By Road from Bushman's Hoek.

Besides these, three companies Royal Scots were sent by rail from Putterskraal. One of them was dropped at Bushman's Hoek, the other two being taken on to Molteno. The units that went by train had with them their first line transport. Although the entraining of the troops began about 12 noon, it was not completed till after 5 p.m., owing to the lack of sufficient sidings. The movement to Molteno was covered by the armoured train, and was carried out without interruption. The detachments of Brabant's Horse and Cape Mounted Rifles ordered in from Penhoek to Molteno failed, however, to appear. A message to the officer commanding at Penhoek, conveying the order, had been handed in at the telegraph office at Putterskraal at midnight on the 8th, but owing to some carelessness had not been forwarded by the telegraph clerk. The precaution of demanding an acknowledgment of the receipt of this important order, or of sending a duplicate, does not appear to have been taken by the divisional staff.

Arrangements for feeding men.

The troops had dined before leaving Putterskraal, and took with them one and a half day's rations, the half ration to be eaten in the train on the way to Molteno, and the remainder to be carried by the men on the march. The preserved meat had been issued in 6lb. tins. These were very inconvenient. Therefore many of them were thrown away.

Dec. 9th, 1899. Orders for night march issues. Lack of maps.

On arriving at Molteno, Sir W. Gatacre assembled the commanding officers and issued personally to them his orders for the movement against Stormberg. His Intelligence staff had ascertained that the actual strength of the Boers in laager at that moment was about 1,700, and that the southern face of the Kissieberg and the Nek between that hill and Rooi Kop were entrenched. The General, on receipt of this information, determined to modify his original plan. Although Stormberg had been occupied for more than a month by British troops, no systematic sketching of the surrounding country had been undertaken. Except a plan made more than a year before of the ground in the immediate neighbourhood of the junction, and reproduced in one of the Intelligence handbooks, the only map at the disposal of the Staff was the Cape Survey, the scale of which, 12-½ miles to an inch, was too small for tactical purposes.

The method of march.

The local Cape Police, the Berkshire mounted infantry, and others were very well acquainted with the country; and, after a personal examination of Sergeant Morgan, Cape Police, and several native policemen, who had previously been selected as guides, Sir W. Gatacre determined to move his force out from Molteno by the Steynsburg road, and to diverge from that road by a cross track, leading northwards from a point near D. Foster's farm to Van Zyl's farm,[193] which was situated immediately in rear of the western face of the Kissieberg. Thus the position on the Nek would be turned. The distance to be covered during this flank march was said by his informants to be about nine miles. The actual distance was about ten miles. Allowing for intermediate rests for the men, the General anticipated that he would be able so to order the time as to place his men in a position to rush the Kissieberg with the bayonet before dawn, and then, as soon as daylight appeared, to plant the guns on that kopje, thus commanding the whole of the Stormberg valley. Sir W. Gatacre informed commanding officers verbally of these intentions, and arranged the following succession: