Kant's Theory of Knowledge

by H. A. Prichard

In conclusion, it may be pointed out that the impossibility that space[30] and spatial characteristics should qualify appearances renders untenable Kant's attempt to draw a distinction between reality and appearance within 'phenomena' or 'appearances'. The passage in which he tries to do so runs as follows:

"We generally indeed distinguish in appearances that which essentially belongs to the perception of them, and is valid for every human sense in general, from that which belongs to the same perception accidentally, as valid not for the sensibility in general, but for a particular state or organization of this or that sense. Accordingly, we are accustomed to say that the former is knowledge which represents the object itself, whilst the latter represents only the appearance of the same. This distinction, however, is only empirical. If we stop here (as is usual) and do not again regard that empirical perception as itself a mere phenomenon (as we ought to do), in which nothing which concerns a thing in itself is to be found, our transcendental distinction is lost; and in that case we are after all believing that we know things in themselves, although in the world of sense, investigate its objects as profoundly as we may, we have to do with nothing but appearances. Thus we call the rainbow a mere appearance during a sunny shower, but the rain the thing in itself; and this is right, if we understand the latter conception only physically as that which in universal experience and under all different positions with regard to the senses is in perception so and so determined and not otherwise. But if we consider this empirical element[31] in general, and inquire, without considering its agreement with every human sense, whether it represents an object in itself (not the raindrops, for their being phenomena by itself makes them empirical objects), the question of the relation of the representation to the object is transcendental; and not only are the raindrops mere appearances, but even their circular form, nay, even the space in which they fall, are nothing in themselves but mere modifications or fundamental dispositions of our sensuous perception; the transcendental object, however, remains unknown to us."[32]

Kant's meaning is plain. He is anxious to justify the physical distinction made in our ordinary or non-philosophical consciousness between a thing in itself and a mere appearance,[33] but at the same time to show that it falls within appearances, in respect of the philosophical distinction between things in themselves and appearances or phenomena. The physical distinction is the first of which we become aware, and it arises through problems connected with our senses. Owing, presumably, to the contradictions which would otherwise ensue, the mind is forced to distinguish between things and the 'appearances' which they produce, and to recognize that they do not correspond. The discrepancy is due to the fact that our perceptions are conditioned by the special positions of our physical organs with regard to the object of perception, and we discover its real nature by making allowance for these special positions. We thereby advance in knowledge to the extent of overcoming an obstacle due to the nature of our senses. But, this obstacle overcome, philosophical reflection forces upon us another. The thing which we distinguish in our ordinary consciousness from its appearances is, after all, only another appearance; and although the physical problem is solved concerning its accordance with our special senses, there remains the philosophical problem as to whether this appearance need correspond to what in the end is the real thing, viz. that which exists in itself and apart from all perception. The only possible answer is that it need not. We therefore can only know appearances and not reality; in other words, we cannot have knowledge proper. At the same time, our knowledge of appearances is objective to the extent that the appearances in question are the same for every one, and for us on various occasions; for the effects due to special positions of our senses have been removed. If, therefore, we return to the physical distinction, we see that the 'things' to which it refers are only a special kind of appearance, viz. that which is the same for every one, and for us at all times. The physical distinction, then, being a distinction between one kind of appearance and another, falls within 'phenomena' or 'appearances'.

Now the obvious objection to this line of thought is that the result of the second or metaphysical application of the distinction between reality and appearance is to destroy or annul the first or physical application of it. To oppose the rain, i. e. the raindrops as the thing in itself to the rainbow as a mere appearance is to imply that the rain is not an appearance. For though what is opposed to a mere appearance may still be an appearance, it cannot be called an appearance at all if it be described as the thing in itself. If it be only another appearance, it is the same in principle as that to which it is opposed, and consequently cannot be opposed to it. Thus, if Kant means by the rain, in distinction from the rainbow, the appearance when, as we say, we see the circular raindrops, the title of this appearance to the term thing in itself is no better than that of the rainbow; it is, in fact, if anything, worse, for the appearance is actual only under exceptional circumstances. We may never see the raindrops thus, or in Kant's language, have this 'appearance'; and therefore, in general, an appearance of this kind is not actual but only possible. The truth is that we can only distinguish something as the thing in itself from an appearance, so long as we mean by the thing in itself what Kant normally means by it, viz. something which exists independently of perception and is not an appearance at all.[34] That of which Kant is really thinking, and which he calls the appearance which is the thing, in distinction from a mere appearance, is not an appearance; on the contrary, it is the raindrops themselves, which he describes as circular and as falling through space, and which, as circular and falling, must exist and have these characteristics in themselves apart from a percipient. Kant's formula for an empirical thing, i. e. a thing which is an appearance, viz. 'that which in universal experience and under all different positions with regard to the senses is in perception so and so determined', is merely an attempt to achieve the impossible, viz. to combine in one the characteristics of a thing and an appearance. While the reference to perception and to position with regard to the senses implies that what is being defined is an appearance, the reference to universal experience, to all positions with regard to the senses, and to that which is so and so determined implies that it is a thing. But, plainly, mention of position with regard to the senses, if introduced at all, should refer to the differences in perception due to the different position of the object in particular cases. There is nothing of which it can be said that we perceive it in the same way or that it looks the same from all positions. When Kant speaks of that which under all different positions with regard to the senses is so and so determined, he is really referring to something in the consideration of which all reference to the senses has been discarded; it is what should be described as that which in reality and apart from all positions with regard to the senses is so and so determined; and this, as such, cannot be an appearance. Again, the qualification of 'is so and so determined' by 'in perception' is merely an attempt to treat as relative to perception, and so as an appearance, what is essentially independent of perception.[35] Kant, no doubt, is thinking of a real presupposition of the process by which we distinguish between the real and the apparent qualities of bodies, i. e. between what they are and what they appear. We presuppose that that quality is really, and not only apparently, a quality of a body, which we and every one, judging from what it looks under various conditions (i. e. 'in universal experience'), must believe it to possess in itself and independently of all perception. His mistake is that in formulating this presupposition he treats as an appearance, and so as relative to perception, just that which is being distinguished from what, as an appearance, is relative to perception.

Underlying the mistake is the identification of perception with judgement. Our apprehension of what things are is essentially a matter of thought or judgement, and not of perception. We do not perceive[36] but think a thing as it is. It is true that we can follow Kant's language so far as to say that our judgement that the portion of the great circle joining two points on the surface of a sphere is the shortest way between them via the surface belongs essentially to the thinking faculty of every intelligent being, and also that it is valid for all intelligences, in the sense that they must all hold it to be true; and we can contrast this judgement with a perception of the portion of the great circle as something which, though it cannot be said to be invalid, still differs for different beings according to the position from which they perceive it. Kant, however, treats the judgement as a perception; for if we apply his general assertion to this instance, we find him saying that what we judge the portion of the great circle to be essentially belongs to the perception of it, and is valid for the sensuous faculty of every human being, and that thereby it can be distinguished from what belongs to the same perception of a great circle accidentally, e. g. its apparent colour, which is valid only for a particular organization of this or that sense.[37] In this way he correlates what the great circle really is, as well as what it looks, with perception, and so is able to speak of what it is for perception. But, in fact, what the great circle is, is correlated with thought, and not with perception; and if we raise Kant's transcendental problem in reference not to perception but to thought, it cannot be solved in Kant's agnostic manner. For it is a presupposition of thinking that things are in themselves what we think them to be; and from the nature of the case a presupposition of thinking not only cannot be rightly questioned, but cannot be questioned at all.

FOOTNOTES

[1] B. 37, M. 23.

[2] Similarly, we do not say—if we mean what we say—of a man who is colour blind that an object which others call blue is pink to him or to his perception, but that it looks pink to him.

[3] B. 44, 52, 53-4, 62-3, 69-70; M. 27, 31-2, 37-8, 41-2; Prol., § 13, Remark iii.

[4] This is Kant's way of putting the question which should be expressed by asking, 'Are things spatial, or do they only look spatial?'