In this state of things, at 7.30 p.m. a fourth message was received, and is said by the Marconi operator Bride to have been delivered to the bridge. This message was from the steamship Californian to the steamship Antillian, but was picked up by the Titanic. It was as follows:
To CAPTAIN, Antillian:
Six-thirty p. m., apparent ship's time; latitude 42° 3´ N., longitude 49° 9´ W. Three large bergs 5 miles to southward of us. Regards.
LORD
Bride does not remember to what officer he delivered this message.
By the time the Titanic reached the position of the collision (11.40 p. m.) she had gone about 50 miles to the westward of the indicated position of the ice mentioned in this fourth message. Thus it would appear that before the collision she had gone clear of the indicated positions of ice contained in the messages from the Baltic and Californian. As to the ice advised by the Caronia message, so far as it consisted of small bergs and field ice, it had before the time of the collision possibly drifted with the Gulf Stream to the eastward; and so far as it consisted of large bergs (which would be deep enough in the water to reach the Labrador current) it had probably gone to the southward. It was urged by Sir Robert Finlay, who appeared for the owners, that this is strong evidence that the Titanic had been carefully and successfully navigated so as to avoid the ice of which she had received warning. Mr. Ismay, however, stated that he understood from the Baltic message that "we would get up to the ice that night."
There was a fifth message received in the Marconi room of the Titanic at 9.40 p. m. This was from a steamer called the Mesaba. It was in the following terms:
From "Mesaba" to "Titanic" and all east-bound ships:
Ice report in latitude 42° N. to 41° 25´ N., longitude 49° to longitude 50° 30´ W. Saw much heavy pack ice and great number large icebergs. Also field ice. Weather good, clear.
This message clearly indicated the presence of ice in the immediate vicinity of the Titanic, and if it had reached the bridge would perhaps have affected the navigation of the vessel. Unfortunately, it does not appear to have been delivered to the master or to any of the officers. The Marconi operator was very busy from 8 o'clock onward transmitting messages via Cape Race for passengers on board the Titanic, and the probability is that he failed to grasp the significance and importance of the message, and put it aside until he should be less busy. It was never acknowledged by Capt. Smith, and I am satisfied that it was not received by him. But, assuming Sir Robert Finlay's contentions to be well founded that the Titanic had been navigated so as to avoid the Baltic and the Californian ice, and that the Caronia ice had drifted to the eastward and to the southward, still there can be no doubt, if the evidence of Mr. Lightoller, the second officer, is to be believed, that both he and the master knew that the danger of meeting ice still existed. Mr. Lightoller says that the master showed him the Caronia message about 12.45 p. m. on April 14, when he was on the bridge. He was about to go off watch, and he says he made a rough calculation in his head which satisfied him that the Titanic would not reach the position mentioned in the message until he came on watch again at 6 p. m. At 6 p. m. Mr. Lightoller came on the bridge again to take over the ship from Mr. Wilde, the chief officer (dead). He does not remember being told anything about the Baltic message, which had been received at 1.42 p. m. Mr. Lightoller then requested Mr. Moody, the sixth officer (dead), to let him know "at what time we should reach the vicinity of ice," and says that he thinks Mr. Moody reported "about 11 o'clock." Mr. Lightoller says that 11 o'clock did not agree with a mental calculation he himself had made and which showed 9.30 as the time. This mental calculation he at first said he had made before Mr. Moody gave him 11 o'clock as the time, but later on he corrected this, and said his mental calculation was made between 7 and 8 o'clock, and after Mr. Moody had mentioned 11. He did not point out the difference to him, and thought that perhaps Mr. Moody had made his calculations on the basis of some "other" message. Mr. Lightoller excuses himself for not pointing out the difference by saying that Mr. Moody was busy at the time, probably with stellar observations. It is, however, an odd circumstance that Mr. Lightoller, who believed that the vicinity of ice would be reached before his watch ended at 10 p.m., should not have mentioned the fact to Mr. Moody, and it is also odd that if he thought that Mr. Moody was working on the basis of some "other" message, he did not ask what the other message was or where it came from. The point, however, of Mr. Lightoller's evidence is that they both thought that the vicinity of ice would be reached before midnight. When he was examined as to whether he did not fear that on entering the indicated ice region he might run foul of a growler (a low-lying berg) he answers: "No, I judged I should see it with "sufficient distinctness" and at a distance of a "mile and a half, more probably 2 miles." He then adds: