Il nipotismo di Roma, or, The History of the Popes Nephews / from the time of Sixtus IV. to the death of the last Pope, Alexander VII

by Gregorio Leti

The like discourse he had with Monsignor Rasponi (who now is Cardinal) and was then created Plenipotentiary for the Treaty of Pisa, after he had in vain been sent to Lyons, to make an agreement; for there the business was crossed with a thousand difficulties, amongst which the precedency was one.

The Pope was brought into such a Labyrinth, that he did almost lose his wits in seeking how to come out of it; for on one side the affection of his Family did continually solicite him to yield to the great pretensions of the French King; on the other, the Decorum and honour of his Pontificate, which would be blurr’d with the infamy of having given away so much of the Dignity and Profits of the Church, did make him resolve to be constant, and bate nothing of that respect and Majesty which the Popes do use to expect from Princes: and the rather, because he had alwayes shewed himself a singular defender of the Pontifical Dignity, and could not endure to be forced to submit to a Crown for which he had never had any great inclination.

For all this, at last, the interest of his Kindred carried it before those of the Church; and after he had worn out all the slights and arts that the Court of Rome could furnish him withal, he was forced at last to come to an agreement, as infamous for the See of Rome, as it was honourable for France.

Whereupon some of the most zealous Cardinals having vented their complaints in the Consistory it self, blaming Monsignor Rasponi for signing the Treaty, He was obliged to excuse himself to every one of them in a particular Visit, by saying That he had an express Order from his Holiness for what he had done; who had declared his resolution of yielding to any conditions, rather than of leaving his Family engaged against so powerful an Enemy as France. To which purpose he related to some of his particular friends, the very words which the Pope spoke to him when he went to take his leave of him to go to Pisa, to treat with the Duke of Crequy, which were these, Be discreet and yield up something of the Popedom, to save our Family; and not leave them and the Church in an obligation of maintaining a dangerous War in Italy.

Thus it appears that it is not so much that universal care of a Father, that makes the Popes maintain a good correspondence with Christian Princes; as the fear of leaving Enemies to their Families, and bringing ruine upon their Relations.

We all know that every Pope either out of envy or some other motive is well pleased to lessen, if not utterly to destroy the Family of his Predecessor; and of this we have had many experiences since two ages. Therefore also the Popes, to prevent this misfortune, do ordinarily endeavour to get, while they are alive, the protection of some eminent Christian Prince, for their Family; under whose wings they may shelter themselves in a time of calamity.

And if this be, we may conclude, that all the affection, the care, and the desire which the Popes have of advancing their Kindred, does at last turn to a general benefit and profit for Christendom; and if you except one inconvenience, which is, that they impoverish the Church, and carry away all its treasure, it were and is better for all other considerations, that the Popes do govern conjoyntly with their Nipotismo, than without it: which is proved by a third reason; which is, that without a Nipotismo the Negotiations and business of the Court could never be carried with secresie enough.

I am in doubt whether it be harder to keep a thing secret in the Court of a Prince, than in the Council of a Commonwealth; for in the Commonwealth the great number of Counsellors make the keeping of a Secret a very difficult thing: and in the Court of Princes, the envy of those Courtiers, who are excluded from the management of Affairs, is so sharp-sighted, and does so pry and penetrate into the most hidden Mysteries of the Court, to the end they may either hurt the Prince through his Counsellors, or the Counsellors through the Prince, that it is almost impossible to keep any thing hidden from them.

I am of opinion, that for one reason the Secrets of a Commonwealth are better concealed, which is; because that those that are conscious to them, are themselves the Princes and Masters of the State: but in a Monarchy, the Prince being forced to trust some of his Subjects, it is much more dangerous for him and for his business; for he becomes slave and dependent of those who should be his. Divers Histories will furnish us with examples to prove what we say; and if that be true, and that yet nevertheless it is very hard to keep counsel in a Commonwealth, it is easily inferr’d, how difficult a thing it is to do it in a Monarchy.

But what shall we say then of the state of the Church, of which no body can tell whether it be Commonwealth, or Monarchy, the Popes appearing sometimes absolute like Princes, and other while dependent like Dukes of Commonwealths; and without doubt the Popes could never be able to conceal so many private and publick interests without that trust and relyance, which they have in their Nipotismo: and this particularly for two reasons. The first is thus.