Life of James Buchanan, Fifteenth President of the United States. v. 1 (of 2)

by George Ticknor Curtis

There is another point of view in which the inequality and injustice of the present system, in the new States, is very striking. In order to produce a final decision, both the judges of a circuit court must concur. If they be divided in opinion, the point of difference is certified to the Supreme Court, for their decision; and this, whether the amount in controversy be great or small. The same rule applies to criminal cases. In such a court, no man can be deprived of life, of liberty, or of property, by a criminal prosecution, without the clear opinion of the two judges that his conviction is sanctioned by the laws of the land. If the question be doubtful or important, or if it be one of the first impression, the judges, even when they do not really differ, often agree to divide, pro forma, so that the point may be solemnly argued and decided in the Supreme Court. Thus, the citizen of every State in which a circuit court exists, has a shield of protection cast over him, of which he cannot be deprived, without the deliberate opinion of two judges; whilst the district judge of the six new Western States must alone finally decide every criminal question, and every civil controversy in which the amount in dispute does not exceed two thousand dollars.

In the eastern district of Louisiana, the causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction decided by the district court must be numerous and important. If a circuit court were established for that State, a party who considered himself aggrieved might appeal to it from the district court in every case in which the amount in controversy exceeded fifty dollars. At present there is no appeal, unless the value of the controversy exceeds two thousand dollars; and then it must be made directly to the Supreme Court, a tribunal so far remote from the city of New Orleans, as to deter suitors from availing themselves of this privilege.

I shall not further exhaust the patience of the committee on this branch of the subject. I flatter myself that I have demonstrated the necessity for such an alteration of the existing laws as will confer upon the people of Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee, and of the six new Western States, the same benefits from the judiciary, as those which the people of the other States now enjoy.

The great question, then, which remains for discussion is, does the present bill present the best plan for accomplishing this purpose, which, under all circumstances, can be devised? It is incumbent upon me to sustain the affirmative of this proposition. There have been but two plans proposed to the Committee on the Judiciary, and but two can be proposed, with the least hope of success. The one an extension of the present system, which the bill now before the committee contemplates, and the other a resort to the system which was adopted in the days of the elder Adams, of detaching the justices of the Supreme Court from the performance of circuit duties, and appointing circuit judges to take their places. After much reflection upon this subject I do not think that the two systems can be compared, without producing a conviction in favor of that which has long been established. The system of detaching the judges of the Supreme Court from the circuits has been already tried, and it has already met the decided hostility of the people of this country. No act passed during the stormy and turbulent administration of the elder Adams, which excited more general indignation among the people. The courts which it established were then, and have been ever since, branded with the name of the “midnight judiciary.” I am far from being one of those who believe the people to be infallible. They are often deceived by the arts of demagogues; but this deception endures only for a season. They are always honest, and possess much sagacity. If, therefore, they get wrong, it is almost certain they will speedily return to correct opinions. They have long since done justice to other acts of that administration, which at the time they condemned; but the feeling against the judiciary established under it remains the same. Indeed, many now condemn that system, who were formerly its advocates. In 1826, when a bill, similar in its provisions to the bill now before the committee, was under discussion in this House, a motion was made by a gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Mercer] to recommit it to the Committee on the Judiciary, with an instruction so to amend it, as to discharge the judges of the Supreme Court from attendance on the circuit courts, and to provide a uniform system for the administration of justice in the inferior courts of the United States. Although this motion was sustained with zeal and eloquence and ability by the mover, and by several other gentlemen, yet, when it came to the vote, it was placed in a lean minority, and, I believe, was negatived without a division. It is morally certain that such a bill could not now be carried. It would, therefore, have been vain and idle in the Committee on the Judiciary to have reported such a bill. If the Western States should be doomed to wait for a redress of their grievances, until public opinion shall change upon this subject, it will, probably, be a long time before they will obtain relief.

