“Let gentlemen for a moment realize what must then have been the situation and the feelings of these officers. They had spent their best days in the service of their country. They had endured hardships and privations without an example in history. Destitute of everything but patriotism, they had lived for years upon the mere promise of Congress. At the call of their country, they had relinquished half-pay for life, and accepted a new promise of five years’ full-pay. When they had confidently expected to receive this recompense, it vanished from their grasp. Instead of money, or securities equal to money, which would have enabled them to embark with advantage in civil employments, they obtained certificates which necessity compelled most of them to sell at the rate of eight for one. The government proved faithless, but they had, what we have not, the plea of necessity, to justify their conduct.
“In 1790, the provision which was made by law for the payment of the public debt, embraced these commutation certificates. They were funded, and the owner of each of them received three certificates; the first for two-thirds of the original amount, bearing an interest immediately of six per cent.; the second for the remaining third, but without interest for ten years; and the third for the interest which had accumulated, bearing an interest of only three per cent.
“What does this bill propose? Not to indemnify the officers of the Revolution for the loss which they sustained in consequence of the inability of the government, at the close of the war, to comply with its solemn contract. Not, after a lapse of more than forty years, to place them in the situation in which they would have been placed had the government been able to do them justice. It proposes to allow them even less than the difference between what the owners of the commutation certificates received under the funding system, and what these certificates when funded were worth upon their face. My colleague has clearly shown, by a fair calculation, that the allowance will fall considerably short of this difference. If the question now before the committee were to be decided by the people of the United States instead of their Representatives, could any man, for a moment, doubt what would be their determination?
“I hope my friend from Massachusetts will not urge the amendment he has proposed. Judging from past experience, I fear, if it should prevail, the bill will be defeated. Let other classes of persons who think themselves entitled to the bounty of their country present their claims to this House, and they will be fairly investigated. This is what the surviving officers of the Revolution have done. Their case has been thoroughly examined by a committee, who have reported in its favor; and all the information necessary to enable us to decide correctly is now in our possession. I trust their claim will be permitted to rest upon its own foundation. They are old, and for the most part in poverty; it is necessary, if we act at all, that we act speedily, and do them justice without delay. In my opinion, they have a better claim to what this bill contemplates giving them, than any of us have to our eight dollars per day. Gentlemen need apprehend no danger from the precedent; we shall never have another Revolutionary war for independence. We have no reason to apprehend we shall ever again be unable to pay our just debts. Even if that should again be our unfortunate condition, we shall never have another army so patient and so devoted as to sacrifice every selfish consideration for the glory, the happiness, and the independence of their country. I shall vote against the proposed amendment because I will do no act which may have a tendency to defeat this bill.”
Mr. Buchanan used to relate, in after years, that at this juncture, the friends of the bill were dismayed by the course of Mr. Everett, who was then a young member from Massachusetts, and who wished to make and insisted upon making a rhetorical speech. The friends of the bill remonstrated with him, that all had been said that needed to be said; and that the only thing to be done was to vote down the amendment, after which the bill was almost certain to be passed. But Mr. Everett persisted, and made his speech while the amendment was pending.[[19]] He “demanded” of the House to pass the bill, and by passing it as proposed to be amended by his colleague to give the survivors of the Revolution “all they ask and more than they ask.” The consequence was that the appropriation was increased. Then a member from New York moved to extend its provisions to every militia-man who had served for a certain time. Then other amendments embraced widows and orphans, artificers and musicians, the troops who fought at Bunker Hill, the troops raised in Vermont, those of the battles of Saratoga and Bennington, and of the Southern battles. The enemies of the original measure promoted this method of dealing with it, and finally, when thus loaded down with provisions not at all germane to its real principle, it was recommitted to the Committee and was therefore lost.
The first important subject of contention on which the opposition put forth their strength against the administration of Mr. Adams related to what was called “The Panama Mission.” In his Message of December, 1825, the President made the following announcement:
“Among the measures which have been suggested to the Spanish-American Republics by the new relations with one another resulting from the recent changes of their condition, is that of assembling at the Isthmus of Panama, a Congress at which each of them should be represented, to deliberate upon objects important to the welfare of all. The republics of Colombia, of Mexico, and of Central America, have already deputed plenipotentiaries to such a meeting, and they have invited the United States to be also represented there by their ministers. The invitation has been accepted, and ministers on the part of the United States will be commissioned to attend at those deliberations, and to take part in them, so far as may be compatible with that neutrality from which it is neither our intention nor the desire of the other American States that we should depart.”
