Il nipotismo di Roma, or, The History of the Popes Nephews / from the time of Sixtus IV. to the death of the last Pope, Alexander VII

by Gregorio Leti

The Court of Rome taken in all its latitude, is without doubt the greatest of Europe, and the most magnificent of Christendom; for it yields to no other in the great number of Ambassadours, and publick Ministers which reside in it.

For the Popes, that they may the better conserve the title of Universal Father, which they affect, do by all means procure to have as many Ambassadors of Christian Princes near them as they can. But that very thing by which this Court seems to be most honoured, does also carry with it an evident danger; for these Ambassadours and Residents being unwilling to stay in Rome, without procuring some considerable advantage to the Princes that send them, are perpetually watching for occasions to discover the Popes most secret designs: so that they are in effect so many spyes, who the more they are in number, the more do they encrease the difficulty of preserving and concealing the Secrets of the Court.

Before I speak of the second Reason, which makes the Court of Rome so suspicious a place for Secrets, I must say something about the Cardinals, and their Office, and Employment.

The Cardinals are the Pope’s Counsellors, who by the Dignity of their place, and the Majesty of their Habit, do much augment the pomp and splendor of the Court. The Popes do every day give them new Priviledges and Prerogatives, by the means of which they are respected like so many Kings.

This makes Forreign Princes endeavour to get their friendship by all means, giving them both secret and publick allowances and Pensions, in consideration of these Prerogatives, and of the power which they have to chuse the Pope; who must necessarily be one of their number.

But if Princes shew a promptitude and readiness to win the Cardinals affections, they are themselves reciprocally courted by the Cardinals for divers reasons; As first, for the Emolument of their Pensions; Next, that they may not obstruct their way to the Popedom by an open Exclusion in the Conclave; And last of all, that they may live in greater reputation and esteem in Rome, Where those Cardinals are most valued that entertain an exact correspondence with Princes: particularly if it be with any of the two Crowns of Europe, that is, France, or Spain; upon whose Brigues and Interests does ordinarily depend the election of the Pope.

Now it is to be believed, that these Princes do not prodigally spend their Treasure without receiving a continual Interest for it; which Interest is an exact information of all that is done, treated, and managed in the Court of Rome: And of this the Cardinals acquit themselves with great industry and diligence.

So we see, how intricate and troublesome the Government of Rome would become to the Popes; if they had not Confidents, that is, Nephews, on whom they might relie; and to whom they might trust their secrets without fear.

For indeed, a Pope without Kindred must renounce Monarchy, and resolve to be only as the Head of a Commonwealth; which would be just to give himself up into the hands of the Cardinals, and be at their discretion: Which if it were, every body may easily infer how dangerous it would prove to the Pope’s Authority, and how unbeseeming the greatness and decorum of his place and dignity. Besides that, probably things would fall into confusion and disorder, while every Cardinal would be more intent to satisfie his own ends; and, as they say, draw the water to his Mill, than to mind the necessities of the State and Church.

If the Pope could do nothing without the counsel and assent of the Cardinals, How would he be able to treat any Leagues, make Wars, or Peace? Which are things so incident to the nature of a great State, such as the Pope’s is, that it can seldom be without them. There would be framed a thousand difficulties in the very beginnings of Negotiations; and the Enemy would know all before you had resolved any thing. Every Cardinal would support his Prince and Country, and at last they would all be so embarassed and confounded, that they would either be in danger of losing themselves for the Church, or of exposing the Church to mischief to save themselves.