossible that one office seeker in fifty could have been gratified. What is the natural and necessary result of such numerous disappointments? It is to irritate the feelings and sour the minds of the unsuccessful applicants. They make comparisons between themselves and those who have been successful, and self-love always exaggerates their own merits and depreciates those of their successful rivals, to such an extent, that they believe themselves to have been injured. The President thus often makes one inactive friend, because he feels himself secure in office, and twenty secret enemies awaiting the opportunity to give him a stab whenever a favorable occasion may offer. The Senator greatly overrates the power of executive influence either among the people or in Congress. By the time the offices have been all distributed, which is usually done between the inauguration and the first regular meeting of Congress thereafter, the President has but few boons to offer.
Again: it is always an odious exercise of executive power to confer offices on members of Congress, unless under peculiar circumstances, where the office seeks the man rather than the man the office. In point of fact, but few members can receive appointments; and those soliciting them are always detected by their conduct. They are immediately noted for their subserviency; and from that moment, their influence with their fellow members is gone.
By far the greatest influence which a President can acquire over Congress, is a reflected influence from the people upon their representatives. This is dependent upon the personal popularity of the President, and can never be powerful, unless, from the force of his character, and the value of his past services, he has inspired the people with an enthusiastic attachment. A remarkable example of this reflected influence was presented in the case of General Jackson; and yet it is a high compliment to the independence, if not to the wisdom of Congress, that even he could rarely command a majority in both its branches. Still it is certain, notwithstanding, that he presented a most striking example of a powerful executive; and this chiefly because he was deservedly strong in the affections of the people.
In the vicissitude of human events, we shall sometimes have Presidents who can, if they please, exercise too much, and those who possess too little, influence over Congress. If we witnessed the one extreme during General Jackson’s administration, we now have the other before our eyes. For the sake of the contrast, and without the slightest disrespect towards the worthy and amiable individual who now occupies the Presidential chair, I would say that if General Jackson presented an example of the strength, the present President presents an equally striking example of the feebleness, of executive influence. I ask what has all the patronage of his high office done for him? How many friends has it secured? I most sincerely wish, for the good of the country, and for the success of his administration, that he had a much greater degree of influence in Congress than he possesses. It is for this reason that I was glad to observe, a few days ago, some symptoms of returning favor on this (the Whig) side of the house towards John Tyler. It is better, much better, even thus late, that they should come forward and extend to him a helping hand, than, wishing to do so, still keep at a distance merely to preserve an appearance of consistency. I am sorry to see that from this mere affectation, they should appear so coy, and leave the country to suffer all the embarrassments which result from a weak administration. [Here several of the Whig Senators asked jocosely why the Democrats did not volunteer their services to strengthen the Government.] Oh! said Mr. B., we cannot do that. What is merely an apparent inconsistency in the Whigs, would be a real inconsistency in us. We cannot go for the Whig measures which were approved by President Tyler at the extra session. We cannot support the great Government Exchequer Bank of discount and exchange, with its three for one paper currency. I think, however, with all deference, that my Whig friends on this side of the House ought not to be squeamish on that subject. I think my friend from Georgia (Mr. Berrien) ought to go heart and hand for the Exchequer Bank. It is in substance his own scheme of a “Fiscal Corporation,” transferred into the Treasury of the United States, and divested of private stockholders. Let me assure gentlemen that their character for consistency will not suffer by supporting this measure.
And yet, with the example of this administration before their eyes, the Whigs dread executive influence so much that they wish to abolish the veto power, lest the President may be able to draw within its vortex all the legislative powers of Congress! What a world we live in!
This authentic history is the best answer to another position of the Senator. Whilst he believes that there have been no encroachments of the General Government on the rights of the States, but on the contrary that it is fast sinking into the weakness and imbecility of the Confederation, he complains of the encroachments which he alleges to have been made by the President on the legitimate powers of Congress. I differ from him entirely in both these propositions, and am only sorry that the subject of the veto power is one so vast that time will not permit me to discuss them at present. This I shall, however, say, that the strong tendency of the Federal Government has, in my opinion, ever been to encroach upon the rights of the States and their people; and I might appeal to its history to establish the position. Every violent struggle, threatening the existence of the Union, which has existed in this country from the beginning, has arisen from the exercise of constructive and doubtful powers, not by the President, but by Congress. But enough of this for the present.