Life of James Buchanan, Fifteenth President of the United States. v. 1 (of 2)

by George Ticknor Curtis

The first Congress of the United States have, to a considerable extent, carried this power into execution by the passage of the judicial act, and it contains no provision more important than the 25th section.

This section ought not to be repealed, because, in the opinion of the minority of the Committee on the Judiciary, its repeal would seriously endanger the existence of this Union. The chief evil which existed under the old confederation, and which gave birth to the present Constitution, was that the General Government could not act directly upon the people, but only by requisition upon sovereign States. The consequence was, that the States either obeyed or disobeyed these requisitions, as they thought proper. The present Constitution was intended to enable the Government of the United States to act immediately upon the people of the States, and to carry its own laws into full execution, by virtue of its own authority. If this section were repealed, the General Government would be deprived of the power, by means of its own judiciary, to give effect either to the Constitution which called it into existence, or to the laws and treaties made under its authority. It would be compelled to submit, in many important cases, to the decisions of State courts; and thus the very evil which the present Constitution was intended to prevent would be entailed upon the people. The judiciary of the States might refuse to carry into effect the laws of the United States; and without that appeal to the Supreme Court which the 25th section authorizes, these laws would thus be entirely annulled, and could not be executed without a resort to force.

This position may be illustrated by a few striking examples. Suppose the Legislature of one of the States, believing the tariff laws to be unconstitutional, should determine that they ought not to be executed within its limits. They accordingly pass a law, imposing the severest penalties upon the collector and other custom-house officers of the United States within their territory, if they should collect the duties on the importation of foreign merchandise. The collector proceeds to discharge the duties of his office under the laws of the United States, and he is condemned and punished before a State court for violating this State law. Repeal this section, and the decision of the State court would be final and conclusive; and any State could thus nullify any act of Congress which she deemed to be unconstitutional.

The Executive of one of the States, in a message to the Legislature, has declared it to be his opinion, that the land belonging to the United States within her territory is now the property of the State, by virtue of her sovereign authority. Should the Legislature be of the same opinion, and pass a law for the punishment of the land officers of the United States who should sell any of the public lands within her limits, this transfer of property might be virtually accomplished by the repeal of the 25th section of the judicial act. Our land officers might then be severely punished, and thus prohibited by the courts of that State from performing their duty under the laws of the Union, without the possibility of redress in any constitutional or legal form. In this manner, the title of the United States to a vast domain, which has cost the nation many millions, and which justly belongs to the people of the several States, would be defeated or greatly impaired.

Another illustration might be introduced. Suppose the Legislature of Pennsylvania, being of opinion that the charter of the Bank of the United States is unconstitutional, were to declare it to be a nuisance, and inflict penalties upon all its officers for making discounts or receiving deposits. Should the courts of that State carry such a law into effect, without the 25th section there would be no appeal from their decision; and the Legislature and courts of a single State might thus prostrate an institution established under the Constitution and laws of the United States.

In all such cases, redress can now be peaceably obtained in the ordinary administration of justice. A writ of error issues from the Supreme Court, which finally decides the question whether the act of Congress was constitutional or not; and if they determine in the affirmative, the judgment of the State court is reversed. The laws are thus substituted instead of arms, and the States kept within their proper orbits by the judicial authority. But if no such appeal existed, then, upon the occurrence of cases of this character, the General Government would be compelled to determine whether the Union should be dissolved, or whether there should be a recurrence to force—an awful alternative, which we trust may never be presented. We will not attempt further to portray the evils which might result from the abandonment of the present judicial system. They will strike every reflecting mind.

It has of late years been contended that this section of the judicial act was unconstitutional, and that Congress do not possess the power of investing the Supreme Court with appellate jurisdiction in any case which has been finally decided in the courts of the States. It has also been contended that, even if they do possess this power, it does not extend to cases in which a State is a party. On this branch of the question, we would refer the House to the very able and conclusive argument of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the cases of Martin vs. Hunter’s Lessee (1st Wheaton, 304) and Cohens vs. the State of Virginia (6 Wheaton, 264) by which the affirmative of these propositions is clearly established. It may be proper, however, that we should make a few observations upon this part of the question. Those who have argued in favor of these positions, assert that the general words of the Constitution, extending the judicial power of the Union “to all cases, in law and equity,” arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, ought, by construction, to be restricted to such cases in law and equity as may originate in the courts of the Union. They would thus establish a limitation at war with the letter, and, in our opinion, equally at war with the spirit of the instrument. Had such been the intention of the framers of the Constitution, they well knew in what language to express that intention. Had it been their purpose to restrict the meaning of the general language which they had used in the first clause of the section, they could have done so with much propriety in the second. This clause, after providing “that, in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction,” proceeds to declare “that, in all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations, as the Congress shall make.” On the supposition contended for, it is wholly unaccountable that the framers of the Constitution did not limit the natural effect of the words used in the first clause, by making the second to read “that, in all the other cases before mentioned,” arising in the inferior courts of the United States, “the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.” But no such restriction exists; and, from the fair import of the words used in both clauses, the Supreme Court possess the power of finally deciding “all cases, in law and equity,” arising under the Constitution, the laws, and the treaties of the United States, no matter whether they may have originated in a Federal or in a State court, and no matter whether States or individuals be the parties.

But it is not our intention to enter into a protracted constitutional argument upon the present occasion, because this question has long since been put at rest, if any constitutional question can ever be considered as settled in this country. The Federalist, which is now considered a text-book in regard to the construction of the Constitution, and deservedly so, as well from the great merit of the work as the high character of its authors, is clear and explicit on this subject. After reasoning upon it at some length, the author of the 83d number of that production arrives at the following conclusion: “To confine, therefore, the general expressions which gave appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court to appeals from the subordinate Federal courts, instead of allowing their extension to the State courts, would be to abridge the latitude of the terms, in subversion of the intent, contrary to every sound rule of interpretation.”

The Federalist, it will be recollected, was written between the formation of the Constitution and its adoption by the States. Immediately after its adoption, Congress, by passing the 25th section of the judicial act, now sought to be repealed, fully confirmed this construction. This appellate jurisdiction has ever since been exercised by the Supreme Court in a great variety of cases; and we are not aware that the constitutionality of its exercise has ever been questioned by the decision of any State court, except in a single instance, which did not occur until the year 1815. And even in that case (Hunter vs. Fairfax), the judgment of the Supreme Court was carried into effect according to the existing law, without endangering the peace of the country.

The last topic to which we would advert is, the claim which has been set up to exempt the judgments obtained by the States of this Union, before their own courts, in civil and criminal suits, prosecuted in their name, from being reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United States upon a writ of error. Much stress has been laid by those who sustain this claim, upon the general proposition that a sovereign independent State cannot be sued, except by its own consent. But does this proposition apply, in its extent, to the States of this Union. That is the question for discussion.