[2] Cf. B. 43 init., M. 26 med.
[3] e. g. B. 34, 35, M. 22; B. 41, M. 25; Prol. §§ 9-11. The commonest expression of the confusion is to be found in the repeated assertion that space is a pure perception.
[4] 'Corresponds to' must mean 'is'.
[5] B. 34, M. 21.
[6] Cf. pp. 30-2.
[7] It is impossible, of course, to see how such a process can give us knowledge of the spatial world, for, whatever bodies in space are, they are not arrangements of sensations. Nevertheless, Kant's theory of perception really precludes him from holding that bodies are anything else than arrangements of sensations, and he seems at times to accept this view explicitly, e. g. B. 38, M. 23 (quoted p. 41), where he speaks of our representing sensations as external to and next to each other, and, therefore, as in different places.
[8] It may be noted that it would have been more natural to describe the particular shape of the phenomenon (i. e. the particular spatial arrangement of the sensations) rather than space as the form of the phenomenon; for the matter to which the form is opposed is said to be sensation, and that of which it is the matter is said to be the phenomenon, i. e. a body in space.
[9] Cf. note 4, p. 38.
[10] Cf. Prol. § 11 and p. 137.
[11] Cf. p. 41, note 1.