[85] Cf. p. 177, note 2, and p. 185.
[86] Cf. pp. 215-17.
[87] Cf. pp. 181-2.
[88] Cf. p. 217.
[89] Erkenntnisse here is clearly used as a synonym for representations. Cf. A. 104, Mah. 199.
[90] B. 140-2, M. 86-8; cf. Prol., §§ 18-20.
[91] Cf. Caird, i. 348-9 note.
[92] We may notice in passing that this passage renders explicit the extreme difficulty of Kant's view that 'the objective unity of apperception' is the unity of the parts of nature or of the physical world. How can the 'very same representations' stand at once in the subjective relation of association and in the objective relation which consists in their being related as parts of nature? There is plainly involved a transition from representation, in the sense of the apprehension of something, to representation, in the sense of something apprehended. It is objects apprehended which are objectively related; it is our apprehensions of objects which are associated, cf. pp. 233 and 281-2. Current psychology seems to share Kant's mistake in its doctrine of association of ideas, by treating the elements associated, which are really apprehensions of objects, as if they were objects apprehended.
[93] Cf. A. 112, Mah. 204; B. 162, M. 99.
[94] A. 125, Mah. 214.