After three reverses at Stormberg, Magersfontein and Colenso, it was clear to all that forces far larger than had been estimated would be now required for the war. Much had already been done before the news of Colenso arrived. Another division—the 5th—prepared at home early in November for service in South Africa, was due in a few days' time at Cape Town. A sixth division had been mobilised at the end of November and was on the point of embarkation,[244] and the mobilisation of a seventh had been ordered as soon as the news of Stormberg and Magersfontein had reached England. Yet there was cause for anxiety. Until the 5th division actually landed, not a man was available to be sent forward to reinforce either Lord Methuen on the Modder, or the troops under Sir R. Buller's immediate command facing the Tugela. After Stormberg, Sir W. Gatacre had been strengthened with the 1st Derbyshire from the lines of communication. He had now a weak brigade to cover all the eastern province, from Queenstown northwards. Lt.-General French had, it is true, successfully checked the Boer advance into the Colesberg district, but his success had been due to skilful tactics and audacity, not to any superiority in strength. Danger of possible Boer offence. The true strategy for the enemy would be to assume the offensive, and, using his superior mobility, attack the lines of communication with the coast of one or more of the three British columns in Cape Colony, each of which was in fact in a sense isolated. Bold raids executed for this purpose would have probably secured the active support of a large number of disaffected colonists, whose loyalty had been seriously impaired by the recent victories of their kinsmen. The attitude of many in the districts through which the Cape lines of communication passed was already very unsatisfactory.
Dec. 15th, after Colenso Buller sends message home, "I ought to let Ladysmith go."
Nor was this all: for the moment Sir R. Buller thought that, by direct order of the Cabinet, the 5th division had been assigned to the task of relieving Kimberley,[245] and he judged that without reinforcements the relief of Ladysmith was impracticable. Late, therefore, in the evening of the 15th December, when the work of that exhausting and disheartening day was drawing to a close, he telegraphed in the following terms to the Secretary of State for War:—
"My failure to-day raises a serious question. I do not think I am now strong enough to relieve White. Colenso is a fortress, which I think, if not taken on a rush, could only be taken by a siege. There is no water within eight miles of the point of attack, and in this weather that exhausts infantry. The place is fully entrenched. I do not think either a Boer or a gun was seen by us all day, yet the fire brought to bear was very heavy. Our infantry were quite willing to fight, but were absolutely exhausted by the intense heat. My view is that I ought to let Ladysmith go, and occupy good positions for the defence of South Natal, and let time help us. But that is a step on which I ought to consult you. I consider we were in face of 20,000 men to-day. They had the advantage both in arms and in position. They admit they suffered severely, but my men have not seen a dead Boer, and that dispirits them. My losses have not been very heavy. I could have made them much heavier, but the result would have been the same. The moment I failed to get in with a rush, I was beat. I now feel that I cannot say I can relieve Ladysmith with my available force, and the best thing I can suggest is that I should occupy defensive positions, and fight it out in a country better suited to our tactics."
Sir R. Buller's arrangements for Natal;
In pursuance of this policy Sir R. Buller sent Sir G. White, next morning, a cipher message, which, with the reply, will be recorded in another chapter.[246] He also directed the Natal line of communication staff to select, on the route Eshowe-Greytown-Estcourt, positions for camps, which the Natal army could occupy "until the weather is cooler." As regards the western theatre of war, he was more sanguine. On receiving the news of the repulse at Magersfontein he had, it is true, at first considered that, if the British troops remained on the Riet, they might be enveloped by Cronje's force, with disastrous results. He sent instructions, therefore, to Forestier-Walker that Lord Methuen must be told either to attack Cronje again or to fall back at once on the Orange river. for the western theatre of war. This order was received with dismay by Lord Methuen, for, after consultation with his brigadiers, he was convinced that, until reinforcements arrived, his force was not in a fit state to resume the offensive. He prepared to fall back. But in a telegram, dated 14th December, Sir F. Forestier-Walker urged Sir Redvers to support Methuen with the 5th division[247] and with a brigade of cavalry from Naauwpoort, so as to enable him promptly to relieve Kimberley. He added: "Methuen reports his force in safe position, and well supplied. His communications are held by detachments posted at no great distance apart, and can be further protected by mounted troops. The effect of retirement upon the spirit of Methuen's force after such hard fighting, and upon the general military and political situation, appears to me to justify my placing this alternative before you." Forestier-Walker's proposal was immediately accepted by Sir Redvers, with the exception that he forbad the reduction of French's strength at Naauwpoort. A telegram to that effect had been despatched from Headquarters at Chieveley to the General Officer Commanding Cape Colony the evening before the day of Colenso.
The Cabinet answers Sir Redvers' proposal to give up Ladysmith, Dec. 16th, 1896.
Meantime the Cabinet had received and considered General Buller's suggestion that Ladysmith should be abandoned. They felt that to leave the invested troops to their fate would be equally injurious in its strategical, political, and moral effect on South Africa; a blow to British prestige throughout the world. Sir R. Buller was therefore informed by a cipher telegram, dated 16th December, that "Her Majesty's Government regard the abandonment of White's force and its consequent surrender as a national disaster of the greatest magnitude. We would urge you to devise another attempt to carry out its relief, not necessarily viâ Colenso, making use of the additional men now arriving, if you think fit." A War Office telegram of the same date advised Sir Redvers that the embarkation of the 6th division for South Africa had already begun, that the 7th division would begin to embark on the 4th January, that another cavalry brigade would be sent out as soon as ships could be provided, and that additional field artillery would replace the guns lost at Colenso. In reply to a request made by him that morning by telegram that 8,000 irregulars "able to ride decently, but shoot as well as possible," should be raised in England, the General Commanding-in-Chief was told that "a considerable force of militia and of picked yeomanry and volunteers will also be sent."