In regard to the state of parties, viewed apart from the merely personal element of leadership and following, there was not much, in the beginning of Mr. Adams’s administration, to distinguish its supporters from its opponents. In the course, however, of that administration, those who defended it from the fierce assaults of the opposition, began to take the name of National Republicans, while the opponents of the administration began to call themselves Democrats. Included in the opposition were the political friends and followers of Mr. Calhoun, and the political friends and followers of General Jackson; the latter being distinctly known and classified as “Jackson men.” In the Senate there was a number of older men, who were not likely to form an active element of parliamentary opposition or defence; such as Mr. Silsbee of Massachusetts, Mr. Dickerson of New Jersey, Mr. Samuel Smith of Maryland, Mr. William Smith of South Carolina, Mr. Macon of Georgia, Mr. Rowan of Kentucky, and Mr. Hugh L. White of Tennessee. The opposition in the Senate was led by a younger class of men: Mr. Van Buren of New York, Mr. Woodbury of New Hampshire, Mr. Tazewell of Virginia, Mr. Hayne of South Carolina, Mr. Berrien of Georgia, and Mr. Benton of Missouri.[[17]] But it was not in the Senate that the great arena of debate between the assailants and the defenders of this administration was to be found during the first year or two of its term. In the House, at the opening of the 19th Congress, which began its session in December, 1825, there was an array of combatants—ardent, active and able debaters. Of these, composing the leaders of the opposition, were Mr. Buchanan, Samuel D. Ingham, William C. Rives, James K. Polk, John Forsyth, George McDuffie, Edward Livingston, William Drayton, William S. Archer, Andrew Stevenson, Mangum, Cambreleng, and Louis McLane. The eccentric John Randolph was also one of the leaders of the opposition. The leading friends of the administration were Webster, Sprague, Bartlett, John Davis, Edward Everett, Burgess, Taylor, Letcher, Wright, Vinton, and Henry L. Storrs.
Before the opposition had marshalled their forces for an attack upon the administration, a debate occurred in the House of Representatives upon a subject that did not involve party divisions. A bill was introduced by a Pennsylvania member for the relief of the surviving officers of the Revolution. It proposed an appropriation of only one million of dollars, and it was confined strictly to the cases of the Revolutionary officers to whom half-pay for life had been granted by Congress in 1780, who had afterwards accepted a commutation of five years’ full pay, in lieu of half-pay for life, and who were paid in certificates that were never worth more than one-fifth of their nominal value, and which were soon depreciated to about one-eighth. The passage of this measure depended upon the prudence and skill of those who favored it. The mover, Mr. Hemphill of Pennsylvania, and Mr. Dayton, had advocated the bill in speeches of much discretion, and there was a good prospect of its adoption. In this state of things, an untoward amendment was offered by a member from Massachusetts, which proposed to increase the appropriation. This had a manifest tendency to defeat the bill; and at this crisis Mr. Buchanan came forward to restate the case of the officers, and to replace the measure on its true footing. He said:
“It is with extreme reluctance I rise at this time to address you. I have made no preparation to speak, except that of carefully reading the documents which have been laid upon our tables; but a crisis seems to have arrived in this debate, when the friends of the bill, if ever, must come forward in its support. I do not consider that the claim of the officers of the Revolution rests upon gratitude alone. It is not an appeal to your generosity only, but to your justice. You owe them a debt, in the strictest sense of the word; and of a nature so meritorious, that, if you shall refuse to pay it, the nation will be disgraced. Formerly, when their claim was presented to Congress, we had, at least, an apology for rejecting it. The country was not then in a condition to discharge this debt without inconvenience. But now, after forty years have elapsed since its creation, with a treasury overflowing, and a national debt so diminished, that, with ordinary economy, it must, in a very few years, be discharged, these officers, the relics of that band which achieved your independence, again present themselves before you, and again ask you for justice. They do not ask you to be generous—they do not ask you to be grateful—but they ask you to pay the debt which was the price of your independence. I term it a debt; and it is one founded upon a most solemn contract, with which these officers have complied, both in its letter and in its spirit, whilst you have violated all its obligations.
