One of the first of these duties, and one that he discharged with signal ability, required him to introduce and advocate a bill to amend and extend the judicial system of the United States, by including in the circuit court system the States of Louisiana, Indiana, Mississippi, Illinois, Alabama, and Missouri, which had hitherto had only district courts, and by increasing the number of judges of the Supreme Court to nine. Mr. Buchanan’s speech in explanation of this measure, delivered January 14, 1830, was as important a one as has been made upon the subject. The measure which he advocated was not adopted at that time; but his speech may be resorted to at all times for its valuable discussion of a question that has not yet lost its interest,—the question of releasing the judges of the Supreme Court entirely from the performance of circuit duties. Until I read this speech, I was not aware how wisely and comprehensively Mr. Buchanan could deal with such a question. The following passages seem to me to justify a very high estimate of his powers, as they certainly contain much wisdom:
Having thus given a hasty sketch of the history of the Judiciary of the United States, and of the jurisdiction of the circuit courts which this bill proposes to extend to the six new States of the Union, I shall now proceed to present the views of the Committee on the Judiciary in relation to this important subject. In doing this, I feel that, before I can expect the passage of the bill, I must satisfy the committee, first, that such a change or modification of the present judiciary system ought to be adopted, as will place the Western States on an equal footing with the other States of the Union; and, second, that the present bill contains the best provisions which, under all the circumstances, can be devised for accomplishing this purpose.
And first, in regard to the States of Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee. It may be said that the existing law has already established circuit courts in these three States, and why then should they complain? In answer to this question, I ask gentlemen to look at a map of the United States, and examine the extent of this circuit. The distance which the judge is compelled to travel, by land, for the purpose of attending the different circuit courts, is, of itself, almost sufficient, in a few years, to destroy any common constitution. From Columbus, in Ohio, he proceeds to Frankfort, in Kentucky; from Frankfort to Nashville; and from Nashville, across the Cumberland mountain, to Knoxville. When we reflect that, in addition to his attendance of the courts in each of these States, twice in the year, he is obliged annually to attend the Supreme Court in Washington, we must all admit that his labors are very severe.
This circuit is not only too extensive, but there is a great press of judicial business in each of the States of which it is composed. In addition to the ordinary sources of litigation for the circuit courts throughout the Union, particular causes have existed for its extraordinary accumulation in each of these States. It will be recollected that, under the Constitution and laws of the United States, the circuit courts may try land causes between citizens of the same State, provided they claim under grants from different States. In Tennessee, grants under that State and the State of North Carolina, for the same land, often come into conflict in the circuit court. The interfering grants of Virginia and Kentucky are a fruitful source of business for the circuit court of Kentucky. These causes, from their very nature, are difficult and important, and must occupy much time and attention. Within the Virginia military district of Ohio, there are also many disputed land titles.
Another cause has contributed much to swell the business of the circuit court of Kentucky. The want of confidence of the citizens of other States in the judicial tribunals of that State, has greatly added to the number of suits in the circuit court. Many plaintiff’s, who could, with greater expedition, have recovered their demands in the courts of the State, were compelled, by the impolitic acts of the State Legislature, to resort to the courts of the United States. Whilst these laws were enforced by the State courts, they were disregarded by those of the Union. In making these remarks, I am confident no representative from that patriotic State will mistake my meaning. I rejoice that the difficulties are now at an end, and that the people of Kentucky have discovered the ruinous policy of interposing the arm of the law to shield a debtor from the just demands of his creditor. That gallant and chivalrous people, who possess a finer soil and a finer climate than any other State of the Union, will now, I trust, improve and enjoy the bounties which nature has bestowed upon them with a lavish hand. As their experience has been severe, I trust their reformation will be complete. Still, however, many of the causes which originated in past years, are yet depending in the circuit court of that State.
In 1826, when a similar bill was before this House, we had the most authentic information that there were nine hundred and fifty causes then pending in the circuit court of Kentucky, one hundred and sixty in the circuit court for the western district, and about the same number in that for the eastern district of Tennessee, and upwards of two hundred in Ohio. Upon that occasion, a memorial was presented from the bar of Nashville, signed by G. W. Campbell as chairman, and Felix Grundy, at present a Senator of the United States, as secretary. These gentlemen are both well known to this House, and to the country. That memorial declares that “the seventh circuit, consisting of Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee, is too large for the duties of it to be devolved on one man; and it was absolutely impossible for the judge assigned to this circuit to fulfil the letter of the law designating his duties.”[duties.”] Such has been the delay of justice in the State of Tennessee, “that some of the important causes now pending in their circuit courts are older than the professional career of almost every man at the bar.”
