From subsequent enquiry it was elicited that the Rabia Khel had been joined in this outbreak by the Mamuzai, Sheikhans and Mishtis, and the temporary success of the movement at once swelled the numbers of the enemy, until it was computed that many thousand men were under arms; these included not only all the Orakzais of the Khanki Valley, but a certain number of Afridis under one Mir Bashar, a Malikdin Khel, who, during the Afghan War, had assumed the title of “King of Tirah,” and had received a pension from the Amir. Mir Bashar was reported to be preaching a jehad, aided by Aka Khel and Mamuzai mullahs. It seemed evident that the work commenced on the Samana posts, and on the roads connecting them, had aroused the suspicions of all the Orakzais, and enlisted the sympathies of many of the more fanatical of the Afridis. Both from the Kohat and the Khyber side proclamations were issued, assuring the tribesmen that we had no designs on their independence, and that the posts on the Samana were being erected purely as a defensive measure against the Rabia Khel; but in view of the threatening state of affairs in the district troops were at once pushed up to Kohat, Darband and Baliamin. The tribesmen now forthwith commenced hostilities; on the 8th April they attacked a small party of the 1st Punjab Infantry at Hangu, and two days later a lashkar of about 1000 men attacked our camp at Darband, but was beaten off without loss to us. On this date a reply was received to the proclamation above mentioned, demanding our abandonment of the Samana and the release of certain notoriously troublesome characters then in our custody.
Second Miranzai Expedition
Second Miranzai Expedition, 1891.—The troops detailed for this, the second, Miranzai Expedition, consisted of six squadrons of cavalry, fifteen mountain and three heavy guns, one company of Bengal Sappers, and ten and a half battalions of infantry (one and a half British), and were divided into three columns, concentrating the one at Hangu, the other two at Darband. The whole numbered something under 8000 men, and Sir William Lockhart was again in command.
The enemy—Mishtis, Sheikhans, Mamuzais, and Rabia Khel—were reported to be on the Samana to the number of about a thousand men, while several thousand others were in support in the Khanki Valley.
The advance was made on the 17th April, No. 1 Column moving up on to the Samana, reaching Lakka without opposition, and assaulting and carrying Tsalai, Gogra and Sangar in succession, and with only trifling loss. Meanwhile Nos. 2 and 3 Columns left Darband, No. 2 advancing to the Darband Kotal, and thence, with some opposition, to Gwada, and No. 3 from Darband to Sangar, where it joined No. 1 Column. On the 18th No. 2 remained halted, while Nos. 1 and 3 attacked Sartop, and cleared and held the plateau between it and Gulistan—at the western end of the range—leaving No. 3 Column there in position. Next day No. 2 moved up to Sangar, joining there the first column; and throughout the whole of this day and the greater part of the 20th, No. 3 Column was fired upon from three sides. Having been reinforced after midday on the 20th, No. 3 Column moved out, attacked and captured Saragarhi and Gustang, whence most of the fire was proceeding, burnt these villages and drove the Orakzais off the mountain down into the Khanki Valley. On the 22nd No. 2 Column advanced to the extreme western end of the Samana, overlooking the Chagru Valley, where a large assemblage of armed men was visible. On these moving forward in a threatening manner they were attacked and driven back, as was also another body some 1500 strong, advancing from the Khanki Valley, and the British force retired to camp practically unmolested, although our picquets were threatened later on in the evening. On the same day another column had attacked and destroyed several villages of the Rabia Khel, experiencing but slight opposition. Tribesmen again collecting in large numbers on the 23rd, No. 2 Column moved out in full strength, dispersed them and then burnt the village of Tsalai, where they appeared to have rendezvoused. From the 24th to 29th jirgahs began to come in with offers of submission; and while negotiations were in progress, the General Officer commanding took the opportunity of visiting the Sheikhans and of levelling their towers.
By the beginning of May most of the opposing divisions had come in and had submitted, but were told that all stolen government property must be restored before negotiations could really be opened. With the Rabia Khel, Akhel and Sheikhan, matters were speedily settled, but it was felt that a special punishment must be meted out to the Mishtis, who had been equally troublesome with the others, but whose villages, lying at a considerable distance from our frontier, had not suffered to anything like the same extent as those of other tribesmen, who had taken a no more prominent part in the recent disturbances. It was, therefore, decided to destroy the towers of the large villages about Kandi Mishti, in the Khanki Valley, and lying at the foot of the Sampagha Pass. Sir William Lockhart, then, taking No. 2 Column, marched from Gulistan on the Samana by the Tsalai Spur and the Chagru Kotal to Kharappa, blew up three of the Kandi Mishti towers in the presence of the jirgahs, and from Kharappa marched through the country of some of the more westerly clans, sections of which had been concerned in the risings, and who had hitherto imagined that their position rendered them inaccessible. The Khanki Valley was, therefore, traversed from end to end, and the Kharmana Valley was overlooked and overawed.
Occupation of the Samana
The result of these operations was that all the clans concerned agreed to our occupation of the Samana; adequate punishment had been dealt out to offenders; practically the whole of the Orakzai country had now been traversed by our troops; and for the next six years this part of the border was at peace.
Our casualties in this expedition amounted to twenty-eight killed and seventy-three wounded.
From the date of the conclusion of these operations up to the general “Pathan Revolt” of 1897, the behaviour of the Orakzais as a tribe may almost be described as irreproachable—although, of course, isolated cases of misbehaviour were not uncommon. It was known, too, that our actual presence in occupation of posts on the Samana Range rankled in the minds of the tribesmen. Although the crest of the Samana had for more than thirty years been acknowledged as our boundary, and had been assessed as such, the outward and visible sign of our occupation appeared to be a source of continual offence, and early in 1892 a deputation of the Orakzais asked the assistance of the Amir of Afghanistan in inducing us to abandon the range. The Amir, however, very properly replied that he did not see his way to take any action in the matter.