From the Black Mountain to Waziristan / Being an account of the border countries and the more turbulent of the tribes controlled by the north-west frontier province, and of our military relations with them in the past

by H. C. Wylly

In May 1897 the Orakzais appear, in conjunction with the Afridis, to have again solicited the intervention of the Amir, and it was felt that the situation on the frontier generally, and particularly on this section of it, was becoming serious. The actual causes which may be said to have led to the outbreak along four hundred miles of border have been given at more length in Chapter XIII., and it is not proposed here to recapitulate them; it is sufficient to state that the first definite news of unrest amongst the Afridis and Orakzais was contained in a telegram from the Deputy-Commissioner of Kohat, stating that the Mullah Saiyid Akbar, Aka Khel, had succeeded in persuading the Orakzais to unite against the British Government, and was in Tirah trying to persuade the Afridis to do the same. This information appears, however, to have been discredited by the Commissioner of Peshawar (Sir Richard Udny), even when followed by another telegram from Kohat announcing the actual assembly of hostile tribesmen; and all that was done—so far as precautionary measures against the Orakzais were concerned—was the reinforcement of Kohat on 20th August by a force of the three arms—the 9th Field Battery, 18th Bengal Lancers, and 15th Sikhs.

Beginning of Trouble

Information was now received that the tribal jirgahs had decided that, of the Orakzais, the Massuzais, assisted by the Chamkannis, should move against the Kurram, the Daulatzais against Kohat, and the remainder of the tribe against the forts on the Samana; whereupon the following measures were taken for the security of the district generally by Major-General Yeatman-Biggs, who had now, on the 21st August, assumed command of the troops on the Kohat-Kurram border.

A flying column—four mountain guns, six squadrons cavalry, and one battalion infantry, under Colonel Richardson—was formed for action in the Kurram, and moved out to Hangu; Kohat was reinforced by the 3rd Gurkhas and four companies Royal Scots Fusiliers, while rifles were issued to friendly villagers on the border. On the 25th Colonel Richardson was able to put supplies and ammunition, bringing up the number of rounds per rifle to 400, into the Samana posts; and that this was accomplished none too soon was made clear by the news which now came in, that 12,000 tribesmen were concentrating at Kharappa in the Khanki Valley—chiefly Ali Khels, Malla Khels, and the Alisherzai and Mamuzai divisions of the Lashkarzai. So far it was reported that neither Mishtis nor Akhels (Ismailzai) had joined the gathering, but at the same time their headmen sent in to say that public opinion and tribal pressure would oblige them, sooner or later, to take the field also. A force, composed of fighting men from all three divisions of the Daulatzai, had occupied the Ublan Pass, whence they sent into Kohat a statement of the terms upon which they would be willing to vacate it and disperse; and in the Kurram Valley, too, matters looked threatening, and anxiety was felt in regard to the posts at Sadda and Parachinar, which could not be relieved from Hangu until some, at least, of the Orakzai lashkars had been driven off.

The Orakzais now themselves began to take the offensive. The Daulatzais descended from the Ublan Pass and attacked and captured the old police post, held by twenty-five border police, at Muhammadzai. Against them the Major-General moved out on the 27th August with a field battery, a squadron, two companies Royal Scots Fusiliers, and 487 rifles of the 2nd Punjab Infantry, drove the enemy from the pass and towards the Bara Valley. Our casualties were only two killed and nine wounded, but the heat was intense, twenty British soldiers were prostrated with sunstroke, of whom one died, and eighty-six of the Fusiliers had to be carried back to Kohat in ambulance tongas.

On the same day the Orakzais had been active all along the Samana Range. The levy-posts at Lakka and Saifaldara, further west, had been surrounded and attacked, but Colonel Richardson sent out a force under Lieutenant-Colonel Abbott (two mountain guns, half a squadron of cavalry, one and a half battalions), and the garrisons were successfully relieved and withdrawn, the posts being burnt by the enemy the same evening. The eastern end of the Samana about Gulistan was threatened by large gatherings; the border police post at Shinawari was attacked three nights running, and finally captured and destroyed on the night of the 28th August; and on the night following the tribesmen, intoxicated with their success, raided down into the valley south of Shinawari, plundered Mariab and Kai, and fired into the camp at Hangu.

Orakzai Raids

By this time, however, troops had been pushed up to Kohat from Rawal Pindi, and from Peshawar through the Kohat Pass, and the advanced force at Hangu had now been strengthened. Lieutenant-Colonel Abbott was sent on from Hangu to Doaba, twenty-two miles further west, with two mountain guns, a squadron of cavalry, the 15th Sikhs, and half a company Bombay Sappers; and on the 31st Major-General Yeatman-Biggs left Kohat for Hangu, and formed the troops there into two brigades. One of these, now commanded by Colonel Richardson, was ordered to proceed at once to the relief of the posts at Sadda and Parachinar—distant seventy and ninety-two miles respectively—which expected to be attacked in force on the 3rd September. The rapid advance of this brigade—Sadda was reached on the night of the 3rd—staved off actual attack; but Thal had been fired into, Torawari post had been burnt, while Balish Khel, a post on the border three miles from Sadda, had been fiercely attacked, and its defence by twenty men of the Kurram Militia, under an Afridi havildar, was particularly fine. Its relief was effected by the arrival of some fifty armed Turi villagers from Sadda, and 200 militia from Hasan Ali. With the appearance in the neighbourhood of Colonel Richardson’s brigade, matters quieted down for a time, but on the 16th a determined attack was made upon the camp about 10.30 p.m. by 2000 of the Massuzais, who were not finally beaten off until 1 a.m.

While these operations were in progress in the Kurram desperate fighting had taken place on the Samana.

The posts of Lakka and Saifaldara, at the western end of the range, had, as we have seen, been abandoned, and thereupon destroyed, and in addition two other small police posts, Gogra and Tsalai, had been evacuated and burnt. There remained on the hill two large posts—Fort Lockhart, on the centre of the range, and Gulistan (Fort Cavagnari), at the western end overlooking the Chagru Kotal—and several smaller ones—Saraghari, the Crag Picquet, the Sangar Picquet, Sartop and Dhar. Each of the two larger posts was capable of accommodating two companies, though at Gulistan one company had to be placed in a small hornwork to the west, while the smaller posts could hold from twenty-five to fifty rifles. Of these small posts, Saraghari was by reason of its situation the most important, being on high ground and in signalling communication with the different posts on the range.