The Hindustanis were now showing a very bitter spirit against the British Government, their leaders were preaching something of a jehad, and attacks on our posts and villages were now projected or undertaken. On the night of the 3rd September a party of Hindustanis attempted to attack the camp of the Guides engaged on blockade duty at Topi, but were driven off in panic; the Hassanzais, instigated by the Maulvi of Sitana, made an unprovoked attack upon and destroyed several outlying villages in Amb territory; later the same clan threatened Chamberi, and attacked and killed several of the Amb levies on the Black Mountain. By this time it seemed clear that most of the Hazara tribes had now thrown in their lot against the British, and an expedition against them appeared inevitable; it was therefore decided that the force employed should be a large one, and that Brigadier-General Sir Neville Chamberlain should command it.

Two columns were to be employed, the one operating from the Peshawar Valley, the other from Hazara, and the movements proposed for each were as under: the Peshawar Column was to assemble at Nawa Kala and Swabi, with the apparent intention of moving on Mangal Thana, but when ready to move was to march through the Ambela Pass, occupy Koga in the Chamla Valley, and thence march on Sitana by Chirori; the Hazara Column remaining stationary at Darband to overawe the riverain tribes and protect the Hazara border. Additional troops were detailed to hold the line of the Indus, Hazara and Yusafzai at Darband, Torbela, Topi, Abbottabad, Rustam Bazar and Mardan. Hostilities were not anticipated from the Bunerwals, with whom we had no quarrel, and who were known to have no sympathy with the Hindustanis; but it was unfortunate that the absolute necessity for keeping the line of operations secret prevented the Bunerwals being informed that their frontier would be approached by our troops. Consequently they not unnaturally believed that an invasion of their country was intended, and eventually joined the coalition against us.

Ambela Expedition

Ambela Expedition, 1863.—The preliminary arrangements for the expedition appear to have suffered to no inconsiderable extent from the fact that, in order not to alarm the frontier tribes, General Chamberlain had been asked not to join his command until the last moment. On the 19th October he wrote to his brother: “I never before had such trouble or things in so unsatisfactory a state. Carriage, supplies, grain-bags, all deficient. Some of our guns and the five and a half inch mortars have to be sent back as useless, after having taken the pick of men and animals to equip a half-inch battery of R.A. Our 1st L.F. batteries have to be stripped to make the Half Battery R.A. efficient.”[[41]]

General Chamberlain reached Swabi on the 13th October, and marched on the 18th to the mouth of the Darhan Pass with the following troops:

Peshawar Mountain Train Battery. Hazara Mountain Train Battery.[[42]] 1st Punjab Infantry.[[43]] 5th Gurkhas.

The other troops of the expeditionary force closed up at the same time to Nawa Kala from their camps in rear, and a proclamation was now issued to all the tribes concerned, stating the object of the operations and the reason for following this particular route. Then on the night of the 19th the following troops marched from Nawa Kala and joined at Parmalao the advanced column:

100 sabres, Guides Cavalry. 100 sabres, 11th Bengal Cavalry.[[44]] Guides Infantry. 5th Punjab Infantry. 27th Punjab Native Infantry.[[45]]

The junction effected, the whole moved on, under Colonel Wilde, to the mouth of the Ambela Pass, which was reached at sunrise on the 20th.

On the 20th the pass was entered and traversed, the head of the pass being held by some 250 Bunerwals, who were, however, dislodged without any great difficulty, and Colonel Wilde’s column encamped on and beyond the pass on tolerably open and level ground; he posted picquets to hold the most important points, but was not strong enough to do more. The main column had left Nawa Kala at 1 a.m. on the 20th October, and, after a short halt at Rustam, closed up to the rear of the advanced troops late in the afternoon. Both parties had found the road extraordinarily difficult; the track was tolerably good up to the village of Surkhabi, in our own territory, but thereafter deteriorated, in the pass often lying in the bed of a stream, and in other places being overgrown with jungle. In most parts it was possible to move only in single file; the rear guard did not get beyond Surkhabi; and though the ammunition mules managed, with difficulty, to keep up with their units, not a single baggage animal reached camp during the night of the 20th–21st, and only few had arrived there twenty-four hours later. It had been intended that Colonel Wilde should push forward the few cavalry with him, supported by the other arms, to reconnoitre the road down the further side of the pass and the head of the Chamla Valley, but in view of the difficulties of the road, it was deemed best to postpone any forward movement.