“Let us spend a few moments in tracing the history of this claim. It arose out of the distresses of the Continental Army, during the Revolutionary War; and the utter inability of the government, at that time, to relieve them. What, sir, was the situation of that army, when it lay encamped at the Valley Forge? They were naked, and hungry, and barefoot. Pestilence and famine stalked abroad throughout the camp. The first blaze of patriotism which had animated the country, and furnished the army with its officers, had begun to die away. These officers perceived that the contest would be long, and bloody, and doubtful. They had felt, by sad experience, that the depreciated pay which they received, so far from enabling them to impart assistance to their wives and children, or hoard up anything for futurity, was not sufficient to supply their own absolute and immediate wants. Placed in this situation, they were daily sending in their resignations, and abandoning the cause of their country. In this alarming crisis, Washington earnestly recommended to Congress to grant the officers half-pay, to commence after the close of the contest, as the only remedy for these evils, within their power. The country was not then able to remunerate the officers for the immense and unequal sacrifices which they were making in its cause. All that it could then do was to present them a prospect of happier days to come, on which hope might rest. With this view, Congress, in May, 1778, adopted a resolution allowing the officers who should continue in service until the end of the war, half-pay for seven years. This resolution produced but a partial effect upon the army. The time of its continuance was to be but short; and there were conditions annexed to it, which, in many cases, would have rendered it entirely inoperative.
“In August, 1779, Congress again acted upon this subject, and resolved, ‘That it be recommended to the several States to grant half-pay for life to the officers who should continue in the service to the end of the war.’ This recommendation was disregarded by every State in the Union, with one exception; and I feel proud that Pennsylvania was that State. She not only granted half-pay for life to the officers of her own line, but she furnished them with clothing and with provisions. Thus, when the General Government became unable to discharge its duty to her officers and soldiers, she voluntarily interposed and relieved their distresses. General Washington, when urging upon Congress the necessity of granting to the officers half-pay for life, pointed to those of the Pennsylvania line as an example of the beneficial consequences which had resulted from that measure.[[18]]
“Congress at length became convinced of the necessity of granting to the Continental officers half-pay for life. Without pay and without clothing, they had become disheartened and were about abandoning the service. The darkest period of the Revolution had arrived, and there was but one ray of hope left to penetrate the impending gloom which hung over the army. The officers were willing still to endure privations and sufferings, if they could obtain an assurance that they would be remembered by their country, after it should be blessed with peace and independence. They well knew Congress could not relieve their present wants; all, therefore, they asked was the promise of a future provision. Congress, at length, in October, 1780, resolved, ‘That half-pay for life be granted to the officers in the army of the United States who shall continue in service to the end of the war.’
“Before the adoption of this resolution, so desperate had been our condition, that even Washington apprehended a dissolution of the army, and had begun to despair of the success of our cause. We have his authority for declaring that, immediately after its adoption, our prospects brightened and it produced the most happy effects. The state of the army was instantly changed. The officers became satisfied with their condition, and, under their command, the army marched to victory and independence. They faithfully and patriotically performed every obligation imposed upon them by the solemn contract into which they had entered with their country.
“How did you perform this contract on your part? No sooner had the dangers of war ceased to threaten our existence—no sooner had peace returned to bless our shores, than we forgot those benefactors to whom, under Providence, we owed our independence. We then began to discover that it was contrary to the genius of our Republican institutions to grant pensions for life. The jealousy of the people was roused, and their fears excited. They dreaded the creation of a privileged order. I do not mean to censure them for this feeling of ill-directed jealousy, because jealousy is the natural guardian of liberty.
“In this emergency, how did the Continental officers act? In such a manner as no other officers of a victorious army had ever acted before. For the purpose of allaying the apprehensions of their fellow-citizens, and complying with the wishes of Congress, they consented to accept five years’ full-pay in commutation for their half-pay for life. This commutation was to be paid in money, or securities were to be given on interest at six per cent., as Congress should find most convenient.
“Did the government ever perform this their second stipulation to the officers? I answer, no. The gentleman from Tennessee was entirely mistaken in the history of the times, when he asserted that the commutation certificates of the officers enabled them to purchase farms, or commence trade, upon leaving the army. Congress had not any funds to pledge for their redemption. They made requisitions upon the States, which shared the same fate with many others, and were entirely disregarded. The faith and the honor of the country, whilst they were intrusted to thirteen independent and jealous State sovereignties, were almost always forfeited. We then had a General Government which had not the power of enforcing its own edicts. The consequence was that, when the officers received their certificates, they were not worth more than about one-fifth of their nominal value, and they very soon fell to one-eighth of that amount.