(2) the possible but not actual (possibility, nonexistence);
(3) the actual but not necessary (existence, contingence);
(4) the necessary (necessity).
But since it must, in the end, be conceded that all fact is necessary, it is impossible to admit the reality of the conception of the possible but not actual, and of the actual but not necessary. There remain, therefore, only the conceptions of the necessary and of the impossible. In fact, however, the distinctions between the assertoric, the problematic, and the apodeictical judgement relate to our attitude to reality and not to reality, and therefore involve no different conceptions relating to reality. It must, therefore, be admitted that the 'metaphysical' deduction of the categories breaks down doubly. Judgement, as Kant describes it, does not involve the forms of judgement borrowed from Formal Logic as its essential differentiations; and these forms of judgement do not involve the categories.
FOOTNOTES
[1] B. 20, M. 13.
[2] pp. 23-5.
[3] Cf. p. 24, note 1.
[4] Cf. p. 24, notes 2 and 3.
[5] E. g. the conception of 'cause and effect', and the law that 'all changes take place according to the law of the connexion between cause and effect'.