[6] Gesetzt.
[7] B. 121-3, M. 75-6.
[8] B. 120-1, M. 73-4.
[9] Cf. B. 137-8, M. 85, and B. 160 note, M. 98 note.
[10] B. 91-105, M. 56-63.
[11] B. 92-4, M. 56-7.
[12] B. 74-6, M. 45-6.
[13] Kant, in illustrating the nature of a judgement, evades the difficulty occasioned by his account of perception, by illustrating a 'perception' by the 'conception of body', and 'objects' by 'certain phenomena'. He thereby covertly substitutes the relation of universal and individual for the relation of an appearance and the object which causes it.
[14] It is not Kant's general account of judgement given in this passage, but the account of perception incompatible with it, which leads him to confine his illustrations to universal judgements.
[15] We may note three minor points. (1) Kant's definition of function as 'the unity of the act of arranging [i. e. the act which produces unity by arranging] different representations under a common representation' has no justification in its immediate context, and is occasioned solely by the forthcoming description of judgement. (2) Kant has no right to distinguish the activity which originates conceptions, or upon which they depend, from the activity which uses conceptions, viz. judgement. For the act of arranging diverse representations under a common representation which originates conceptions is the act of judgement as Kant describes it. (3) It is wholly artificial to speak of judgement as 'the representation of a representation of an object'.