But, Sir, there are most powerful reasons for believing that public opinion upon this subject is correct. What would be the natural consequences of detaching the judges of the Supreme Court from circuit duties? It would bring them and their families from the circuits in which they now reside; and this city would become their permanent residence. They would naturally come here; because here, and nowhere else, would they then have official business to transact. What would be the probable effect of such a change of residence? The tendency of everything within the ten miles square is towards the Executive of the Union. He is here the centre of attraction. No matter what political revolutions may take place, no matter who may be up or who may be down, the proposition is equally true. Human nature is not changed under a Republican Government. We find that citizens of a republic are worshippers of power, as well as the subjects of a monarchy. Would you think it wise to bring the justices of the Supreme Court from their residence in the States, where they breathe the pure air of the country, and assemble them here within the very vortex of Executive influence? Instead of being independent judges, scattered over the surface of the Union, their feelings identified with the States of which they are citizens, is there no danger that, in the lapse of time, you would convert them into minions of the Executive? I am far, very far, from supposing that any man, who either is or who will be a justice of the Supreme Court, could be actually corrupted; but if you place them in a situation where they or their relatives would naturally become candidates for Executive patronage, you place them, in some degree, under the control of Executive influence. If there should now exist any just cause for the complaints against the Supreme Court, that in their decisions they are partial to Federal rather than to State authority (and I do not say that there is), that which at present may be but an imaginary fear might soon become a substantial reality. I would place them beyond the reach of temptation. I would suffer them to remain, as they are at present, citizens of their respective States, visiting this city annually to discharge their high duties, as members of the Supreme Court. This single view of the subject, if there were no other, ought, in my judgment, to be conclusive.

Let us now suppose, for the sake of the argument, that the withdrawal of the justices of the Supreme Court from their circuit duties, and their residence in this city, would produce no such effects, as I apprehend, upon the judges themselves; what would be the probable effect upon public opinion? It has been said, and wisely said, that the first object of every judicial tribunal ought to be to do justice; the second, to satisfy the people that justice has been done. It is of the utmost importance in this country that the judges of the Supreme Court should possess the confidence of the public. This they now do in an eminent degree. How have they acquired it? By travelling over their circuits, and personally showing themselves to the people of the country, in the able and honest discharge of their high duties, and by their extensive intercourse with the members of the profession on the circuits in each State, who, after all, are the best judges of judicial merit, and whose opinions upon this subject have a powerful influence upon the community. Elevated above the storms of faction and of party which have sometimes lowered over us, like the sun, they have pursued their steady course, unawed by threats, unseduced by flattery. They have thus acquired that public confidence which never fails to follow the performance of great and good actions, when brought home to the personal observation of the people.

Would they continue to enjoy this extensive public confidence, should they no longer be seen by the people of the States, in the discharge of their high and important duties, but be confined, in the exercise of them, to the gloomy and vaulted apartment which they now occupy in this Capitol? Would they not be considered as a distant and dangerous tribunal? Would the people, when excited by strong feeling, patiently submit to have the most solemn acts of their State Legislatures swept from the statute-book, by the decision of judges whom they never saw, and whom they had been taught to consider with jealousy and suspicion? At present, even in those States where their decisions have been most violently opposed, the highest respect has been felt for the judges by whom they were pronounced, because the people have had an opportunity of personally knowing that they were both great and good men. Look at the illustrious individual who is now the Chief Justice of the United States. His decisions upon constitutional questions have ever been hostile to the opinions of a vast majority of the people of his own State; and yet with what respect and veneration has he been viewed by Virginia? Is there a Virginian, whose heart does not beat with honest pride when the just fame of the Chief Justice is the subject of conversation? They consider him, as he truly is, one of the greatest and best men which this country has ever produced. Think ye that such would have been the case, had he been confined to the city of Washington, and never known to the people, except in pronouncing judgments in this Capitol, annulling their State laws, and calculated to humble their State pride? Whilst I continue to be a member of this House, I shall never incur the odium of giving a vote for any change in the judiciary system the effect of which would, in my opinion, diminish the respect in which the Supreme Court is now held by the people of this country.

The judges whom you would appoint to perform the circuit duties, if able and honest men, would soon take the place which the judges of the Supreme Court now occupy in the affections of the people; and the reversal of their judgments, when they happened to be in accordance with strong public feeling, would naturally increase the mass of discontent against the Supreme Court.

There are other reasons, equally powerful, against the withdrawal of the judges from the circuits. What effect would such a measure probably produce upon the ability of the judges themselves to perform their duties? Would it not be very unfortunate?

No judges upon earth ever had such various and important duties to perform, as the justices of the Supreme Court. In England, whence we have derived our laws, they have distinct courts of equity, courts of common law, courts of admiralty, and courts in which the civil law is administered. In each of these courts, they have distinct judges; and perfection in any of these branches is certain to be rewarded by the honors of that country. The judges of our Supreme Court, both on their circuits and in banc, are called upon to adjudicate on all these codes. But this is not all. Our Union consists of twenty-four sovereign States, in all of which there are different laws and peculiar customs. The common and equity law have thus been changed and inflected into a hundred different shapes, and adapted to the various wants and opinions of the different members of our confederacy. The judicial act of 1789 declares “that the laws of the several States, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide,” shall be regarded as rules of decision in the courts of the United States. The justices of the Supreme Court ought, therefore, to be acquainted with the ever-varying codes of the different States.