[65] I. e. consciousness of our identity is final; we cannot, for instance, go further back to a consciousness of the consciousness of our identity.
[66] I understand this to mean 'This through and through identical consciousness of myself as the identical subject of a manifold given in perception involves a synthesis of representations'.
[67] The drift of the passage as a whole (cf. especially § 16) seems to show that here 'the synthesis of representations' means 'their connectedness' and not 'the act of connecting them'.
[68] B. 131-5, M. 81-4.
[69] Cf. p. 204, note 3.
[70] More accurately, 'of the possibility of the connectedness'.
[71] The same view seems implied A. 117-8, Mah. 208. Kant apparently thinks of this consciousness as also a self-consciousness (cf. § 9), though it seems that he should have considered it rather as a condition of self-consciousness, cf. p. 204, note 2.
[72] Sections 6 and 10.
[73] Cf. pp. 202-3.
[74] A third alternative is to understand Kant to be thinking of all thought as self-conscious, i. e. as thinking accompanied by the consciousness of thinking. But since in that case Kant would be arguing from thinking as thinking, i. e. as apprehending objects, the possibility of self-consciousness would only be glaringly assumed.