[16] B. 95, M. 58.
[17] To this failure in Kant's argument is due the difficulty in following his transition from 'function' to 'functions' of judgements. The judgement, as Kant describes it, always does one and the same thing; it unifies particulars by bringing them under a universal. This activity does not admit of differentiation.
[18] Moreover, the forms of judgement clearly lack the systematic character which Kant claims for them. Even if it be allowed that the subdivisions within the four main heads of quantity, quality, relation, and modality are based upon single principles of division, it cannot be said that the four heads themselves originate from a common principle.
[19] In the case of the third division, the plurality unified will be two prior judgements.
[20] It may be noted that the account cannot be merely inappropriate to the general problem, if it be incompatible with that assumed by Formal Logic.
[21] This expectation is confirmed by Kant's view that judgement introduces unity into a plurality by means of a conception. This view leads us to expect that different forms of judgement—if there be any—will be distinguished by the different conceptions through which they unify the plurality; for it will naturally be the different conceptions involved which are responsible for the different kinds of unity effected.
[22] B. 106, M. 64.
[23] B. 102-5, M. 62-3.
[24] Cf. p. 166.
[25] B. 102-5, M. 62-3.