To strengthen this argument no demand had either been made from those in command of the Fleet or from commanders of our Armies for airships to act as auxiliaries to our forces.
The disasters experienced by all early airships and most particularly by the Zeppelins were always seized upon by those who desired to convince the country what unstable craft they were, and however safe in the air they might be were always liable to be wrecked when landing in anything but fine weather. Those who might have sunk their money in airship building thereupon patted themselves upon the back and rejoiced that they had been so far-seeing as to avoid being engaged upon such a profitless industry.
Finally, all in authority were agreed to adopt the policy of letting other countries buy their experience and to profit from it at a later date. Had the war been postponed for another twenty years all might have been well, and we should have reaped the benefit, but most calamitously for ourselves it arrived when we were utterly unprepared, and having, as we repeat, only three airships of any military value.
With these three ships, Astra-Torres (No. 3), Parseval (No. 4) and Beta, the Navy did all that was possible. At the very outbreak of war scouting trips were made out into the North Sea beyond the mouth of the Thames by the Astra and Parseval, and both these ships patrolled the Channel during the passage of the Expeditionary Force.
The Astra was also employed off the Belgian coast to assist the naval landing party at Ostend, and together with the Parseval assisted in patrolling the Channel during the first winter of the war.
The Beta was also sent over to Dunkirk to assist in spotting for artillery fire and locating German batteries on the Belgian coast. Our airships were also employed for aerial inspection of London and other large towns by night to examine the effects of lighting restrictions and obtain information for our anti-aircraft batteries.
With the single exception of the S.S. ship, which carried out certain manoeuvres in France in the summer of 1916, our airships were confined to operations over the sea; but if we had possessed ships of greater reliability in the early days of the war, it is conceivable that they would have been of value for certain purposes to the Army. The Germans employed their Zeppelins at the bombardment of Antwerp, Warsaw, Nancy and Libau, and their raids on England are too well remembered to need description. The French also used airships for the observation of troops mobilizing and for the destruction of railway depots. The Italians relied entirely at the beginning of the war on airships, constructed to fly at great heights, for the bombing of Austrian troops and territory, and met with a considerable measure of success.
When it was decided, early in 1915, to develop the airship for anti-submarine work difficulties which appeared almost insuperable were encountered at first. To begin with, there were practically no firms in the country capable of airship production. The construction of envelopes was a great problem; as rubber-proofed fabric had been found by experiment to yield the best results for the holding of gas, various waterproofing firms were invited to make envelopes, and by whole-hearted efforts and untiring industry they at last provided very excellent samples. Fins, rudder planes, and cars were also entrusted to firms which had had no previous experience of this class of work, and it is rather curious to reflect that envelopes were produced by the makers of mackintoshes and that cars and planes were constructed by a shop-window furnisher. This was a sure sign that all classes of the community were pulling together for the good of the common cause.
Among other difficulties was the shortage of hydrogen tubes, plants, and the silicol for making gas.
Sufficient sheds and aerodromes were also lacking, and the airships themselves were completed more quickly than the sheds which were to house them.