[12] Cf. p. 51, note 1.
[13] The same confusion (and due to the same cause) is implied Prol. § 11, and B. 42 (b), M. 26 (b) first paragraph. Cf. B. 49 (b), M. 30 (b).
[14] Begriff (conception) here is to be understood loosely not as something opposed to Anschauung (perception), but as equivalent to the genus of which Anschauung and Begriff are species, i. e. Vorstellung, which maybe rendered by 'representation' or 'idea', in the general sense in which these words are sometimes used to include 'thought' and 'perception'.
[15] The next sentence shows that 'external' means, not 'produced by something external to the mind', but simply 'spatial'.
[16] B. 38, M. 23-4.
[17] B. 38, M. 24.
[18] B. 35, M. 22 (quoted p. 39). It is noteworthy (1) that the passage contains no argument to show that extension and shape are not, equally with divisibility, thought to belong to an object, (2) that impenetrability, which is here said to belong to sensation, obviously cannot do so, and (3) that (as has been pointed out, p. 39) the last sentence of the paragraph in question presupposes that we have a perception of empty space, and that this is a form of perception.
[19] And not as mutually involved in the apprehension of any individual reality.
[20] This distinction is of course different to that previously drawn within perception in the full sense between perception in a narrow sense and conception (pp. 28-9).
[21] Kant uses the phrase 'pure perception'; but 'pure' can only mean 'not containing sensation', and consequently adds nothing relevant.