It was, beyond controversy, the constitutional prerogative of the President, as the organ of all intercourse with foreign nations, to accept this invitation, and to name Ministers to the proposed Congress. The Senate might or might not concur with him in this step, and might or might not confirm the nominations of the proposed Ministers. He sent to the Senate the names of John Sergeant of Philadelphia, and Richard C. Anderson of Kentucky, as the Ministers of the United States to the proposed Congress at Panama. The Senatorial opposition, led by Mr. Benton and Mr. Tazewell, after a long discussion in secret session, took a vote upon a resolution that it was inexpedient to send Ministers to Panama. This was rejected by a vote of 24 to 19; and the nominations were then confirmed by a vote of 27 to 17 in the case of Mr. Anderson, and by a vote of 26 to 18 in the case of Mr. Sergeant. The diplomatic department having thus fully acted upon and confirmed the proposed measure, it remained for the House of Representatives to initiate and pass the necessary appropriation. The turn that was given to the subject in the House gave rise to an animated debate on a very important constitutional topic, in which Mr. Buchanan, although opposed to the Mission, asserted it to be the duty of the House to make the appropriation, now that the Senate had confirmed the appointment of the Ministers. This debate began upon a resolution reported by the Committee on Foreign Affairs, that “in the opinion of the House it is expedient to appropriate the funds necessary to enable the President of the United States to send Ministers to the Congress of Panama.” To this resolution, Mr. McLane of Delaware had moved an amendment, which, if it had been adopted, would have placed the House of Representatives in the anomalous attitude of annexing, as a condition of its grant, instructions as to the mode in which the diplomatic agents of the United States were to act in carrying out a foreign mission. Mr. Buchanan, who was in favor of the amendments, was also in favor of making the appropriation necessary to enable the President to send the Mission; and in support of this constitutional duty of the House, he made an argument on the 11th of April (1826) which drew from Mr. Webster the compliment that he had placed this part of the subject in a point of view which could not be improved.[[20]] Mr. Buchanan said:
“I know there are several gentlemen on this floor, who approve of the policy of the amendments proposed, and wish to express an opinion in their favor; and who yet feel reluctant to vote for them, because it is their intention finally to support the appropriation bill. They think, if the amendments should be rejected, consistency would require them to refuse any grant of money to carry this mission into effect. I shall, therefore, ask the attention of the committee, whilst I endeavor to prove that there would not, in any event, be the slightest inconsistency in this course.
“I assert it to be a position susceptible of the clearest proof, that the House of Representatives is morally bound, unless in extreme cases, to vote the salaries of Ministers who have been constitutionally created by the President and Senate. The expediency of establishing the mission was one question, which has already been decided by the competent authority; when the appropriation bill shall come before us, we will be called upon to decide another and a very different question. Richard C. Anderson and John Sergeant have been regularly nominated by the President of United States to be Envoys Extraordinary and Ministers Plenipotentiary ‘to the Assembly of American nations at Panama.’ The Senate, after long and solemn deliberation, have advised and consented to their appointment. These Ministers have been created—they have been called into existence under the authority of the Constitution of the United States. That venerated instrument declares, that the President ‘shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur: and he shall nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law.’ What, then, will be the question upon the appropriation bill? In order to enable our Ministers to proceed upon their mission, the President has asked us to grant the necessary appropriation. Shall we incur the responsibility of refusing? Shall we thus defeat the mission which has already been established by the only competent constitutional authorities? This House has, without doubt, the physical power to refuse the appropriation, and it possesses the same power to withhold his salary from the President of the United States. The true question is, what is the nature of our constitutional obligation? Are we not morally bound to pay the salaries given by existing laws to every officer of the Government? By the act of the first May, 1810, the outfit and salary to be allowed by the President to Foreign Ministers are established. Such Ministers have been regularly appointed to attend the Congress at Panama. What right then have we to refuse to appropriate the salaries which they have a right to receive, under the existing laws of the land?