The number of causes depending in the seventh circuit, I am informed, has been somewhat reduced since 1826; but still the evil is great, and demands a remedy. If it were possible for one man to transact the judicial business of that circuit, I should have as much confidence that it would be accomplished by the justice of the Supreme Court to which it is assigned, as by any other judge in the Union. His ability and his perseverance are well known to the nation. The labor, however, both of body and mind, is too great for any individual.
Has not the delay of justice in this circuit almost amounted to its denial? Are the States which compose it placed upon the same footing, in this respect, with other States of the Union? Have they not a right to complain? Many evils follow in the train of tardy justice. It deranges the whole business of society. It tempts the dishonest and the needy to set up unjust and fraudulent defences against the payment of just debts, knowing that the day of trial is far distant. It thus ruins the honest creditor, by depriving him of the funds which he had a right to expect at or near the appointed time of payment; and it ultimately tends to destroy all confidence between man and man.
A greater curse can scarcely be inflicted upon the people of any State, than to have their land titles unsettled. What, then, must be the condition of Tennessee, where there are many disputed land titles, when we are informed, by undoubted authority, “that some of the important causes now pending in their circuit courts are older than the professional career of almost every man at the bar.” Instead of being astonished at the complaints of the people of this circuit, I am astonished at their forbearance. A judiciary, able and willing to compel men to perform their contracts, and to decide their controversies, is one of the greatest political blessings which any people can enjoy; and it is one which the people of this country have a right to expect from their Government. The present bill proposes to accomplish this object, by creating a new circuit out of the States of Kentucky and Tennessee. This circuit will afford sufficient employment for one justice of the Supreme Court.
Without insisting further upon the propriety, nay, the necessity, of organizing the circuit courts of Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee, in such a manner as to enable them to transact the business of the people, I shall now proceed to consider the situation of the six new States, Louisiana, Indiana, Mississippi, Illinois, Alabama, and Missouri. Their grievances are of a different character. They do not so much complain of the delay of justice, as that Congress has so long refused to extend to them the circuit court system, as it exists in all the other States. As they successively came into the Union, they were each provided with a district court and a district judge, possessing circuit court powers. The acts which introduced them into our political family declare that they shall “be admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original States, in all respects whatever.” I do not mean to contend that by virtue of these acts we were bound immediately to extend to them the circuit court system. Such has not been the practice of Congress, in regard to other States in a similar situation. I contend, however, that these acts do impose an obligation upon us to place them “on an equal footing with the original States,” in regard to the judiciary, as soon as their wants require it, and the circumstances of the country permit it to be done. That time has, in my opinion, arrived. Louisiana has now been nearly eighteen years a member of the Union, and is one of our most commercial States; and yet, until this day, she has been without a circuit court. It is more than thirteen years since Indiana was admitted; and even our youngest sister, Missouri, will soon have been nine years in the family. Why should not these six States be admitted to the same judicial privileges which all the others now enjoy? Even if there were no better reason, they have a right to demand it for the mere sake of uniformity. I admit this is an argument dictated by State pride; but is not that a noble feeling? Is it not a feeling which will ever characterize freemen? Have they not a right to say to us, if the circuit court system be good for you, it will be good for us? You have no right to exclusive privileges. If you are sovereign States, so are we. By the terms of our admission, we are perfectly your equals. We have long submitted to the want of this system, from deference to your judgment; but the day has now arrived when we demand it from you as our right. But there are several other good reasons why the system ought to be extended to these States. And, in the first place, the justices of the Supreme Court are selected from the very highest order of the profession. There is scarcely a lawyer in the United States who would not be proud of an elevation to that bench. A man ambitious of honest fame ought not to desire a more exalted theatre for the display of ability and usefulness. Besides, the salary annexed to this office is sufficient to command the best talents of the country. I ask you, sir, is it not a serious grievance for those States to be deprived of the services of such a man in their courts? I ask you whether it is equal justice, that whilst, in eighteen States of the Union, no man can be deprived of his life, his liberty, or his property, by the judgment of a circuit court, without the concurrence of two judges, and one of them a justice of the Supreme Court, in the remaining six the fate of the citizen is determined by the decision of a single district judge? Who are, generally speaking, these district judges? In asking this question, I mean to treat them with no disrespect. They receive but small salaries, and their sphere of action is confined to their own particular districts. There is nothing either in the salary or in the station which would induce a distinguished lawyer, unless under peculiar circumstances, to accept the appointment. And yet the judgment of this individual, in six States of the Union, is final and conclusive, in all cases of law, of equity, and of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, wherein the amount of the controversy does not exceed two thousand dollars. Nay, the grievance is incomparably greater. His opinion in all criminal cases, no matter how aggravated may be their nature, is final and conclusive. A citizen of these States may be deprived of his life, or of his character, which ought to be dearer than life, by the sentence of a district judge; against which there is no redress, and from which there can be no appeal.