[75] The same is true of A. 116 and A. 117 note, Mah. 208, where Kant also appears to be offering what he considers to be an argument.
[76] §§ 5-11.
[77] Cf. B. 138 fin.-139 init., M. 85 fin.
[78] B. 139 init., M. 85 fin. also assumes that it is impossible for a mind to be a unity without being able to be conscious of its unity.
[79] It is in consequence of this that the statement that 'a manifold of representations belongs to me' means, with the probable exception of § 1, not, 'I am aware of A, I am aware of B, I am aware of C,' but, 'I am aware, in one act of awareness, of A B C as related' (= ABC are 'connected in' or 'belong to' one consciousness). Cf. §§ 4, 8 ('in one consciousness'), 9, 10 ('in one consciousness'), and A. 116, Mah. 208 ('These representations only represent anything in me by belonging with all the rest to one consciousness [accepting Erdmann's emendation mit allen anderen], in which at any rate they can be connected').
[80] The above criticism of Kant's thought has not implied that it may not be true that a knowing mind is, as such, capable of being aware of its own unity; the argument has only been that Kant's proof is unsuccessful.
[81] Cf. p. 198.
[82] A. 111, Mah. 204. Cf. A. 119, Mah. 210.
[83] A. 112, Mah. 204.
[84] Cf. p. 161.