On the nights of the 3rd and 4th September Gulistan was attacked in force, and the enemy came on so determinedly that they succeeded in setting fire to the abatis outside the hornwork, but the fire was extinguished by volunteers rushing out from the fort. In these attacks the Orakzais lost so heavily that they withdrew entirely from the Samana for some days, and indeed made up their minds to leave the posts alone unless the Afridis should come to their assistance. Raids continued, however, but as the Tirah Expeditionary Force was now being assembled, Government refused to permit of any reprisals against the Orakzais on a large scale; but the Mishtis, who were easily accessible in the Lower Khanki Valley, were proceeded against, several of their fortified villages being destroyed by a small column sent out from Hangu.
The Samana Forts
Between the 7th and 12th September Major-General Yeatman-Biggs was able to throw a month’s supplies into the Samana forts, and on the last-named date his column came in contact with the combined force of the enemy, estimated at a total of 10,000 men, for the Afridis had now thrown in their lot with the Orakzais. As the column was, however, short both of water and supplies, it was unable to remain on the hill, and was forced to descend to Hangu, when the whole strength of the tribesmen was pitted against the Samana forts, held by the 36th Sikhs, distributed as follows:
| Fort Lockhart (Headquarters), | 168, | and 2 British officers. |
| Crag Picquet, | 22. | |
| Sartop, | 21. | |
| Sangar, | 44. | |
| Dhar, | 38. | |
| Saraghari, | 21. | |
| Gulistan, | 175, | and 4 British officers. |
On the night of the 11–12th September the post of Sangar was first attacked, but being well situated and with no cover in the vicinity, the enemy were repulsed without serious difficulty. They then, on the morning of the 12th, vigorously assailed Saraghari, one of the smallest posts in regard to garrison, and being further weakly constructed and badly placed for prolonged resistance to overwhelming numbers. The whole course of the attack could be seen from both Fort Lockhart and Gulistan, whence no effective assistance could be rendered, for these garrisons were themselves small, the villages between Fort Lockhart and Saraghari were full of the enemy, and Gulistan was itself being vigorously attacked. None the less two attempts were made from Fort Lockhart to effect relief, but they were unsuccessful. During one of the rushes upon the post, some men established themselves under the wall where there was a dead angle, and managed there to effect a breach, when the enemy rushed in in overwhelming numbers, and the garrison, fighting manfully to the last, were killed to a man. The twenty-one heroes had, however, inflicted heavy loss upon the enemy, who owned to a death-roll of 180; the last of the Sikhs killed twenty men before he was overpowered. Truly of these twenty-one men of the 36th Sikhs may be said, as was recorded of the Guides at Kabul: “By their deeds they have conferred undying honour, not only on the regiment to which they belong, but on the whole British Army.”
Gulistan had been closely invested since noon, all was over at Saraghari by 4 p.m., and the tribesmen now put out their whole strength against the first-named post. The attack was pressed throughout the whole of the night, a hot fire being maintained upon the post from the closest quarters. When the morning of the 13th dawned the enemy were found to be entrenched within twenty yards of the walls, but the Sikhs under Major Des Vœux, not only maintained their ground throughout the day and the night that followed, but carried out two most successful sorties, capturing three standards and striking terror into the tribesmen as much as they heartened themselves.
Relief of Gulistan
At midnight on the 13th General Yeatman-Biggs had moved out from Hangu with a relieving force.[[131]] Advancing up the Samana via Lakka, the column met and drove off a body of the enemy, estimated at 4000, holding Gogra hill and the ruined Tsalai post; and, continuing its progress, put to a hurried flight into the Khanki Valley a second force, numbering several thousand, entrenched on the Saraghari ridge. Continuing westward, Gulistan was seen to be surrounded by swarms of tribesmen, but, declining attack, these also drew off hurriedly into the Khanki Valley, and by 1 p.m. Gulistan was relieved. Our losses were: Saraghari, twenty-one killed; Gulistan, two killed, thirty-nine wounded; relieving force, one killed, six wounded; while the total losses of the enemy on the Samana were found later to have amounted to about 400 killed and 600 seriously wounded.
The subsequent operations of this year, wherein the Orakzais were concerned, will be found described in Chapter XIII., “Afridis: operations,” and in Chapter XVI., “Chamkannis,” but the moral effect of the heavy losses incurred in the attacks on the Samana forts was undoubtedly responsible for the feeble character of the resistance thereafter offered to us by the Orakzais, and for the readiness they evinced in coming to terms, and making a complete and unconditional submission.
Since 1897 the Orakzais, as a tribe, have given us no trouble.