The third class differs essentially from each of the two first. In the cases embraced by it, neither the validity of acts of Congress, nor of treaties, nor of State laws is called in question. This clause of the 25th section merely confers upon the Supreme Court the appellate jurisdiction of construing the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, when their protection has been invoked by parties to suits before the State courts, and has been denied by their decision. Without the exercise of this power, in cases originating in the State courts, the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States would be left to be finally construed and executed by a judicial power, over which Congress has no control.
This section does not interfere, either directly or indirectly, with the independence of the State courts in finally deciding all cases arising exclusively under their own constitution and laws. It leaves them in the enjoyment of every power which they possessed before the adoption of the Federal Constitution. It merely declares that, as that Constitution established a new form of Government, and consequently gave to the State courts the power of construing, in certain cases, the Constitution, the laws, and the treaties of the United States, the Supreme Court of the United States should, to this limited extent, but not beyond it, possess the power of reviewing their judgments. The section itself declares that no other error shall be assigned or regarded as a ground of reversal, in any such case as aforesaid, than such as appears on the face of the record, and immediately respects the before-mentioned questions of validity or construction of the said Constitution, treaties, statutes, commissions, or authorities in dispute.
The minority of the committee will now proceed to advance, in a more distinct form, a few of the reasons why, in their opinion, the 25th section of this act ought not to be repealed.
And, in the first place, it ought to be the chief object of all Governments to protect individual rights. In almost every case involving a question before a State court under this section of the judiciary act, the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States are interposed for the protection of individuals. Does a citizen invoke the protection of an act of Congress upon a trial before a State court which decides that act to be unconstitutional and void, and renders judgment against him? This section secures his right of appeal from such a decision to the Supreme Court of the United States.
When a citizen, in a suit before a State court, contends that a State law, by which he is assailed, is a violation of the Constitution of the United States and therefore void (if his plea should be overruled), he may bring this question before the Supreme Court of the United States.
In like manner, when an individual claims any right before a State court under the Constitution or laws of the United States, and the decision is against his claim, he may appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States.
If this section were repealed, all these important individual rights would be forfeited.
The history of our country abundantly proves that individual States are liable to high excitements and strong prejudices. The judges of these States would be more or less than men if they did not participate in the feelings of the community by which they are surrounded. Under the influence of these excitements, individuals, whose rights happen to clash with the prevailing feeling of the State, would have but a slender hope of obtaining justice before a State tribunal. There would be the power and the influence of the State sovereignty on the one side, and an individual who had made himself obnoxious to popular odium on the other. In such cases, ought the liberty or the property of a citizen, so far as he claims the same under the Constitution or laws of the United States, to be decided before a State court, without an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, on whom the construction of this very Constitution and these laws has been conferred, in all cases, by the Constitution?
The Supreme Court, considering the elevated character of its judges, and that they reside in parts of the Union remote from each other, can never be liable to local excitements and local prejudices. To that tribunal our citizens can appeal with safety and with confidence (as long as the 25th section of the judicial act shall remain upon the statute book) whenever they consider that their rights, under the Constitution and laws of the United States, have been violated by a State court. Besides, should this section be repealed, it would produce a denial of equal justice to parties drawing in question the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. In civil actions, the plaintiff might then bring his action in a Federal or State court, as he pleased, and as he thought he should be most likely to succeed; whilst the defendant would have no option, but must abide the consequences without the power of removing the cause from a State into a Federal court, except in the single case of his being sued out of the district in which he resides; and this, although he might have a conclusive defence under the Constitution and laws of the United States.
Another reason for preserving this section is, that without it there would be no uniformity in the construction and administration of the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States. If the courts of twenty-four distinct, sovereign States, each possess the power, in the last resort, of deciding upon the Constitution and laws of the United States, their construction may be different in every State of the Union. That act of Congress which conforms to the Constitution of the United States, and is valid in the opinion of the supreme court of Georgia, may be a direct violation of the provisions of that instrument, and be void in the judgment of the supreme court of South Carolina. A State law in Virginia might in this manner be declared constitutional, whilst the same law, if passed by the Legislature of Pennsylvania, would be void. Nay, what would be still more absurd, a law or treaty of the United States with a foreign nation, admitted to be constitutionally made, might secure rights to the citizens of one State, which would be denied to those of another. Although the same Constitution and laws govern the Union, yet the rights acquired under them would vary with every degree of latitude. Surely the framers of the Constitution would have left their work incomplete, had they established no common tribunal to decide its own construction, and that of the laws and treaties made under its authority. They are not liable to this charge, because they have given express power to the Judiciary of the Union over “all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority.”