The force was again divided into three columns, which were now, however, somewhat differently constituted—the First to act against Mangal Thana, the Second to proceed as a support to Panjtar, the Third remaining in reserve at Salim Khan. On the 28th April the First Column left camp while it was moonlight; the ascent of the hills was found to be very difficult, and it was necessary to leave half the column at Dukarai. No opposition was, however, met with, and Mangal Thana was found to be abandoned.

Mangal Thana consisted of two villages, one above the other, the upper containing the citadel of the leader of the fanatics with enclosures for his followers, and the whole surrounded by strong fortifications of stones and timber. The position was about 5000 feet above sea-level, and the neighbourhood was densely wooded. The troops bivouacked here for the night, blew up the fort next day, and returned on the 30th to camp at Salim Khan.

Operations against the Fanatics

The colony of fanatics at Sitana had now to be dealt with, and accordingly, on the 2nd May, the force marched to Khabal, about four miles from Sitana. Between Amb, on the right bank of the Indus, and our frontier village of Topi, is a narrow strip of land forming part of the Utmanzai territory. It contains, in addition to the two or three small hamlets of Topi, the villages of Upper and Lower Khabal (exactly opposite Torbela), Upper and Lower Kai, and Lower Sitana, Mandi and Upper Sitana. The Utmanzais of this strip had, previous to this date, had feuds with the Saiyids and Hindustanis of Sitana, and consequently welcomed our troops as allies against a common foe.

Early on the 4th May a force of five guns and 1050 rifles was sent to the left bank of the Indus, and advanced against the villages from the east; the main column moved against them from the south; while the men of our ally, the Nawab of Amb, occupied the hills to the north. On approaching Lower Sitana, two regiments were detached to move up the mountain in rear, the position was attacked in front, and the enemy were driven with considerable loss to their second position. Here they were met by one of the regiments coming up in their rear, and driven back on the bayonets of the troops in front. Hand-to-hand fighting now ensued until every Hindustani in the position was either killed or captured. Some Gadun allies of the fanatics made no stand, retiring precipitately. The enemy’s position having been carried at all points and their villages destroyed, the force retired, being closely followed up. This was the first time the Enfield rifle had been used against the tribesmen, and the effectiveness of its fire made a great impression. Our losses had been six killed and twenty-nine wounded.

That night the force encamped on the Sitana Plain by the Indus bank, whence it proceeded next day to Khabal.

The Hindustanis, expelled from Sitana by the Utmanzais, had taken refuge with the Upper Gaduns, and to prevent the Utmanzais being compelled, on our retirement, to readmit them, the Gadun villages immediately on the Yusafzai border were surrounded by our troops, and coercive measures were threatened. This had an immediate effect, the Upper and Lower Gaduns sending in their representatives and binding themselves, equally with the Utmanzais, to expel and keep out the Saiyids and Hindustanis, and to resist any other tribe which should try to readmit them.

The force then marched back to Nowshera, where it was broken up.

The Gaduns Troublesome

The Hindustani fanatics, now ejected from Sitana, settled at Malka, on the north side of the Mahaban Mountain, but in 1861 they came down to a place called Siri, close to their old haunts, and began abducting Hindu traders from across the Hazara border. The only way whereby it seemed possible to check these crimes was to punish the tribes which allowed these robbers passage through their territories. The Utmanzais and Gaduns were accordingly placed under blockade, and towards the end of 1861 these came in, made submission, and again agreed to exclude the Hindustanis. For a brief period the kidnapping ceased; then in the spring of 1863 came reports of two murders, followed in the summer by the news that the Hindustanis had suddenly reoccupied Sitana. Not only had the tribes above mentioned done nothing to prevent this, according to agreement, but some of the tribesmen had actually invited this occupation. A blockade of the Gaduns and Utmanzais was therefore reimposed, and a large number of troops and levies were disposed on either bank of the Indus, while the 101st Fusiliers were ordered up to Hazara.